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ProfessorSamuelson casts a criticaleye on the FinalReportof the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) which recommendedthat copyrightprotectionbe extended to machine-readableversions of computerprograms. CONTU
appearsto have misunderstoodcomputer technology andmisinterpreted
copyright tradition in two significant respects. The Commissionfailed
to take into account the historicalimportance of disclosure of the contents ofprotected works as a fundamental goal of both the copyright
andpatent laws. It also erroneously opined that the utilitariancharacter of a work was no bar to its copyrightability when both the statute
and the case law make clear that utilitarian works are not copyrightable. Since computer programs in machine-readableform do not disclose their contents and are inherently utilitarian,copyrightprotection
for them is inappropriate. Congress acted on CONTU's recommendation without understandingthe significance of these conceptualflaws.
Professor Samuelson recommends the creation of a newform of intellectual property law specfically designed for machine-readable
programs.
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INTRODUCTION

Nine years ago, the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) convened to make recommen-

dations to Congress about whether any revisions of the copyright law
were needed to make adequate provision for protection of copyrighted
works used in conjunction with computers and other newly developed

technological devices.' Among the issues the Commission considered
was whether computer programs in machine-readable form were

proper subject matter for copyright. 2 The Commission concluded that
they were, and recommended that Congress amend the copyright law
to provide explicitly that computer programs are within the domain of

copyright.

3

Serious doubts about the wisdom of adopting these recommenda-

tions were raised by several commissioners, chiefly Commissioner John
Hersey, an eminent man of letters,4 and Commissioner Melville Nim-

1. The 93rd Congress authorized establishment of this Commission as a part of the Act of
Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74. Congress gave the Commission
three years to conduct a study and report on computer-related uses and reproductions of copyrighted works and of photocopying practices and technologies. Id See infra notes 117-27 and
accompanying text for more detail on this 1974 legislation. This article will focus only on the
issues raised by that part of CONTU's work that concerned the copyrightability of computer
programs in machine-readable form.
President Ford announced the appointment of the commissioners in mid-July, 1975. The
commissioners held their first meeting in October, 1975, and issued their final report on July 31,
1978. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 3-8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT]; infra notes 133-60 and
accompanying text.
2. This issue was not one which Congress explicitly designated as a subject for CONTU's
study. Nevertheless, it was within the broad scope of the statutory mandate. See Act of Dec. 3 1,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. II, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74. The attention given by the Commission to this topic seems to have been greater than that given to other computer-related issues
that Congress had more explicitly directed CONTU to study. Of the 38 pages in the CONTU
Final Report devoted to computer-related issues, 29 are devoted to the copyrightability of computer programs, while three focus on copyright ownership of computer-generated works, and six
focus on copyright issues related to data bases. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at ch.
III.
3. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
4. See Dissent of Commissioner Hersey, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-37
[hereinafter cited as Hersey Dissent]. Commissioner Rhoda Karpatkin also dissented. Her dissenting statement indicates that she shared Commissioner Hersey's doubts about the advisability
of treating computer programs as copyrightable subject matter, and that Commissioner Dix, who
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mer, the leading scholar of copyright law.5 Dissenting Commissioner
Hersey stated that "forcible wrenching" would be required to fit computer programs in machine-readable form within the copyright framework. Hersey feared that forcing the fit would result in "distortions of

traditional copyright usages" that "must in the long run tend to corrupt
and erode the essential purposes of copyright."'6 Commissioner Nimmer warned that adoption of the Commission's recommendations
might take copyright law "beyond the breaking point," converting
copyright into a general misappropriation law, which he thought un-

wise and possibly unconstitutional. 7 Because of the industry's strong
asserted need for protection, he was willing to go along with the Commission's recommendation; yet he recognized that, in the future, Con-

gress might want to adopt a more limited approach to granting
copyright protection to computer programs, one which would be more
compatible with copyright tradition.8
The Congress apparently was glad to have the issue resolved by a

blue-ribbon commission. It passed without debate in 1980 the amendments to the copyright statute that CONTU had recommended. 9 De-

spite passage of these amendments, several cases raising statutory and
died before the Commission finished its work, shared Hersey's doubts and concerns as well. See
Dissent of Commissioner Karpatkin, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 37-38.
5. Commissioner Nimmer concurred in the majority position, but expressed some substantial doubts about the implications for copyright of extending such protection to computer programs. See Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Nimmer, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note
I, at 26-27 [hereinafter cited as Nimmer Concurrence];infra notes 402-09 and accompanying text.
6. Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 3 1. Specifically, Commissioner Hersey warned that extending copyright protection to computer programs would not, as the Commission apparently
expected, lead to greater disclosure of innovative ideas contained in the programs. Id at 34. See
also infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text. This result was, in Hersey's view, contrary to
established copyright policy. He was also very concerned about extending copyright protection to
something that was essentially a machine-control device. Id at 28-30. See infra notes 337-45 and
accompanying text.
7. Nimmer Concurrence,supra note 5, at 26. See also infra notes 402-04 and accompanying
text.
8. Nimmer Concurrence,supra note 5, at 27. See also infra notes 407-12 and accompanying
text.
9. The copyright amendments proposed by CONTU were added to H.R. 6933, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980), An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, which became Pub. L. No. 96517, 94 Stat. 3007 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). The copyright amendments
can be found in the House bill's section IV, which dealt with miscellaneous items. The amendments were relatively minor, involving only the addition of a definition of "computer program" to
§ 101, the deletion of the interim § 117, and the substitution of a new § 117 to give owners of
copyrighted programs the right to make modifications in them and to make archival copies. See
H.R. 6933, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Although there is considerable legislative history concerning the patent and trademark issues
of this law, very little legislative history focused on the copyright issues. The House Report on the
bill mentions that the bill embodies the CONTU recommendations, but does not discuss the
copyrightability issues. See H.R. REP.No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 at 23 (1980), reprinted
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constitutional questions about whether computer programs in machinereadable form are, or can be, copyrightable subject matter have recently been decided. These cases seem to be of two sorts. The cases
°
that have found machine-readable programs protectible by copyright'

have treated the defendants' arguments against copyrightability as if
the defendants were simply pirates in search of a loophole," as they

seem to have been in most cases.' 2 The opinions in those cases have

tended to be quite brief' 3 and have made little or no effort to place
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482. See also Keplinger, Computer Software-Its
Nature and Protection,30 EMORY L.J. 483, 502 (1981).
10. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983);
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aid, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management
Assistance, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983); GCA Corp. v.
Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524
F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
11. See, e.g., Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D.
Cal. 1981). In interpreting the meaning of § 117, the temporary provision on computer-related
issues in the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 117 (1976) (deleted from 17 U.S.C. in 1980); see supra note 9, the court stated that § 117
"was not intended to provide a loophole by which someone could duplicate a computer program
fixed on a silicon chip." See also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d
Cir. 1982), in which the court said, "We cannot accept defendant's suggestion that would afford an
unlimited loophole by which infringement of a computer program is limited to copying of the
computer program text but not to duplication of a computer program fixed on a silicon chip."
12. In GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982), the defendants were former
employees of the plaintiff who seemed to have availed themselves of the opportunity to copy
almost exactly the plaintiffs computer programs. In Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983), the alleged infringer was
a licensee of the program who broke the encryption code with which the program owner had tried
to protect its work. In Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982),
there was, in the court's view, overwhelming evidence that the Williams videogame program had
been copied; Artic had even copied the coded copyright notice Williams had inserted into its
program. Artic was no stranger to copyright infringement actions involving videogames. It had
been named a defendant in at least one other such action at about the same time. See Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. 11. 1982), aft'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)
(alleged infringement of "PacMan" and "Galaxian" games). Three cases, Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l,
Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), af'a 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), and Tandy Corp. v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1982), involved the copying-with
little or no variation-of operating system programs encoded on disks or silicon memory chips.
See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for an explanation of operating system programs. In
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the defendant was found not to
have copied the audiovisual aspect of a videogame, but nonetheless to have illicitly copied the
computer program underlying the audiovisual work.
13. The copyright portion of the GCA opinion, GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718, 71819 (N.D. Cal. 1982), is about one and one-half pages long. The whole of the Tandy opinion,
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981), is about four
pages long, most of which deals with the proper interpretation of the provisional § 117 in the
Copyright Act of 1976. The Williams Electronics,Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d

DUKE LAW JOURAAL

[Vol. 1984:663

computer programs within the traditions of copyright law.1 4 They have
tended to rely for support on the CONTU report, on the 1980 amendments, on the videogame audiovisual copyright cases, and on one
5
another.1
The courts that have expressed profound doubts about whether
computer programs in machine-readable form can be protected by
copyright law have made strenuous efforts to reconcile such protection
870 (3d Cir. 1982), and Strohon, Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. IlL. 1983),
cases both involved claims of infringement of audiovisual copyrights as well as of computer program copyrights. Although these opinions are nine and thirteen pages, respectively, in length,
only three pages of Williams and four and one-half pages of Midway are devoted to the issues
concerning the copyright in the computer program. The Third Circuit opinion in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), is mostly a reprise of points
made in Williams. Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. ReP.
(CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983), is a longer than average opinion on this subject, but most
of its discussion focuses on the facts of the case and on publication and originality issues, rather
than copyrightability ofcomputer programs per se. The district court opinion in Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 777-84 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aJ'd,725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984), is an exception, devoting seven pages to the copyrightability issue; it acknowledges that
computer programs fit poorly into the copyright framework, but says such arguments should be
made to Congress. 562 F. Supp. at 783. The court of appeals decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), devotes only two pages to the copyrightability
issue.
14. Contrast the careful development of the compatibility of the copyrightability of videogames as audiovisual works and traditional copyright doctrines in such cases as Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afijd,704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) and
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), with
the analysis of the copyrightability of machine-readable versions of programs in any of the cases
cited supra note 10.
15. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981), was
the first of these cases. Although CONTU had by then issued its final report, no mention was
made of the CONTU Final Report or of the videogame cases. Tandy was decided before most of
the videogame audiovisual cases were decided or reported. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 174-75, cites
the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Nimmer treatise, 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 (1983), and distinguishes two prior opinions which were precedent for
the defendant's contentions. Five cases-Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1246-54 (3d Cir. 1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875-77
(3d Cir. 1982); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCI-)
25,529 at 18,105-06 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp.
741, 749-52 (N.D. IlL. 1983); and Apple Computer Corp. v. Formula Int'l, Inc,, 562 F. Supp. 775,
779-85 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)-mention or discuss the CONTU
Report, at least one of the videogame cases, and Tandy or another of the computer program cases,
and also distinguish one or both of the cases cited infra note 16. Apart from this, their reference to
copyright cases or tradition is scant. GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982), is
the barest of all, citing only Tandy and distinguishing Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,
480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I11. 1979), affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). The
videogame audiovisual cases present significantly different copyright issues because protection is
based on the visual and aural characteristics of the programs, not on the machine execution instructions. See infra note 188.
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with traditional copyright doctrine.' 6 In the one opinion of this type
handed down after the 1980 amendments, the court was unconvinced
7
that the statute applied to the particular type of program at issue.'
When these reconciliation efforts have been unsuccessful,' 8 at least two
courts apparently have been willing to let possible pirates go free in
order to preserve essential principles of copyright law. Because one of
these cases was affirmed on other grounds and the other was reversed
on appeal, they have little strength as precedent; yet the issues they
raise cannot be dismissed as lightly as the cases disputing their conclusions on copyright seem to indicate.
16. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063
(N.D. Ill. 1979), af'don other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). An interesting thing to note
about JS&A is that neither of the parties to the action briefed or argued the issue of the
copyrightability of the machine-readable version of the program; the district court raised the issue
sua sponte and decided the case on that ground, denying copyright protection to the program
encoded on a chip. See JS&4, 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69. The Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary
to reach this issue and explicitly stated that it expressed no opinion on the subject. JS&A, 628
F.2d at 1041. While some have wondered whether the Seventh Circuit impliedly rejected the
district court's view by deciding that the plaintiff had foregone copyright protection by publishing
the encoded version of its program without copyright notice, see, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982), there is no reason not to take the Seventh Circuit at its
word. When faced with a choice between a clear basis for a decision and an uncertain basis, either
of which is dispositive, courts tend to opt for the former over the latter.
17. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
rep"d, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), involved an operating system rather than software of the sort
to which the CONTU Report refers. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text, regarding
operating systems, and infra notes 362-99 and accompanying text, regarding the copyright law
implications of a distinction based on the difference between operating-system and application
programs.
18. In Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
afdon other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), the court could not reconcile copyright for
the program with copyright tradition because the computer program became part of the mechanical functioning of the computer. Moreover, the court was not convinced that the machine-readable version of a program could be a "writing" in the constitutional sense or a "copy" within the
statutory definition of that term under the 1909 Copyright Act, lacking, as the encoded program
did, communicability with the human user. Id at 1068-69. These same issues and others--such
as the inseparability of idea and expression in a program, the utilitarian character of the particular
type of program in machine-readable form that the case involved, and the apparent conflict between copyright and patent law with respect to the type of program the case involved--disturbed
the district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 820-25
(E.D. Pa. 1982), rep'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). While not holding that operating system
programs were not copyrightable subject matter, the Franklin Computer district court declined to
issue the preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiff on the ground that reasonable
probability of success on the merits had not been established. Id at 825.
That a pirate may go free is one of the costs of enforcing the copyright law within its traditional and constitutional bounds. As the Seventh Circuit said in JS&.4, 628 F.2d at 1044, with
respect to a question of statutory interpretation, "[wle cannot award the defendants any accolades
for their ethics, but this is not the statutory standard."
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The cases-both those which favor and those which disfavor copy-

right as a form of protection for computer programs-raise a number
of serious questions. They raise questions of the constitutionality of
extending copyright protection to machine-readable forms of programs.' 9 They raise statutory questions concerning whether certain
kinds of programs were intended to be covered by the law.2 0 And they

raise serious questions about whether CONTU was correct in concluding that copyright is an appropriate form of protection for computer
programs in machine-readable form. 2t Congress, when it implemented
the CONTU recommendation, did not understand the extent to which
fundamental principles of copyright would be undermined by this

action.
Doubts about the appropriateness of copyright as a form of legal
22
protection for computer programs have also surfaced in other areas.
Professor Ralph Brown, a respected copyright scholar, has recently
said: "Nothing has challenged the patent and copyright laws like this
issue. . . . It raises the question of whether we need a whole new sys-

tem just to deal with computer chips."'2 3 Congress seems already to
have begun to reassess copyright as a form of legal protection for programs.2 4 And the software industry has expressed significant doubts
19. See infra notes 170-399 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 354-99 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 170-462 and accompanying text.
22. The New York Times reported, "[t]he nation's copyright and patent laws, which have
protected literary works and inventions for nearly 200 years, apparently fail to safeguard much of
the computer technology that many people hope will help revive America's economy, according to
a growing number of legislators, judges, and computer executives." N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at 1,
col. 6. The article focused on computer programs and semiconductor chip designs. Another New
York Times article noted a more general problem:
Seven years ago, when Congress finished the first complete overhaul of Federal copyright law since 1909, members turned from the 15-year-long project with relief. Copyright law, they felt, was finally up to date, able to accommodate such 20th century
innovations as the photocopy machine.
But the pace of technological change has been so fast since then, a congressional
subcommittee was told this week, that it threatens to render obsolete not only the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 but also the essential premise of copyright itself.
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
23. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at 29, col. I. Ralph S. Brown is Professor Emeritus of Law at
Yale University. For a description of a computer "chip", see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
24. In April, 1984, at the request of several congressmen, the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress undertook a study of whether current intellectual property law is adequate to the needs of "high tech" industries, including software production and distribution. Its
report is scheduled to be issued in September, 1985. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROJECT PROPOSAL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS & INFORMATION (March 13, 1984) (copy on file with the author)
[hereinafter cited as OTA PROJECT PROPOSAL]; see also N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at 14, col. 1;
STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 97TH CONG., IST SSS., ISSUESPRESENT & FUTURE, REPORT 70 (Comm. Print 1981).
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about the usefulness of copyright protection for programs. 25
Computer programs may well deserve to be protected.2 6 The
choice, however, is whether to let the courts evolve new rules of copyright doctrine and discard the old rules, whether to amend further the
copyright law to avoid the confficts with copyright doctrine that have
already been identified, or whether to devise a new intellectual property law specifically for machine-readable computer programs.
The latter option is not as unthinkable as it may seem at first
glance. After all, copyright as a form of legal protection for writings
was created to deal with the consequences of the invention of the printing press, which made it possible, for the first time, to make multiple
copies of a writing in a relatively short period of time. 27 Similarly, patent law was responsive to the technological necessities of the Industrial
Revolution. 28 Given that the computer and its programs may have
29
propelled us into a Post-Industrial or Information Revolution, it is
time to think about what kind of intellectual property computer programs are, and to design a form of legal protection appropriate to their
characteristics.
Section II of this article describes what computer programs are,
not merely in terms of how they are created, but also, and more significantly, in terms of how they function in a computer. That programs
are mere substitutes for computer hardware has not yet been grasped in
the copyright literature.
Section III reviews Copyright Office policy with respect to computer programs prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, the decision to establish CONTU by Congress, the CONTU deliberations and report,
and the action taken by Congress in response to the CONTU recom25. The prospectus of one computer software company contained this ominous warning:

"'Computer software systems cannot be patented, and any copyright laws may not be meaningful.'" Seneker & Pearl, Software to Go, FORBES MAG., June 20, 1983, at 93, 99. See also infra

notes 417-49 and accompanying text.
26. CONTU Commissioners were persuaded that computer programs needed to be given
some sort of legal protection in order to stimulate the production and dissemination of software
products. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-12. See also infra notes 134, 143, 264
and accompanying text. But see Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 340-50 (1970) (questioning

the need for copyright protection for programs).
27. See, e.g., A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES:

MATERIALS 1-4 (1981) (describing the Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710).
28. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT, SENATE

CASES AND

COMM. ON THE

JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., STUDY No. 15, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYS-

TEM 2 (Comm. Print. 1958); Outline of the History ofthe United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT.

OFF. SOC'Y, July, 1936 at 19-34.
29. See generally D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SoCIETY (1973); D. HANSON,
THE NEW ALCHEMISTS (1982).
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mendations. The CONTU Final Report is criticized for its failure to
consider several important matters and for its misunderstanding of
copyright tradition.
Section IV concentrates its analysis on two of the myriad difficulties that the attempt to integrate machine-readable programs into the
copyright tradition has brought to the surface. The first is the undermining of the constitutional goal of promoting the progress of science
and the arts, a goal that requires disclosure of published works to
which copyright attaches. This problem arises because software manufacturers generally market only machine-readable forms of programs,
thereby withholding not only their ideas, but much or all of the manner
in which those ideas are expressed. The second is the undermining of
the copyright rule against allowing copyright protection for utilitarian
works, a rule which Congress reaffirmed and strengthened in 1976.
Disclosure of a published work and nonutility of the work are essential
elements of copyright tradition that should be retained.
Section V argues that copyright is not generally perceived by those
in the industry as being an efficacious form of legal protection for computer programs. It also considers the deficiencies of patent and tradesecret law.
Section VI considers the possible solutions: allowing copyright to
become a general misappropriation law; making some modifications in
the copyright law to retain disclosure and nonutility as general rules of
copyright to which machine-readable programs would be a limited exception; or devising a new form of legal protection for machine-readable programs. It contains suggestions about the characteristics a new
legal form of protection should have. It is possible to develop a proposal that will meet the industry's pressing need for effective legal protection without undue sacrifice of the public's interest in obtaining
disclosure of the ideas contained in encoded computer programs.
II.

WHAT COMPUTER PROGRAMS ARE AND How THEY WORK

Many discussions of the copyrightability of machine-readable
forms of programs, particularly those which favor copyright protection,
emphasize the set of preparatory writings that may go into producing
an operable computer program. 30 Although what they say is correct as
far as it goes, it reveals only one aspect of what a program is. A more
30. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 778 (C.D. Cal.
1983); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote I, at 9-10; Iskrant, The Impact ofthe Multiple Forms of
ComputerProgramson TheirAdequateProtectionby Copyright, 18 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
92, 105-06 (1970).
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complete examination is required to assess the copyrightability of com-

puter software.
This section begins with a description of programs in the context
of what computers do and how programs affect them. Because part of

the debate on the appropriateness of copyright as a form of protection
depends on the answer to the question, "Is it a writing or is it a machine

part?," it is essential to understand programs in their entirety. As one
judge faced with this characterization dilemma has'3 aptly said,

"[e]qually good analogies lead to contradictory results." '

A.

Developments in Hardware Design.

It is important to note at the outset that the first generation of computers 32 did not utilize what are now referred to as computer programs
31. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 823 (E.D. Pa.
1982), rey'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
32. It is commonly said that to date there have been four "generations" of computers. See E.
FEIGENBAUM & B. MCCORDRUCK, THE FIFTH GENERATION 17 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
FEIGENBAUM]. See generally B. ARDEN, WHAT CAN BE AUTOMATED?, 10-13, 299-300 (1980).
The "generations" of computers have been distinguished from one another chiefly by the
nature of the device used in them to control and amplify electrical currents. All four generations
of computers have employed the same general design, which consists of a central processing unit,
a memory, an arithmetic unit, and input-output devices. FEIGENBAUM, supra, at 17. All operate
in serial fashion, that is, by having the mechanism perform its function one step at a time in a
prescribed order. Id The first generation of computers used electronic vacuum tubes, and hence
is referred to as the generation of "electronic vacuum tube computers." FEIGENBAUM, supra, at 17.
The ENIAC computer, built in 1946 at the University of Pennsylvania, and often hailed as the
first operating electronic digital computer, was of this type. See Boraiko, The Chip, 162 NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC 421, 429 (1982). The invention of the transistor in 1947 led to the development of
the second generation of computers known as "transistorized computers." See FEIGENBAUM,
supra,at 17. This generation of computers was less bulky, more energy efficient, and more reliable
than those that used vacuum tubes, but transistors often became disconnected from the circuit
boards to which they were supposed to be attached. To solve this problem, as well as to make
transistors smaller, two scientists hit upon the idea of making the crystal in the transistor serve as
its own circuit board. See Boraiko, supra, at 429. The device they invented is known as an "integrated circuit" or "chip." Chips are thin slices of semiconductor material (usually silicon) in
which layers of electronic switches connected by thin wires have been laid. Each switch is functionally a transistor. Each chip contains several thousand switches. Id Chips were a considerable
improvement over the transistors they replaced because they were less bulky, cheaper to make,
more energy efficient, and more reliable than transistors had been. Not surprisingly, this generation of computers is known as "integrated circuit computers." See FEIGENBAUM, supra, at 17.
The fourth generation of computers are known as very large-scale integrated (VLSI) computers.
They too employ integrated circuits, but ones that are more densely packed than the third generation. Chips containing 100,000 or more transistors are VLSI chips. See Boraiko, supra, at 429.
Chips have two different functions in current models of computers. Some are memory units
which store information, that is, data or program instructions; others are processing elements of
the machine, i.e., the central processing units that are responsible for execution of the program's
instructions. See Boraiko, upia, at 421. There are two basic types of memory chips: those which
have programs or data permanently "burned" into them (known as "read only memory" or ROM
chips because the computer can only "read" the stored information; it can't change or "write" new
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to carry out their computational tasks. Rather, they were constructedor "hard-wired"-in such a way that the machine could perform only
the particular function for which it had been wired. To change the
operation the machine could accomplish, that is, to enable the machine
to perform a different task, the computer's engineers had to rewire or
reconfigure the machine. 33 In other words, the first operating computers were all hardware.
An important development in the history of computers was that a
computer could be made to store and use encoded instructions, "programs," to perform particular tasks, thus eliminating the necessity for
making modifications to the hardware of the machine to change the
tasks that it could perform. 34 The programmability of computers had a
number of important implications, the most important of which was
that computers could now become "universal machines," that is, machines capable of performing any task for which it was possible to create program instructions. 35 Today virtually all computers are universal
information into this memory device) and those which are capable of receiving data and alterations of that of data (known as "random access memory" or RAM chips). Programs are often
distributed in ROM form. RAM chips are used to store data that is to be updated or only temporarily stored in a particular part of the computer's memory. See Toong & Gupta, PersonalComputers, Sc. AM., Dec. 1982, at 87, 87-94. Chips capable of storing more than 260,000 bits (short
for "binary digits") of data are currently in production in the U. S. See Bylinsky, The Next Battle
in Memory Chips, FORTUNE MAG., May 16, 1983, at 152.
33. "To perform different operations, [ENIAC] had to be manually rewired, like an old wireand-plug telephone switch board, a task that could take several days." Golden, Big Dimwits and
Little Genuises,TIME MAO., Jan. 3, 1983, at 31. One could say that, in a sense, such a machine was
programmed by its hardware. That is, the order in which the machine would execute its primitive
functions was set by the manner in which the hardware had been constructed. But this is using the
word "program" in a very different sense from the way one uses it today to refer to the set of
written instructions which are translated to binary code, stored in a computer, and used to cause a
computer to perform a useful function.
34. "The principle of the stored program, the invention of which was a milestone in the
development of the modem digital computer, makes it possible to change the function of a computer by changing the contents of its memory unit instead of by changing its hardware." Patterson,
Microprogramming,Scd. AM., March 1983, at 50, 52. The Hungarian mathematician John von
Neumann first "suggested putting the machine's operating instructions, or program, within the
same memory as the data to be processed and writing it in the same binary language. The computer could thus be programmed through the same input devices used to feed in data, such as a
keyboard or a reel of tape." Golden, supranote 33, at 31. The first commercial programmable
computer was the Sperry-Rand UNIVAC, first manufactured in 1951. Id
35. See, e.g., A. HODGES, ALAN TURING: THE ENIGMA 293-95, 318-21 (1983). Hodges
quotes the mathematician and early computer scientist Alan Turing: "We do not need to have an
infinity of different machines doing differentjobs. A single one will suffice. The engineering problem of producing various machines for various jobs is replaced by the office work of 'programming' the universal machine to do these jobs." Id at 293. See also D. HANSON, supranote 29, at
39-68.
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machines. 36 The differences among present-day computers-from the

supercomputer to the microprocessor on a chip-are not so much the
tasks they can accomplish, but the speed and efficiency with which they
37
can accomplish them, their memory capacities, and their cost.
While the programmable computer has a number of advantages

over the completely hardwired computer, programmability did not

make it possible for computers to perform tasks that a hardwired computer could not perform, or to perform those tasks faster or better than

hardwired computers could. It is possible to construct a customized
piece of hardware to do any given task that might otherwise be
programmed on a universal machine. 38 A completely hardwired

machine may do that given task more rapidly than a programmed computer.39 The prime advantage of the programmable computer is its

generality. That is, it does away with the need to construct many different kinds of machines because one machine can be built and program-

med to perform a variety of functions. Another of the implications of
the development of programmmable computers is that such computers
were built so that the hardware itself could no longer perform any use40
ful function without the directions given to it by a computer program.

36. While many modem computers are programmed to perform only one function-running
the watch you wear on your wrist, for instance-they may be capable of being programmed to do
any number of different things. See, e.g., Boraiko, supranote 32, at 421-25; see also infra note 63.
37. The 1946 ENIAC computer could perform about 5,000 additions per second. Golden,
Other Maestro of the Micro, TIME MAG., Jan. 3, 1983, at 29. The supercomputers currently in use
can perform several hundred million operations per second. The Race to Build a Supercomputer,
NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 58. Japanese researchers are aiming to produce supercomputers
which will process 10 billion operations per second. Id at 63. Personal computers such as the
Apple Ile can execute a mere 500,000 operations per second. Id See also With Stakes High, Race
Is On For Fastest Computer of411, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1983, at Cl, col. 2.

One current supercomputer model contains a dense pack of 240,000 silicon chips and costs
about $11 million. The Race to Build a Supercomputer, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 63. Personal

computers have far fewer;, thirty-one, for example, are used in the Apple Ile. Id The Apple II
Plus model sells for about $1300. Faflick, The Hottest Selling Hardware,TIME MAG., Jan. 1, 1983,

at 37. See supra note 32 concerning the memory capacity of chips.
38. Given a precise definition of a computer, it is always possible to realize the computer
in hardware--that is, to construct a hardware device whose machine language is preIn suggesting this possibility we are appealing
cisely that of the defined computer ....
to the important basic principle behind computer design: Anyprecisel defined algorithm
or datastructure may be realized in hardware.Because a computer is simply a collection

of algorithms and data structures, we may assume that its hardware realization is a possibility regardless of the complexity of the computer or its associated machine language.
T. PRATr, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION 19 (2d ed. 1983).
39. This makes sense because many of the features included in the programmable machine
are there to give the machine flexibility. The programmable machine will be slowed down by
having to carry through operations the hard-wired machine can eliminate or streamline.
40. "The hardware can do nothing by itself; it requires the array of programs, or instructions,
collectively called software." Toong & Gupta, supra note 32, at 88.
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At this point it may be helpful to explain briefly what it means to
say a computer is "programmable." The hardware of all programmable computers is capable of performing a set of primitive functions,
which may include adding two numbers together, subtracting two numbers, comparing two numbers, and determining if they are the same or
different, retrieving something from memory, or routing data to memory for storage. 41 A program specifies the exact sequence in which the
42
hardware is to execute these primitive functions.
One of the primitive functions of the hardware of a programmable
machine that the completely hardwired machines did not have is the
capability of "reading" the next instruction in the program for the next
addition,44 subtraction or other primitive function.43 The hardware
"reads" a program's instructions by sensing a sequence of electrical
impulses that have been encoded to "mean" that the next primitive
function to be performed is, for example, addition. Uninstructed, the
hardware is inert. Properly programmed, the hardware can perform
the series of steps necessary to accomplish a task as directed by the
program.
One could say that the set of instructions which constitutes a computer program gives the machine the "knowledge" it needs to do the
task, but this is using the word "knowledge" in a very different sense
from that in which it is normally used. A more accurate way to describe a program would be to say that the program's instructions simply
prescribe an order for the hardware's executiQn of its primitive functions. This is, at base, the definition of a program.
B.

The Different Types of Programs.

For the purposes of copyright analysis, it is helpful to view computer programs as falling into three main categories: (1) microcode,
also known as "firmware"; (2) operating systems, sometimes known as
"systems software"; and (3) application programs, which are what people generally mean when they refer to "software."
1. Microcode. Microcode was developed to respond to one of
the same basic problems that attended the completely hardwired com41. See T. PRATT,supra note 38, at 15-16 for a list of hardware primitive functions.
42. See R. CONWAY &
PROGRAMMING 4
ed.
43. See B. ARDEN, supra note 32, at 12.
44. See, e.g.,
SiPPL,
COMMUNICATIONS DICTIONARY (1976) (defining "read": "To
copy, usually from one form of storage to another, particularly from external or secondary storage; to sense the meaning of arrangements of hardware; to sense the presence of information on a
recording medium."). See also infra note 163, explaining further the technical meaning of the
term "read" when used in relation to computers.
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puter. Given a programmable computer, consisting only of hardware
and software, if one wanted to change either the number or the nature
of its primitive functions, one still had to disassemble the hardware and

reconstruct it.
Microcode is a set of encoded instructions-in other words, a program-that controls the fine details of the execution of one or more
primitive functions of a computer. Microcode serves as a substitute for
certain elements of the hardware circuitry that had previously controlled that function.45 Microcode is generally designed at the same
46 Altime as and in conjunction with the design of the hardware.
though, strictly speaking, it is a program, it is considered a more integral part of the machine hardware than is software, hence its
alternative name, "firmware." 47
The development of microcode was important for several rea-

sons.48 Microcode replaced hardware and thereby reduced the building expense and the bulk of the hardware. It also permitted either the
original manufacturer of the machine or a subsequent purchaser of the
machine to make a change in one of the primitive functions of the computer without tearing the machine apart. Significantly, it also allowed

the machine designers to increase the number of functions the hardware could perform, and even to add previously unattainable func-

tions. 49 This ability to extend the number of primitive functions of the
hardware has become the most important characteristic of microcode.

Microcode also permits greater flexibility as to certain primitive func45. The function of microcode is discussed at length in a recent Scientfic American article:
A fundamental issue in the design of any computer is how to control, or steer, the electrical signals that represent information. In the arithmetic and logic unit, where the actual
processing of information is done, signals must be routed between various counters, adders, and other components. The control system must also mediate the transfer of information between the central processor, the main memory units, and the various input and
output devices. In one approach the control system is completely "hard-wired," that is, it
is laid down permanently in the processor's electrical circuitry. A second approach
[microcode] is more flexible and in many cases less expensive. The essential idea is to
reduce the complexity of the control system by recording the detailed instructions for
controlling the computer in a coded form. In other words, the sequence of paths a signal
is to follow is embodied in a program, which is stored in a separate memory unit incorporated into the processor.
Patterson, supranote 34, at 50; see also id at 54 regarding the flexibility provided by microcode.
46. See T. KIDDER, THE SOUL OF THE NEw MACHINE 97-102 (1982).
47. "[M]icro programs are sometimes classified as firmware, thereby signifying their intermediate status between hardware and software." Patterson, supra note 34, at 50.
48. See id at 56 regarding the advantages of microcode.
49. Some hardware, for example, does not include multiplication as one of its primitive functions, except, of course, by sequential additions. Microcode can add multiplication to the set of
primitive functions such hardware can perform.
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tions than does hardware alone. 50 Finally, microcode allowed certain
very common sequences of primitive functions to be encoded so that
subsequent programmers are relieved from the task of writing a set of

instructions to carry out those sequences of functions each time they
write a program to be executed on that computer.5 1

2. Operating Systems. Although conceptually microcode and
operating systems are distinct, they have many common features. For

one thing, both are computer programs. For another, both are
designed to control internal functions of the computer. Third, both are

invisible to one who is using the computer to perform a particular task.
Fourth, neither in itself is capable of making the machine perform a

useful function; it is the application programs that enable the computer
to perform their external functions. Fifth, both are designed to facilitate the user's ability to program the machine to perform application
tasks.
Operating systems, however, are considered to be a category of

software. 52 While it is possible for some operating system functions to
be microcoded, generally speaking, the two are distinct.5 3 Microcode

attends to the primitive functions of the machine. An operating system
attends to interrelation between the hardware and the application pro54
gram the hardware may be about to execute.

Computers sold today generally come equipped with an operating
system that was designed by--or at least for-:-the manufacturer. The

Apple II, for instance, was sold with a set of fourteen operating system
50. There are, for instance, different ways to round off numbers when one multiplies sets of
them. One way may be useful for one application, but not for another. Microcode allows the
round-off function to be coded in more than one way so that a user of the machine can decide
which way suits his or her purposes for particular applications.
51. See Patterson, supra note 34, at 54-55.
52. "The part of the software that is most closely associated with the hardware is the operating system." Toong & Gupta, supra note 32, at 96.
53. At one point in its opinion, the district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd,714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), may have
mistaken the operating system programs involved in that case for firmware. But it is true that the
operating system programs in that case could have been microcoded, or even made part of the
hardware, as supra note 38 and accompanying text have explained, so that the basic point the
district court was trying to make about the potential problem of copyright/patent conflict because
of the patentability of firmware was well taken. See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text
regarding the patent/copyright conflict.
54. "The core of the software is an 'operating system' that controls the computer's operations
and manages the flow of information. The operating system mediates between the machine and
the human operator and between the machine and an 'application' program that enables the computer to perform a specific task." Toong & Gupta, supranote 32, at 88. Note that the hardware
the operating system interfaces with includes the microcode. See infra note 61 and accompanying
text concerning the concept of the virtual machine.
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programs.5 5 An operating system is analogous to secretarial assistance
to an executive. When an executive wants to get some figures out of the
files, he or she does not normally start rummaging through the office
filing system. Rather, the executive will call upon a secretary to do the
fie search. The secretary will know how to gain access to the files,
where the files are located, and how they are organized. The secretary
can use that knowledge to retrieve the desired information from the
files. The operating system of a computer performs similar tasks. It
contains a series of routines which virtually all application programs
require.56 The operating system obviates the necessity for each
programmer using the system-or writing a program for use in a particular computer-to write out the sequence of instructions to perform
these routines. When the computer reaches the instruction in the application program which, for example, directs the retrieval of a file from a
disk and the transfer of it to main memory, the operating system will
take over, instructing the machine to perform that function.
3.

Application Programs. Application programs are the

software programs with which the public has come to be familiar.
Software connotes to the public the word processors we use for our
writing, the videogames we play, the spread sheets we use to make our
business calculations, and the payroll systems that print out our
paychecks.5 7 But the reality of what application programs are in connection with what computers do is a bit more complicated than the
popular view suggests.
The term "application program" has a more dynamic and functional meaning than one might suppose. The same program that in a
55. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 815-16 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). See also B. ARDEN, supranote 32, at 563 (hardware
manufacturer now routinely supplies the operating system).
56. To understand the kinds of tasks done by the operating system, consider the sequence of steps that must be taken to transfer a file of data from the primary memory to
disk storage. It is first necessary to make certain there is enough space available on the
disk to hold the entire file. Other files might have to be deleted in order to assemble
enough contiguous blank sectors. For the transfer itself sequential portions of the file
must be called up from the primary memory and combined with "housekeeping" information to form a block of data that will exactly fill a sector. Each block must be assigned
a sector address and transmitted to the disk. Numbers called check-sums that allow
errors in storage or transmission to be detected and sometimes corrected must be calculated. Finally, some record must be kept of where the fie of information has been
stored.
If all these tasks had to be done under the direct supervision of the user, the storage
of information in a computer would not be worth the trouble. Actually the entire procedure can be handled by the operating system; the user merely issues a single command,
such as "save file."
Toong & Gupta, supranote 32, at 96.
57. See Boraiko, supra note 32, at 421-25; Friedrich, The Computer Moves In, TIME MAG.,
Jan. 3, 1983, at 14-23.

DUKE LAW JOURV4L

[Vol. 1984:663

digital watch may be an "application program" may serve as a timing
device in an operating system program, and in that context it is not an
"application program." What an application program is, from a computer scientist's standpoint, depends on what the user wants to do with
a computer at any given time.5 8 One has a computer; one has an application, that is, a task, that one wants that computer to perform; the
program that will bring about the desired result is the "application pro59
gram" for that task.
To be precise, we must realize that it is not the application program alone that performs the task we ask the computer to do. Nor is it
the hardware alone. Rather, it is the complex hierarchy of programs
and hardware that, while interacting with one another, works as a unit
to perform a particular application task.60 Computer scientists refer to
this complex hierarchy as the "virtual machine" or "virtual computer."'6' The virtual machine is the computational unit a user confronts when he or she sits down to use it. For functional purposes, the
programs in a computer are part of the machine; programs are only
substitutes for hardware. They are not hardware per se, but are components of the virtual machine.
Computer programs make it possible for one machine to perform
the functions of many machines. When a word processing program is
operating in a computer, the computer is a word processor. When a
videogame program is operating in a computer, the computer is a videogame machine. When a digital watch program is operating in a computer, the computer is a digital watch. With each new program, the
computer is a new machine. We have been so conditioned to regard
machines as separate entities fixed by the nature of their hardware to
perform only one function that it is difficult to adjust to this new chameleon-like machine. What a computer program does is to transform
58. See B. ARDEN, supra note 32, at 13-15.
59. Even microcode can, under this functional definition, be a kind of application program.
If the task one programs the hardware to perform is adding multiplication to the primitive functions, the program that will do that task is an application program, even if it is also microcode.
60. The preceding discussion might suggest the hierarchy is composed solely of hardware,
microcode, an operating system, and an application program. But any one application task may

require calling on more than one operating system program and more than one application program. That is, for a particular application, something which in another context would be "the"
application program may be called on to aid in the accomplishment of another application task.
For example, a word processing program may call upon a dictionary program to check the spelling in a draft of an article in the processor, or upon a footnote conformity program to check that
the footnotes to a draft article are in the proper form.
61. "The computer that executes the translated programs may occasionally be a hardware
component, but ordinarily it is a virtualcomputer composed partially of hardware and partially of
software." T. PRATt, supra note 38, at 14.
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the machine: without changing the hardware, the machine's form and
function can be altered by different programs. That is what it means to
say the modem computer is a universal machine. 62 The program determines what kind of machine the computer will be.
Computers and their programs have become a highly visible part
of our lives. Programs are so visible in our lives partly because they
sometimes cause the computer to display things-words, symbols, pictures-on a screen.6 3 Some programs produce much display. Videogames, for instance, produce series of highly colorful graphic images
and absorbing sounds. Videogames are programmed to be, if you will,

"display-intensive." It is the audiovisual display of videogames that
makes them seem so much like other categories of copyrightable

works. 64 Many software programs, however, produce considerably less
display. 65 Some produce no display at all. There is a wide variety of
other kinds of output that application programs can generate. 66

What a program displays is not at all the same thing as the instructions which cause the display to occur. That is, it is not the program

instructions that are displayed on the screen when a program is being
executed. In general, one cannot get the program instructions to be
-displayed on the screen even if one wants to.67 Of course, for the most
62. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. Not every computer is a universal
machine. Some computers are specially designed to serve only a single purpose-for instance, to
be digital watches or carburetor injection devices-and have only one program which contains all
the instructions the computers will need to perform their specified tasks. These computers resemble somewhat the completely hardwired machines discussed supra at note 33 and accompanying
text in that the hardware may be tailored for performance of a specific task.
63. Display is one of the primitive functions now included in the hardware of most computers. The program, of course, does not itself directly produce the display. It causes the hardware to produce the display. It is the interaction of the hardware, microcode, operating systems,
and software--that is, the virtual computer, see supranote 61-which produces the display. Each
change in the display is orchestrated by the program.
64. Videogames were initially classified as audiovisual works by the Copyright Office. See
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aft'd,704 F.2d 1009
(7th Cir. 1983). That explains why most of the early videogame cases discuss the audiovisual
nature of these works. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. A dictionary program that checks the spelling of words in a text on a word processing
system may be a very large, complicated program. It will do a great deal of its work in a manner
invisible to the user. Such a program will only display misspelled words and a request for corrections by the user.
66. The microcode and operating system programs, discussed supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text, produce no visual or auditory displays. Examples of application programs that produce no display are a program containing instructions for injecting fuel into the carburetor of an
automobile and a program for the operation of a heart pacemaker. See Boraiko, supranote 32, at
425.
67. When a program is under development, a programmer will have the source code stored
in one file and the machine-readable code in another file on a memory disk. The programmer will
be able to have the source code instructions displayed on the screen. But once the program is
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part, the computer user does not want to know what the program instructions "say" to the computer. The user does not care how the program does what it does, just that it does what it is supposed to do.
Computers are useful to society precisely because they greatly reduce
or eliminate the need for the user to go through the tedious ordeal of
following the thousand or more steps of- some computational task.
Also, the machine, if properly programmed and operating smoothly,
does not make the mistakes so often made by humans.
It is easy to get confused about whether computer programs can or
should be copyrightable subject matter because a computer can be
programmed to be a book. A computer can store, replicate, display on
a screen, and print out Gone With The Wind, a telephone directory, and
other types of written materials. It can be a book or a book
68
substitute.
C. The "Writing" of a Program.
It is important to understand precisely what is meant by the term
"computer program. ' 69 The word is often loosely used to refer to a
wide range of things: the formulation of an algorithm for solving a
particular computational task, one or more of the preparatory writings
created to aid in implementing the algorithm, or the final machineoperating correctly, the source code becomes superfluous. Only the machine-readable version is
generally distributed. See infra note 75. From the machine-readable form, one generally cannot
have the program instructions displayed on the screen because the instructions have been converted to machine language.
68. There are also programs with large data bases that can serve as book substitutes and have
additional capabilities books do not have. Mead Data Central's LExis and West Publishing Company's WESTLAW service, for example, have put in digital but displayable form all cases decided
by courts of various jurisdictions during a defined time period. These cases may also be found in
bound volumes published by West. The main advantage of the computerized form of this material is that the computer will not only display it for the user, but will make searches through its
data base to locate things which might take a human searcher an inordinate amount of time to
find.
Another well-publicized new type of application program is known as an "expert system."
See FEIGENBAUM, supranote 32, at 63-64; Boraiko, supranote 32, at 445-46. An expert system is a
computer program that aims to incorporate sufficient knowledge about a particular field or subfield to allow it to analyze fact situations at an expert's level. It may incorporate not only textbook
knowledge on a subject, but also some of the experience-based "hunches" which experts in a field
would be likely to apply when faced with certain circumstances. FEIGENBAUM, Supra note 32, at
76-77. Expert systems are now available to aid in the diagnosis of illnesses, id at 65, and oil
drilling problems, id at 70.
69. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 813-14
(E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Of signal difficulty in this case. . . is the
elasticity of the word 'program.' "); Keplinger, supra note 9, at 484-85 ("Much of the confusion
and argument over the appropriate legal form of protection for computer software stems from a
failure to fully appreciate the consequences flowing from the separability of software into functional components.").
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readable product of these efforts. 70 A more precise use of the term

"program" would limit its meaning to source code and machine code

(often referred to as "object code"). 71 Source and machine code are

similar in that both are sets of detailed instructions setting forth the
order in which the hardware of a computer is to execute its primitive
functions in order to carry out a particular task. Source code, however,
is a written text in a human-readable computer programming language. 72 Machine code is the set of electrical pulses that, more or less,
correspond to the source code and make the program instructions
"readable" by the computer. 73 Machine code is not readable by human

beings.74 In general, only machine-readable forms of programs are
70. A bill, H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Kastenmeier on August 12, 1982, that would have amended § 101 of 17
U.S.C. to redefine "computer program" in a more precise way and to define separately several
program-related terms, often loosely referred to as manifestations of programs. The bill did not
become law, however, and was not reintroduced in the next session of Congress.
71. The computer program cases tend to refer to "object code" when referring to machinereadable forms of computer programs and often imply-when they do not say so outright-that
source code and object code are the only forms to be considered. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983). There are, in fact, several intermediate stages possible between source code and the machine-readable code that can be executed.
See, e.g., I D. KUCK, THE STRUCTURE OF COMPUTER AND COMPUTATIONS 10 (1978). Depending
on which hardware and which operating system one uses, object code may be one of those intermediate forms, not the executable form of the program. See, e.g., R. HUNTER, THE DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION OF COMPILERS I1 (1981). Because the cases have involved appropriations of
machine-readable versions of programs, which may not be the same as their object codes, this
article will focus its analysis on what it will call "machine-readable programs" or "machine code."
It will refer to machine-readable programs as "object code" only when the terminology of another
source under discussion requires use of that term for consistency.
72. The CONTU Final Report defines source and object code as follows: "A source code is a
computer program written in any of several programming languages employed by computer programmers. An object code is the version of a program in which the source code language is
converted or translated into the machine language of the computer with which it is to be used."
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 n.109.
73. It is possible to write a program directly in machine-readable form, but this is rarely done
because of the difficulty of writing in machine language. See infra note 74.
74. In source code form, the ideas of the program, as well as the particularities of the expression of the ideas in the program, will be apparent, that is, capable of being read by someone who
understands the language or symbols the program author has used to describe the program.
Source code, like poetry, may contain some abstruse words whose precise meaning might be open
to interpretation by readers of the source code, but whatever content there is in the program is
there to be discerned. With machine-readable code, neither the ideas nor the expression of the
ideas can be "read" in any meaningful sense by one who has no access to the earlier written form
of the program.
Examining an encoded ROM chip with an oscilloscope, see supranote 32 for an explanation
of ROM chips, one can detect the presence or absence of the electrical pulses which constitute the
machine code. But machine code is so unreadable that the Copyright Office cannot even identify
whether a particular encoded program is an original work of authorship. See infra note 218 and
accompanying text.
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sold, leased, or otherwise made available to the public. 75 If what one
means by "computer program" is a set of instructions that may be used
in a computer to bring about a desired result, 76 one is referring only to
Numerous commentators have pointed to the unreadability of object code. See, e.g., Iskrant,
supranote 30, at 106 ("The object [code] is not readable by a human in the sense that information
concerning the program would be conveyed."); Hersey Dissent, supranote 4, at 29 ("[Tlhe means
of expression of the preparatory writing--that which the copyright is supposed to protect-is not
to be found in the computer program's mechanical phase."); infranotes 190-94 and accompanying
text. See also D. HOFSTADTER, G6DEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 290
(1980):
Looking at a program written in machine language is vaguely comparable to looking at a
DNA molecule atom by atom. If you glance back to [a drawing] showing the nucleotide
sequence of a DNA molecule-and then if you consider that each nucleotide contains
two dozen atoms or so-and if you imagine trying to write the DNA, atom by atom, for a
small virus (not to mention a human being!)-then you will get a feeling for what it is
like to write a complex program in machine language, and what it is like to try to grasp
what is going on in a program if you have access only to its machine description.
The plaintiff in Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), was
so certain that the computer chess game program encoded on the ROM chip could not be "read"
that it did not bother to put a copyright notice on it. How unreadable object code is was also
illustrated in Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). Artic's copying
of Williams' program included the copying of a "buried" copyright notice in code. Id at 876 n.6.
Copyright notices have traditionally been intended to provide reasonable public notice of the
claim of copyright, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(c), 402(c) (1982), not as a trap with which to catch
pirates.
75. See, for example, Grogan, Decompilationand Disassemby: Undoing Software Protection,
1 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1984): "In seeking to preserve a competitive advantage and protect proprietary rights in computer software, many software companies distribute only machine-readable object code copies of their software." The software producer may provide source code to the
purchaser or lessee to enable him to modify the program to suit the user's particular purposes or to
correct "bugs" in the program. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (explanation of program "bugs").
76. The copyright statute presently defines "computer program" as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). By its terms, it would seem to apply only to machine-readable code,
for only it can bring about results either directly or indirectly (e.g., in conjunction with other
programs in the system).
It should be noted that the present statutory definition of "computer program" refers both to
"statements" and "instructions" without defining further what is meant by these two words. A
computer scientist would not quarrel with this statutory definition if proper meaning were
ascribed to the term "statements." "Statement" has very precise technical meaning to a computer
scientist, a meaning somewhat different from the ordinary meaning of the word; within the whole
of a set of program instructions, one functional subgrouping of instructions constitutes a "statement." Computer scientists would not regard as "statements" any "comments" that might have
been written by the programmer as part of the source code for the program. Comments are a kind
of marginal note the programmer makes to himself, the first comment to a program is often the
name of the program. "Comments" are for humans; they may serve to remind, explain, or document something about the program for the programmer, but they are not part of the instructions
which will carry out the desired machine function. When the source code is sent through a compiler, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text, the compiler throws away the comments.
Comments may reveal nothing of the substance of a program if its drafter so chooses. See infra
notes 214-16 and accompanying text. One reason why it matters what Congress meant by its use
of the term "statement" and whether "comments" were intended to be included is that the Copy-
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machine code.
There are often several phases in the development of an operable
computer program. Each phase may be characterized by a different
written work. The writings may include: a description of the task or
tasks the program is intended to perform; a formulation-in either
mathematical or nonmathematical terms-of the algorithm 77 of the

program, that is, the programmer's idea about how the task should be
right Office may currently be accepting deposit of "comments" in satisfaction of the deposit requirements for programs. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text. "Comments" do not
seem to fit within the statutory definition of computer program if Congress intended a technical
use of the term "statement."
77. A computer program is an instantiation, i.e., an implementation, of an algorithm. Computer scientist Donald Knuth states in his well-known book, D. KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMMING: FUNDAMENTALS OF ALGORITHMS 4 (1975) (emphasis in original):
The modem meaning for algorithm is quite similar to that of recipe,process, method,
procedure,routine,except that the word "algorithm" connotes something just a little different. Besides merely being a finite set of rules which gives a sequence of operations for
solving a specific type of problem, an algorithm has five important features ....
The first of these features, according to Knuth, isfiniteness; that is, an algorithm must terminate
after a finite number of steps. The second is defniteness; each step of an algorithm must be precisely defined and the actions to be carried out unambiguously specified. The third characteristic is
input, that is, data to be used to implement the algorithm. The fourth is output, that is, data that
will have a relation to the input as prescribed by the algorithm. The fifth is efectiveness. id at 46. "This means that all of the operations to be performed in the algorithm must be sufficiently
basic that they can in principle be done exactly and in a finite length of time by a man [or a
woman] using pencil and paper." Id at 6.
To aid in the understanding of what an algorithm is, it may be helpful to give three examples,
of the many possible, of an algorithm that could be used to perform one specific task. Assume a
list of one hundred numbers that one wants sorted, so that, at the end of the process, all of the
numbers will be neatly ordered from lowest to highest. There are numerous ways to accomplish
such a sort. One method would be to begin at the top of the list of unordered numbers (list A),
and work one's way down the list, first comparing the top two numbers, keeping the lesser of the
two as the provisional minimal number, comparing this provisional minimum to the third
number, and so forth until list A is exhausted. The number yielded from this process will then be
the number to place at the top of list B. To get the next lowest number, one repeats the process,
and so forth. This is one algorithm for sorting numbers, albeit a rather tedious, cumbersome one.
A second algorithm for the sorting might involve the selection of a median number. The first
sort through the list of one hundred numbers might put all the numbers lower than the median
into one group and all the numbers above that median into a second group. Thereafter, one could
perform internal sorts of the kind described in the first example. For a list of random numbers,
this second sorting algorithm would be a faster method than the first.
A third algorithm for the sort might involve creating a set of "baskets" to aid in the sort. One
could do an initial sort of the numbers that would throw into "basket" I all those numbers in list A
with one digit, into "basket" II all those with two digits, and so on. Once all the numbers are in
their respective "baskets," one could sort numbers within the "baskets" in the manner described in
the first example. Of the three algorithms described, this is the one that will be likely to do the sort
in the least number of steps.
Assuming that all three algorithms perform the task equally effectively-and remember that
these are only three of a multitude of possible sorting algorithms-the algorithm that causes the
task to be performed the most quickly is generally regarded as the superior algorithm. Which
algorithm is superior will depend on the nature of the task. Although the third algorithm would
be the best algorithm for sorting a set of random numbers, it might not be the superior algorithm
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accomplished; a flow chart that schematically depicts the steps the
programmer thinks will be necessary to carry out the algorithm; and

the source code, which is a written statement of the precise set of instructions that when transformed into "machine-language" will be capable of producing the desired result in the desired manner. All of

these writings are like the plans an architect may draw as a guide to the
construction of a house.

The transformation of source code to machine code is accomplished within the computer by processing the source code through an
operating system program known as a "compiler. 7T In the transformation process, compiler programs often restructure the set of program
79
instructions so that the hardware will be able to execute them.

Once compiled into machine-readable form, the program is theoretically able to be executed, that is, to be used in the computer to per-

form the task for which it was originally designed. The freshly
compiled program may, however, not work. Often, there are errors in
the logic of the program-commonly called "bugs"-that must be cor-

rected before the program can be successfully executed. 80 To locate the
for sorting numbers which have the same number of digits. All algorithms can be described mathematically, as well as in prose.
78. For the sake of simplicity, the text refers only to compilers. There are, in fact, two kinds
of programs, interpreters and compilers, that convert into machine code a program written in a
programming language such as Pascal or BASIC (often referred to as higher level languages),
Some computers have both interpreter and compiler programs. Most personal computers have
only interpreters because of the smaller amount of memory that is required to store them. A
major reason to compile a program rather than interpret it is to produce more efficient machinereadable code. Compiled code is many times faster in execution than interpreted code. When one
writes source code, one generally does so in a programming language adapted either for being
interpreted or compiled. Most versions of BASIC are designed to be interpreted; Pascal and Fortran are generally designed to be compiled. The basic difference between interpreters and compilers is that compilers convert the whole program at one time whereas interpreters in essence
translate each high level programming language statement in turn into the appropriate sequence
of machine-language instructions. See Toong & Gupta, supra note 32, at 99.
79. A compiler may, for example, restructure a task of computation which is input as ((3/5)
x 4) + ((3/5) x 6). The compiled output may be structured as follows: ((4+6) x 3)/5. As this
example suggests, there will not necessarily be a one-to-one correspondence between the structure
of the source code's expression of a particular idea and the structure of the machine-readable
expression of it. As indicated supra note 76, another respect in which the source code will differ
from the compiled machine-readable code is that compiler programs discard portions of the
source code, such as comments, that are unnecessary for the performance of the task.
80. "If there is even one character out of place in these hundreds of lines [of source code],
chances are the program will not work properly. These software 'bugs,' as programming mishaps
are called, can take weeks to find. One bug in an AT&T program knocked out all long-distance
telephone service to Greece in 1979. It was months before Ma Bell's programmers pinned down
the problem." Golden, supra note 33, at 32. See also B. ARDEN, supranote 32, at 563. The origin
of the term "bug" is literal. When investigating the cause of a breakdown of one of the early
computers, the machine's engineers found that a moth caught in one of the vacuum tubes had
caused the tube to malfunction. See R. PATrIS, KAREL THE RoBOT 14-15 (1981).
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source of the errors and to correct them almost always takes longer
than writing the source code. Specialized programs, known as "debuggers," have been developed to aid in the detection of bugs.8 1 Many
programs are marketed before all of the bugs in the program have been
worked out, but usually the major bugs are out when the product is
sold to the public. Usually, it is the debugged machine-readable version of the program that the so-called "software pirates" appropriate.
Some programs can be written relatively quickly. Most of the
commercially valuable programs on the market, however, required
months, and often years, of work. Large or complex programs may
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to develop and de-bug.8 2 A little
reflection is necessary to understand why it takes so much time and
effort to write a commercially valuable program.
As previously noted, one of the major values of computer programs to society is that they permit very time-consuming--that is, labor-intensive-repetitive tasks to be performed without the need for a
human to repeat the myriad steps in the process.8 3 A word processor,
for example, allows one to make changes in a draft without the necessity of having a human retype the whole text. The writer types in the
desired changes; the machine prepares a corrected copy. In order for
the word processor to be able to perform this and other time-saving
functions, the writer of the word processor program must anticipate
every function that a user needs to be able to perform, map out how
those functions will be organized and how they will interrelate, and
then ensure that those functions are carried out by the system in a fast,
reliable, and efficient manner. But this is only a part of the task. The
programmer must design a system for filing drafts and for retrieving
them from memory, must provide for multiple simultaneous uses of the
program by many people, and must also interrelate the word processing program with other programs in the computer.8 4 The process of
designing a program is time-consuming because it involves thinking
out every detail of every function, coordinating them, and putting all
those details into programming language. The creative part of writing
81. See B. ARDEN, supra note 32, at 563.
82. Apple claimed the operating system programs at issue in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) had taken 46 man-months, and cost more
than $740,000, to produce. This figure was said not to include the time or cost of creating or
acquiring earlier versions of the programs or the expense of marketing them. Id
83. "'What you look for is a repetitive application that is a bother to people and that you can

put on a machine and make 10 times easier. It can be anything, anything at all."' Seneker &
Pearl, supranote 25, at 95 (quoting John Imlay).
84. Some part of the interface work may be done by the operating system; if not, the
programmer will have to include the interface in his word processing program.
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a good program may come in finding a faster, more efficient alternative
to an obvious but slower way of performing the function. Thinking of
the nonobvious solution may itself be very time-consuming.
In general, the more complicated the task, the more time it takes to
write a program to do it. On complex assignments, a programmer may
produce, on an average, only a few words of code a day. 85 Many programs consist of several thousand lines of code. Others consist of
86
millions.
Programs are tailor-made to operate only on a particular machine
or set of machines. Programs written for Apple computers, for exam-

ple, will not operate in IBM or Commodore machines, unless special
compatibility instructions are available in either the software or the operating systems of the other computers. Moreover, programs written
for one model of a manufacturer's hardware are not necessarily capa-

ble of operating on its other models, although most manufacturers now
maximize compatibility among their own models to the extent they
can. 87 The same program written in the same programming language
for different machines will, in fact, be a different program. This is so
because computer programs are instructions controlling the sequence
in which the primitive functions of a particular type of hardware are to
be executed.
The tailoring of program to machine is not simply a matter of
knowing which programming language one can use. It also must take
into account what primitive functions the hardware can perform and
what protocols the operating system requires, among other things. The
adaptation of a program written for one machine so that it can be run
on another machine may be nearly as time-consuming as creating the
original program. 88 Unless there is likely to be a substantial demand
for software written for many different machines, software firms are not
likely to undertake the modification effort, but will write software
which works only on the leading manufacturers' machines.
The incompatibility of software results in a substantial advantage
85. One study of programmer productivity, cited in F. BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN
MONTH 90-91 (1975), indicated that one complex program consisting of only 52,000 words of code
had been developed over a four-year period by the efforts of 83 programmers and had required
101 man-years of effort to create. The productivity of the programmers was, on the average, 515

words per man per year. In other words, the programmers on this task produced only about two
good words of code a day.
86. See Iskrant, supra note 30, at 96.
87. See Patterson, supranote 34, at 56, regarding IBM's efforts to make its models compatible
with one another. See also Compatible Computers, N. Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at D2, col. I.
88. Microcode can assist in making software for one model compatible with another model.
See Patterson, supra note 34, at 56.
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to the more successful hardware manufacturers. 89 Not only does the

availability of a large number of software programs become a prominent feature in the marketing of a successful manufacturer's machines,

giving it a competitive advantage in the initial sale of a machine to a
customer, but that firm also has a significant advantage in subsequent
sales of computers to the same purchaser since the library of software
already accumulated would be unusable if a competitor's incompatible
machine was purchased. It is not surprising, then, that new entrants
and less-successful experienced firms have wanted to copy the systems
software-which is a key to compatibility-of their more successful
rivals. 90
D. The Ease with Which Programs Can Be Copied
It is an unfortunate fact that programs in machine-readable form
are as easy and cheap to copy as they are difficult and expensive to
develop and refine. There are presently three major media for the storage of programs in machine-readable form: tapes, disks, and silicon
chips.

91

If the program a software pirate wants to copy is on a tape or disk,
all the pirate needs to do is take an empty tape or disk and insert it in a
computer which will automatically replicate the coded pulses of the
program and store them on this new medium. 92 This can be done in
much the same way as one would make a tape recording of one's favor89. "Much of Apple [Computer, Inc.'s] success is attributed to the company's policy of encouraging vendors of software and peripheral equipment to develop and sell products that are
compatible with Apple Computers. For example, more than 11,000 application programs are
available for Apple Computers, 95% of them developed by independent vendors." Toong &
Gupta, supranote 32, at 102. Time Magazine estimated that about 16,000 software programs were
available for the Apple II. It estimated that there were only about 1000 available for the IBM PC.

Fafflick, supranote 37, at 37.
90. This was the basis of one of Franklin's defenses in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). Franklin
argued that for Apple software to be 100% compatible with the Franklin machine, appropriation
of Apple's operating system would also have been necessary. 545 F. Supp. at 814-15. Apple
introduced evidence that other Apple-compatible operating systems existed. 714 F.2d at 1245.
Although in the future it is possible that standardization-and hence maximal compatibilityrather than differentiation (or noncompatibility) will be the rule as to hardware, this may be wishful thinking, given the advantages of noncompatibility for leading hardware manufacturers. At
any rate, it is clearly not the rule at present.
91. See, e.g., B. ARDEN, supranote 32, at 357-64. Other storage media-punched cards, for
example-have been used in the past, but have fallen out of fashion because of their unreliability,
bulkiness, and slower speed in operation.
92. "[Mlost computers include utility programs making it possible for even a novice to make
an exact electronic backup copy of almost any commercially available program." N. Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1983, at D2, col. 1.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:663

ite record. The cost of disks and tapes is minimal.93 No specialized
equipment is necessary. Each copy can be made in a matter of seconds
and can be used in exactly the same way as the original tape or disk.
There are no limits to the number of copies that can be produced in this
manner.
If the program is instead on a silicon chip, the pirate will not even
have to find a chip with the same circuitry as the chip to be copied. The
digital code embodied in a chip can be transferred to tapes or disks, as
well as to other chips. If one wants to mass-produce chips with the
same program on them, one may need specialized facilities. A stencil
of the coded patterns on the chip can be placed over the face of a blank
chip, and used to imprint the pattern on the new chip.94 But anyone
with a chip manufacturing facility will have the necessary equipment,
and anyone with a few thousand dollars can buy the chips and the
equipment to make such copies. A stencil can be prepared in a matter
of days. The imprintation on the chip takes an instant. As with disks,
copied chips may be used as readily as the originals for the purposes
the program was designed to perform. There is an even easier and less
expensive way to copy programs than those already described. If one
can gain access to a system that has the desired program on file, one
can call for that file and have a copy of it transferred to one's own
computer.95 Since the reproductions of tapes, disks and chips may be
identical to the copies from which they were made, it may be difficult,
if not impossible, to detect whether a given tape, disk or chip is an
96
unauthorized copy of the program.
E. The Threat of Software Piracy.
So great is the cost of developing a marketable computer program
and so little is the cost of copying it exactly, that, not surprisingly,
93. Software disks sell for about $2 each at wholesale. (Programs sold on them may sell for
as much as $495 each.) See Seneker & Pearl, su.pranote 25, at 93. The wholesale cost for large
blank tapes is about $50 each. See Seneker, The Growth Industry's Growth Industry, FORBES
MAG., July 6, 1981, at 142.
94. For a description of the process of manufacturing chips, see Boraiko, supra note 32, at
426-34.
95. See Bosworth, Hardware and Software-What Are They?, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA LAW CENTER FOURTH ANNUAL COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE 1 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE]. "Software can be sent over communication lines from one
computer to another, this is called downline loading." Id at 13. It may be possible, however, to
trace the transfer of the file from the central computer to the home computer.

96. If the copyright owner does not sell programs on that particular brand of medium, it may
be possible to ascertain that a particular copy is contraband.
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software piracy has become widespread. 97 To appreciate just how
much of a threat this piracy may be to the legitimate software industry,
one need only review a few basic facts.
Millions of computers are used in the United States. In 1982 an
estimated 2.8 million personal computers were sold in the United
States. 98 Another five million were expected to be sold in 1983.99
Some estimate that by the end of the century there will be 80 million

personal computers in use.1°° All of these computers need programs to
perform useful functions. As one commentary has noted, "software

...is to computers what blades are to razors."''

Computers only

have value to their owners to the extent there are application programs-word processors, video games, balance sheet projections-to be

run on them. Most computers now have the capability of operating a
02
large number of programs.'

The demand for computers creates a demand for software. As
might be expected, the current market for software is thus very large

and is expected to grow dramatically in the next five to ten years. Estimates of total software revenues for 1982 run as high as $45 billion, of
which $3.1 billion was for sales of packaged software.'0 3 For 1983,
packaged software sales are expected to be more than $7 billion.'0 4 By
1987, packaged personal computer software sales alone are expected to
97. See, e.g., PlayingHardballwith Software, SCIENCE '83, May 1983, at 66; Piracyin Era of
Computers, N. Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at D2, col. 1; Getting Tough on Software Theft, BUSINESS
WEEK, May 31, 1982, at 28; Secrets of the Software Pirates,ESQUIRE MAO., Jan., 1982, at 58.
98. Friedrich, .4New World Dawns, TIME MAG., Jan. 3, 1983, at 14.
99. Seneker & Pearl, supra note 25, at 93. The total computer sales for 1983 were expected to
be more than $24 billion, of which about $6.5 billion would go for personal computers. Manuel,
U.S. Markets: DataProcessingand Software, ELECTRONICS MAG., Jan. 13, 1983, at 132.
100. Friedrich, supra note 98, at 16. Microcomputer sales are expected to reach $15 billion by
1987. Getting Tough on Software Theft, supra note 97, at 29.
101. Seneker & Pearl, supranote 25, at 93.
102. The number of programs any particular computer can have stored in its internal memory
is limited. The availability of supplementary memory devices such as disks, however, means that
the machine's internal memory storage capacity can be easily augmented.
103. Manuel, supra note 99, at 133. Software revenues include not only sales of prepackaged
software, but revenues from customized software, from leased software, and from maintenance of
these products and services. The growth in the software industry is evident by comparing the 1982
figures with the 1980 figures. Total software revenues in 1980 have been estimated at $13 billion
of which $3.6 billion were for sales of packaged software. See Seneker, supra note 93, at 143.
104. More than $1 billion will be for application programs and more than $4 billion for operating systems. Manuel, supra note 99, at 133. One research analyst thinks the microsoftware
market is growing by 43% a year, see Seneker & Pearl, supra note 25, at 93; another estimates
growth at 57% a year, id One software directory that has aimed to be comprehensive has identified 21,000 microsoftware packages for sale from 2900 different sources. Id at 94. Entry into this
market is relatively easy, especially for microsoftware packages, because of low capital costs. Id
The number of new entrants to the field can reasonably be expected to continue to grow as long as
the computer boom lasts. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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reach $4.8 billion. 05
The amount of piracy in this rapidly expanding market is difficult
to estimate with any precision. One analyst has estimated that thirty
percent of software industry revenues are lost to piracy.10 6 It is a major
problem in the industry. Preoccupation with the problem of piracy,
however, should not obscure the difficulties of using copyright to solve

the problem. That copyright is helpful in checking some forms of
piracy does not mean it is appropriate for checking all of them. There
may be other, more effective, ways to control piracy; 0 7 moreover, they
may be more appropriate than copyright to protect machine-readable
programs.
III.

WHY COPYRIGHT WAS PERCEIVED

To

BE A SOLUTION TO THE

PROBLEM OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER
PROGRAMS:

COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICE,

CONTU,
A.

AND CONGRESS

Copyright Office Practice.

When the issue of the copyrightability of computer programs first
arose,1 08 the Copyright Office had profound doubts about the concept-some of which were statutory and some of which were constitutional. 0 9 Under its "rule of doubt,"'

°

the Office decided, in 1964, to

105. Getting Tough on Software Thef, supra note 97, at 29.
106. Battling the Computer Pirates,N. Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1§83, at DI, col. 3. One company
whose annual sales are $26 million estimates its losses due to piracy at $20 million to $40 million a
year. Id "Some software producers estimate that half their sales are lost to illegal copies." Getting
Tough on Software Theft, supranote 97, at 28. The publisher of the magazine Sofialk has said, "'I
don't know anyone with a personal computer who doesn't have about $500 worth of free [pirated]
software.'" PlayingHardballwith Software, supra note 97, at 66, 67-69.
107. Efforts are underway to try to check piracy by technological means, for example, by making software which will operate only on the purchaser's computer. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983,
at D2, col. 1. See also PlayingHardballwith Software, supra note 97, at 67-69; Kolata, Scheme to
Foil Software Pirates, 221 SCIENCE 1279 (1983). The problem with this type of solution is its
restrictiveness. A proposal of the sort set forth infra notes 464-92 and accompanying text may be
more satisfactory to the industry, perhaps making this restrictiveness unnecessary.
108. Cary, the Deputy Register of Copyrights in 1964, reports that the issue first arose in 1961
when an aviation company deposited a copy of a computer tape for registration with the Copyright Office. See Cary, Copyright Registration and Computer Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 362, 363 (1964).
109. The statutory doubt was whether machine-readable versions of programs were "copies"
of programs within the meaning of that term under the 1909 Act as it had been interpreted by the
courts. Under White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908), copyright
protection was said to extend only to "copies which were perceptible to humans-things written or
printed... in intelligible notation." The constitutional doubt was whether machine-readable
versions of programs could be considered the "writings of an author" within the meaning of the
phrase in the enabling clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See infranote 181
and accompanying text. But see CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
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permit registration of programs as long as certain conditions were
leaving the ultimate question of copyrightability to the
met,'
courts." 2 Between 1964 and the enactment of the copyright revision
statute in 1976," s about 1200 programs, most of which were owned by
major corporations such as IBM, were registered with the Copyright
Office. 114 This was a very small proportion of the programs estimated
to have been written during that same period." 5 The copyrightability
of machine-readable forms of programs does not seem to have been
questioned in any litigation prior to the enactment of the copyright revision law.t 6
B.

The 1976 Revision of the Copyright Law.

By the time the Copyright Office promulgated its policy on registration of computer programs, Congress had already begun the massive
task of revising the federal copyright law.' ' Although the twenty-year
process of revision generated a great many reports and led to a great
110. See Cary, supranote 108, at 365 ("This doubt was such that the office considered itjustifiable to resolve the doubt in favor of registration, in keeping with its policy of giving the applicant
the benefit of the doubt wherever possible.").
111. The office first announced its willingness to accept programs for registration in May,
1964. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 82. The prerequisites were (1) the work had
to contain sufficient original authorship to be copyrightable; (2) the work had to be published with
a copyright notice; and (3) the copies of the program submitted for registration had to be in
human-readable (as contrasted with machine-readable) form (i.e., source code, not object code).
Id
112. See Cary, supranote 108, at 363 ("The resulting decision [to accept programs for registration] is not, of course, to be interpreted as constituting a judicial holding that a computer program
is in fact a 'writing' of an author. It is merely an administrative decision that, based upon existing
judicial precedents and statutory law, the courts might agree that it was a writing in the constitutional sense.").
113. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. (1982)), was enacted on October 19, 1976. Most of its provisions became effective on January 1, 1978.
114. CONTU Commissioner Hersey observed that only 1205 programs had been registered
between 1964 and January 1, 1977. HerseyDissent, supranote 4, at 34. Hersey noted that 971 of
the 1205 registered programs (80%) were owned by two companies-IBM and Burroughs Corp.
id
115. Hersey cited estimates that a million programs a year had been developed. Id
116. The CONTU Final Report states that the "Register's 1964 determination has never been
challenged." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note I, at 16. Subsequent to the issuance of that
Report, one case applied the 1909 Act to hold that machine-readable versions of computer programs were not copyrightable subject matter. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480
F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. II1. 1979), af'don othergrounds,628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). The CONTU
Report concedes that under the 1909 Act machine-readable programs may not have been protectible by copyright. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 7-8.
117. The revision of the copyright laws began in 1955 when Congress appropriated funds for a
comprehensive study of needed changes in the law. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at
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many hearings on a great many issues,'"8 the copyrightability of computer programs does not seem to have been among them.' 9 There is
some legislative history that suggests Congress contemplated that the

revised statute would extend to programs,

20

although, as enacted, the

statute itself is silent about computer programs; there is also legislative

history suggesting that Congress's decision to defer decision on some
computer-related matters included the copyrightability issue.1 21
Whatever mystery might have existed as to whether computer pro-

grams in machine-readable form were within the reach of the copyright
statute was, however, resolved in December, 1980, when Congress

amended the copyright law to make explicit that programs were copyrightable, thereby adopting the CONTU recommendations. 22 Without questioning the integrity or diligence of the CONTU
Commissioners who favored recommending that copyright protection
be available for machine-readable forms of programs, we may question
whether the Commission's conclusions were warranted. It is possible to
ask whether Congress was fully informed of the implications of the de-

cision before it was made and whether Congress might have acted differently if the information provided to it had been more complete and
if other alternatives had been explored by CONTU.
C.

CONTU's Mandatefrom Congress.

The major reason why Congress began -thinking of creating the
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works was
because it was having difficulty resolving one highly controversial issue. So contentious was the debate and lobbying on the issue that it

was among the matters delaying enactment of the whole copyright revi118. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION (Comm. Print 1961); COPYRIGHT Soc'Y OF THE U.S.A., STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (1983);
Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856 (1978); Symposium:
The Copyright Act of 1976, 24 UCLA L. REV. 951 (1977).
119. Since the Copyright Office had been so unsure of the constitutional and statutory implications of the extension of copyright protection to programs, it is curious that the issue did not
excite more congressional attention. However, CONTU's Final Report is the only congressionally
authorized study of the matter.
120. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]. The text of these references may be found infra at note 132.
121. See infra note 131.
122. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). As
mentioned supra note 9, these amendments were appended to a bill to amend the patent and
trademark law; the legislative history as to the copyright amendments is sparse. The recommendations of the Commission may be found in the CONTU Final Report, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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sion package.' 23 The issue was whether the owner of a copyrighted
work-such as a book-should be given the exclusive right to control
the encoding of his or her work in an electronic form for storage and
use in a computer or whether the copyright owner's exclusive rights
ought to be limited to the manufacture and distribution of "hard" copies of the work. 124 Congress was mindful of speculations that hardcopy distribution of books, journals and the like might diminish substantially, or perhaps even cease, and might be replaced with huge
memory banks containing computerized copies of these works that
each reader with access to the memory bank could "call up" and read
or duplicate at will.t 25 Book publishers understandably were con-

cerned about the financial implications of this, as were librarians and
educators. 126 The same groups were also intensely concerned about another controversial new technology issue, the photocopying of hardcopy materials, which more immediately affected their interests than
did the computerized data base issue. 127 Congress decided to include
representatives of these groups on the Commission. 128 The
123. See, e.g., R. SALTMAN, COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER-READABLE WORKS 27 (1977);
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 39 n.163. CONTU was first proposed in 1967. See S.

2216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 20,694 (1967).
124. R. SALTMAN, supra note 123, at 1.
125. Id
126. Id

127. Id at 23-26.
128. The Congress declared that CONTU should have four members representative of the
interests of authors and publishers; four representative of the interests of users of works (primarily
libraries and educational institutions); and four representative of the public interest generally (one
was specifically to be a consumer protection expert). Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 1873,
1874 (1974). The thirteenth member of CONTU was to be the Librarian of Congress. Id
President Ford appointed the following persons to the Commission:
-As representatives of the interests of authors and publishers:
1) John Hersey, novelist and journalist;
2) Dan M. Lacy, senior vice president of McGraw Hill, Inc.;
3) E. Gabriel Perle, Vice-President-Law, Time, Inc.;
4) Hershel B. Sarbin, Executive Vice President, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.
-As representatives of the interests of users:
5) William S.Dix, Librarian Emeritus, Princeton University;
6) Arthur R. Miller, Professor, Harvard Law School;
7) Robert Wedgeworth, Executive Director, American Library Association;
8) Alice Wilcox, Director of Minitext.
-As representatives of the public interest:
9) Stanley H. Fuld, formerly Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals (appointed Chair of the Commission);
10) George D. Cary, retired Register of Copyrights;
11) Melville B. Nimmer, Professor, U.C.L.A. Law School (appointed Vice-Chair);
12) Rhoda H. Karpatkin, Executive Director, Consumers Union.
Daniel J. Boorstin, the Librarian of Congress, and Barbara Ringer, the Register of Copyrights, were ex officio members of the Commission.
CONTU Final Report, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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copyrightability of computer programs was not named explicitly as an

issue to be studied, but it was certainly an unresolved new technology
issue. 129
In addition to establishing CONTU to study the computer-related
and photocopy issues,' 30 Congress decided to put an interim section
117 in the copyright revision bill to preserve the status quo-whatever

that was-as to the computer-related issues. 13 ' Whether the
copyrightability of computer programs in machine-readable form was
among the computer-related issues specifically deferred by Congress in
interim section 117 is somewhat unclear; most courts which have adt32
dressed the issue have said they were.
129.
130.
Section
sion on
(1)

See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
The bill establishing the Commission was passed in December, 1974. See supra note 1.
201(b) of Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873, 1874 (1974), directed the National CommisNew Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works to study
the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship(A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information, and
(B) by various forms of machine reproduction, not including reproduction by or at
the request of instructors for use in face-to-face teaching activities; and
(2) the creation of new works by the application or intervention of such automatic systems of machine reproduction.
Section 201(c) directed the Commission to make recommendations as to changes in copyright law
or procedures as may be necessary to assure access to copyrighted works and recognition of the
rights of copyright owners. Id
131. "Section 117 was agreed upon by interested parties as a means of permitting passage of
the revision bill without committing Congress to a position on the computer-related issue until
more study could be undertaken." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 39 n.163. Section 117
was first introduced into the copyright revision bill in 1969, S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REc. 1382 (1969); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 39 n.163, and was enacted as a
part of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 on October 19, 1976. The enigmatic interim § 117
states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does not
afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the
use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with any similar device,
machine, or process, than those afforded to works, under the law, whether title 17 or the
common law or statutes of a state, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and
construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), repealedby Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019, 3028 (1980).
132. Despite the apparent relation of these three developments-passage of a statute silent
about computer programs, inclusion of a "hold fast" provision, and the establishment of
CONTU-the extent of their interconnection has not been at all clear. Had Congress intended to
include machine-readable forms of programs within the reach of the 1976 Act? Had section 117
been intended to freeze the law only as to the encoding of hard-copy works, or was it meant to
freeze the law as to the copyrightability of machine-readable programs as well? Was the establishment of CONTU a decision to defer decision on this copyrightability issue until CONTU had had
a chance to study it as well as the issue of computerization of hard-copy materials? The CONTU
majority regarded the legislative history of the 1976 Act as unambiguously in favor of copyright
protection for machine-readable forms of programs. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote I, at 16.
Others, cited infra, have interpreted the 1976 Act as unambiguously deferring the decision.
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Curiously, the computer issue that brought about the creation of
CONTU does not seem to have caused any controversy within the
CONTU relied on two references to programs in one of the House reports on the copyright
revision bill to support its conclusion. The two references are as follows:
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works
accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expansion has fallen into two
general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries and technological developments
have made possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before. In some
of these cases the new expressive forms-electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for example--could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter
Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from
the outset without the need of new legislation. In other cases, such as photographs,
sound recordings, and motion pictues, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to give
them full recognition as copyrightable works.
HousE REPORT, supra note 120, at 51.
The term "literary works" does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional
works and compilations of data. It also includes computer data bases and computer
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression
of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.
Id at 54. (CONTU did not point out that the Senate Report on the copyright revision bill did not
include the same explicit reference to computer programs as literary works. See Nimmer, The
Subject Materof Copyrigit Under The Act of 1976, 24 UCLA L. REV. 978, 994-95 (1977).) Yet the
1976 Act was sufficiently ambiguous to cause CONTU to recommend that the copyright law be
amended to make explicit that machine-readable forms of programs were within the purview of
copyright. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at I.
The fact that CONTU derived its mandate to study the copyrightability of machine-readable
forms of programs from the same portion of Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873 (1974), that
directed CONTU to study the "use of copyrighted works. . . in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving and transferring information"--terms that track
very closely those in interim § 117-supports the argument of congressional deferral of decision
on the matter. Cf CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
Further evidence of the ambiguity of the legislative history of the 1976 Act is found in a
reference in a congressional report to machine-readable versions of programs as perhaps not being
"fixed" enough to qualify for copyright protection. That report states: "[Tihe definition of 'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those
projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on television or other cathode ray tube, or
captured momentarily in 'memory' of a computer." House REPORT, supra note 120, at 53.
CONTU dealt with this bit of legislative history by arguing that it was incorrect about fixation
and, therefore, could be ignored; the statutory definition of "fixed" was unambiguous, making
perusal of the legislative history unnecessary. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,at 22 n. I11.
Many who have found that the 1976 Act did not speak to the copyrightability issue have cited
the passage of an interim § 117 and the decision to establish CONTU in support of their arguments. See, e.g, Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 31. Commissioner Hersey acknowledged that
there were in the voluminous legislative history on the copyright revision bill a few passing references to computer programs which seemed to assume their copyrightability, but to him the § 117
moratorium "indicate[d] beyond a doubt that Congress has not reached the point of clear intention." Id
In several court decisions since the CONTU Final Report, the interim § 117 has been interpreted as an expression of Congress's decision to defer decision on the copyrightability issue as,to
machine-readable programs. The district court in Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480
F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1979), afd on othergrounds,628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), interpreted § 117 as requiring it to apply the rules under the 1909 Act to the copying of a program
encoded on a chip: "The legislative history for section 117 explains that this section was enacted
because the problems in the area of computer uses of copyrighted works are not sufficiently devel-
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Commission. 133 CONTU was unanimous in its conclusion that inserting and storing a copyrighted work as part of a computerized data
base was making a copy within the meaning of § 106 of the new law
34
and would, unless authorized, infringe the copyright.'
The issue that generated heated controversy within the Commis-

sion was the copyrightability of programs in machine-readable form.
oped for a definitive legislative solution. Thus, the purpose of § 117 is to preserve the status quo."
The court also noted that CONTU had been established to deal with these problems. Id at 1067
n.5. The court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982), rev'd,714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (reversal based on 1980, not 1976 law), stated, "Congressional intent regarding the copyrightability of object codes and ROMs is not clear. The 1976 Act
left intact the case law developed under the 1909 Act." 545 F. Supp. at 819 n.9. It also noted that
"CONTU was established in 1974 to make recommendations to Congress concerning the
copyrightability of computer software and programs." 545 F. Supp. at 817 n.17. The court in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779-80 (C.D. Cal. 1983), although
finding that under the 1980 amendments the machine-readable programs were copyrightable,
viewed the legislative history of the 1976 Act as reflecting prior indecisiveness on this issue. It
pointed to interim § 117. "Section 117 specifically preserved the preexisting state of the law as to
copyrightability of computer programs without clearly defining what the preexisting law was. The
status quo was preserved pending further study and decision by Congress." Id at 779. See also
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The language and
legislative history of the 1980 amendment are convincing that original section 117 was intended
only to leave unaltered the existing law governing the exclusive rights of owners of copyrights in
computer programs."). The Midway Manufacturingcourt made this remark in rejecting the defendant's argument that § 117 required resort to the 1909 Act and common law to determine
whether circuit boards can be copies of an audiovisual work such as a videogame. Cf.Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the
legislative history of the 1976 Act "suggested" that programs were considered copyrightable as
literary works but noting that § 117 was added to preserve the status quo until CONTU finished
its deliberations and made its report).
One court, Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 174 (N.D. Cal.
1981), has said that the interim § 117 pertained only to the controversial issue of "inputting"
works otherwise found in hard copy into computer memory. One must examine the language of
§ 117 closely to derive even this meaning from it. The language is certainly not narrow enough to
cover only this situation and no others. Since a source-code version of a computer program, just
like any other hard-copy material, must be "inputted" into the computer-that is, must be transformed into machine-readable form-it would have to be treated as within the reach of § 117 just
as other hard-copy material. The copyrightability of the source-code program thus would be as
secure as the copyright in a book put into a computer's memory storage. But the electronic version of a computer program-whether "used" in the sense of being "input" and stored in a computer memory, or in the sense of being processed through the computer-was not something
whose copyright implications Congress had settled, having left this to CONTU.
133. Only four paragraphs of the CONTU Final Report were devoted to discussion of it. See
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 39-40. There were no dissents to the Commission's
recommendation on this point. Id at 1.
134. "[The provisions of the new copyright law offer appropriate and sufficient guidance to
determine what acts create copyright liability in this area. The protection afforded by section 106
of the new law seemingly would prohibit the unauthorized storage of a work within a computer
memory, which would be merely one form of reproduction, one of the exclusive rights granted by
copyright." Id at 39. CONTU thought no change in the statute would be necessary to recognize
this, id, except, of course, the repeal of the interim § 117, id at 12.
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Even as to this issue, the Commission unanimously agreed that computer programs in machine-readable form deserved some form of legal
protection. 35 Several Commissioners, however, doubted36 whether
copyright was the proper means to protect these programs.'
D.

CONTU on Copyrightabilify of Machine-ReadablePrograms.

The issue of the copyrightability of machine-readable forms of
computer programs was not one on which the Commissioners had any
special expertise. 137 There were no computer scientists, no software or
hardware industry representatives, nor any users of complex software
systems on the Commission. Because Congress had decided that the
composition of the Commission should reflect the interests of groups
concerned about the computerization of hard-copy works and about
photocopying,13 8 this is not surprising. It was, however, unfortunate,
for the issue the Commission was to decide was of the utmost importance, and the Commissioners themselves were not well equipped to
take on the task.
A subcommittee of three Commissioners focused its attention on
the software protection issue.139 They unanimously favored copyright
protection for computer programs. Their argument on the
copyrightability of programs is worth studying, for it was carefully constructed to make it seem that copyright was indubitably the correct legal form, when, in fact, it is not. The argument began with a grand
sweep from the Renaissance through the Industrial Revolution during
which "technological developments [had] consistently extended society's power to control natural phenomena and to shape its own
destiny."' 40 Now society was experiencing an Information Revolution
in which "[n]ew means of communication [were] transcend[ing] words
135. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
136. At least four Commissioners had serious reservations about the chosen means. See supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text regarding the dissenting opinions and others with reservations

about the majority proposal.
137. One of the Commission members, Professor Arthur Miller, had eight years earlier written
one short article on computers and copyright law. See Miller, Computers and Copyright Law, 46
Mich. St. Bar J. 11 (1967). Another of the Commissioners, George D. Cary, had been the Register
of Copyrights at the time the Copyright Office had decided to permit registration of computer

programs.
138. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text regarding the composition of the

Commission.
139. The software protection subcommittee consisted of the Commission Chairman Stanley
Fuld, Professor Arthur Miller, and a Time, Inc. executive, Gabriel Perle. The Commission had
three other subcommittees: one on photocopying, one on data bases, and one on computer-created works. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.

140. Id at 9.
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fixed on paper or images on film and permit[ting] authors to communi-

41
cate creatively, adaptively, and dynamically with their audience."'
Digital computers and their programs were a central part of this
Revolution. 142 The social desirability of utilizing computers to free
43
humans from mundane tasks was evident.
Because computers had become more widely available, because

they had become able to use many different programs,"44 and because
programs were easy to replicate, a concern about legal protection for
programs was emerging.145 It was evident to CONTU that if program
authors were to have the incentive to create and disseminate their
works, there must be adequate legal protection for their product.' 46 A

critical reader might be willing to agree with these notions, but at the
same time might observe that none of this addressed the appropriate-

ness of copyright as a form of legal protection for machine-readable
programs.
CONTU then observed that the "universe of works protectible by
copyright [had] expanded along with the imagination, communications
media, and technical capabilities of science."' 47 Many of the statutory
emendations that had added new categories of works to the copyright
realm had been intended to accommodate new technological develop141. Id
142. Id Computer programs as a new form of "writing" are discussed briefly at this point in
the CONTU Final Report.
143. "For both economic and humanitarian reasons, it is undesirable for people to carry out
manually the process described in painstaking detail in a computer program. Machines, lacking
human attributes, cannot object to carrying out repetitious, boring and tedious tasks." Id at 10.
144. What CONTU said was that "programs have become less and less frequently written to
comply with the requirements imposed by a single-purpose machine." Id at 10. This is true, but it
does not, as some readers might think, necessarily imply that programs written for one machine
will work on others. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
145. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,at 10.
146. CONTU reminded the reader that this principle was the basis of copyright law. It posited that computer programs would only be disseminated if
1. the creator may recover all of its costs plus a fair profit on the first sale of the work,
thus leaving it unconcerned about the later publication of the work; or
2. the creator may spread its costs over multiple copies with some form of protection
against unauthorized duplication of the work; or
3. the creator's costs are borne by another, as, for example, when the government or a
foundation offers prizes or awards; or
4. the creator is indifferent to cost and donates the work to the public.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. CONTU recognized that the third and fourth possibilities were rare in this country and thus might not provide the broad incentive needed to produce programs. The first would cause program prices to be so high that there would be a reduction
in the number of programs marketed. The second was the copyright solution which appealed to
the majority of the commissioners.
147. Id at 11.
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ments.148 Since copyright had been expanding all along, its expansion
to cover programs in machine-readable form seemed to the CONTU
majority to be a part of a natural progression. 49 That relatively few
statutory changes in the copyright law would be needed to make appro-

priate accommodations for computer programs also seemed to demonstrate the suitability of copyright.' 50
The inadequacy of other forms of legal protection for machinereadable forms of programs was another factor that persuaded

CONTU of the importance of protecting them through copyright.
Supreme Court cases had questioned the patentability of computer programs.' 5 1 Trade secret law and the common law of misappropriation
148. Id at 15. The constitutional term "writings," the CONTU majority noted, had a "broad
and dynamic meaning" that could be seen in the variety of work that had been found to be
constitutionally copyrightable. Id at 14.
149. CONTU viewed copyright as appropriately balancing the author's interests, the user's
interests, and the public interest:
To provide reasonable protection for proprietors without unduly burdening users of
programs and the general public, the following statements concerning program copyrights ought to be true:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of these works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these works.
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemination of these works.
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power than is necessary to
achieve the incentive to create.
Id at 12.
150. CONTU recommended three statutory changes: Section 117 would have to be repealed;
a definition of "computer program" would have to be inserted into § 101; and a new § 117, which
would permit authorized users to adapt programs to their needs and to replicate the programs for
archival purposes, was needed. Id at 12. CONTU was of the opinion that the statutory redefinition of the term "copies" removed any doubt that machine-readable versions of programs were
within the statutory reach of the Copyright Act. Under the 1976 Act "copies" had been defined to
mean "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'copies' includes
the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982). Under the 1909 Act, the term "copy" had been interpreted to require human readability.
See supra note 109; see also infra text accompanying note 194 for a contrary interpretation of the
definition of "copy."
151. At the time CONTU issued its final report, there had been three cases before the
Supreme Court concerning the patentability of computer programs. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 504
(1978) (program to update alarm limits for catalytic converter not patentable as a process); Dann
v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (program for cash dispensing machine not patentable because
obvious); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (program to convert binary-coded numbers
from one form to another held not to be patentable subject matter because it involved only mathematical formula). See infra text accompanying notes 430-36 for further discussion of Benson and
Flok. Because in all three cases the Supreme Court had found the programs ineligible for patent
protection, it was not clear the Supreme Court would ever find programs to be patentable. In
none of these cases, however, had the Court gone so far as to say programs would never be eligible. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 16-17.
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52
were said to be too limited in scope to provide adequate protection. 1
The CONTU majority report, however, nowhere suggests that any conof intellectual
sideration whatever was given to developing a new form
53
property law to protect machine-readable programs.'
The sense of the inevitability of copyright as a proper form of protection continued to build in the lengthy discussion of the compatibility
of programs with copyright doctrine. Of course, the scope of the program copyright, in accordance with copyright tradition, would not exbut only to the program author's
tend to the ideas or processes,
"expression" of those ideas. t54 Nor would Copyright protect the electromechanical functioning of a machine. 155 CONTU concluded that
the use of programs in conjunction with machines was no more a copyright problem than was the use of phonograph records in conjunction
with phonograph machines.' 5 6 The law would require that sufficient
intellectual labor be put into a program to make it "an original work of
authorship" within the meaning of the copyright law. 157 If the idea of
Disadvantages of patent law, apart from the uncertainty, were said to be the expense and time
required to obtain legal protection, and the high standards required to achieve patent rights.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
152. Trade secret law was said by CONTU to be "inappropriate for protecting works that
contain the secret and are designed to be widely distributed. Although this matters little in the
case of unique programs prepared for large commercial customers, it substantially precludes the
use of trade secrecy with respect to programs sold in multiple copies over the counter to small
businesses, schools, and consumers, and hobbyists." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 17.
The lack of national uniformity in trade secret law and the expense of maintaining secrecy were
other factors which caused CONTU to conclude that trade secret protection was inadequate. Id
at 17-18.
Misappropriation theory, which was "based upon the principle that one may not appropriate
a competitor's skill, expenditure and labor," id at 18, was also subject to local variations in interpretation. CONTU felt this law, by itself, was unlikely to provide sufficient protection for programs. Id
Table 1 in the CONTU Report shows the considerations CONTU weighed in deciding upon
the most approprate form of legal protection. Of the theories it considered, CONTU reported that
"copyright has the smallest negative impact." Id at 18.
153. Commissioner Hersey's dissent suggests that other forms of protection for programs
might develop if copyright did not. See Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 27.
154. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 18-19. CONTU here discussed the "venerable
case," Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
155. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
156. "All that copyright protection for programs, videotapes, and phonorecords means is that
users may not take the works of others to operate their machines. In each instance, one is always
free to make the machine do the same thing as it would if it had the copyrighted work placed in it,
but only by one's own creative effort rather than by piracy." Id at 21. But see infra notes 340-48
and accompanying text for a discussion of significant differences between computer programs and
phonograph records.
157. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 20. This labor is required by the Copyright Act
of 1976, § 102, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544-45 (codified as amended, at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982) cited in CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
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the program could be expressed in but a limited number of ways, the
program embodying it could not be copyrighted. This too, CONTU

said, was in accordance with copyright tradition.

58

Near the end of its report about software protection, CONTU said
that it would be best to leave to the courts the task of making fine dis-

tinctions as to the copyrightability of the "various manifestations" of
programs. 5 9 But the overall tenor of its report was that all programs
160
were the same and none presented any copyrightability problems.

E.

Inadequaciesof the CONTU FinalReport.

The CONTU Final Report was misleading in a number of ways.
First, CONTU interpreted the legislative history of the 1976 Act as

unambiguously providing copyright protection for machine-readable
programs when there was, in fact, ambiguity in the legislative history
on the issue.16 1 CONTU's insistence that there was no ambiguity set
the tone of the report, as if the presumption had already been established solidly in favor of copyrightability.

Second, a serious failure in the CONTU Report was its refusal to
address straightforwardly whether granting copyright protection to

machine-readable programs was consistent with the constitutional goal
of promoting the progress of science and the arts, which in patent and
158. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 20. CONTU's investigation led it to conclude
that program ideas could be expressed in a virtually limitless number of ways. Id at 18 n.106.
CONTU also discussed the means by which programs could be misappropriated. Why should it
matter, CONTU asked, whether one copies from the handwritten form or duplicates a chip? Was
not the same thing taken? Id at 22.
159. "Should a line need to be drawn to exclude certain manifestations of programs from
copyright, that line should be drawn on a case-by-case basis by the institution designed to make
fine distinctions-the federal judiciary." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. It is interesting that neither district court that found copyright protection for machine-readable versions of
programs to be problematic relied on this statement to support its conclusion. See Data Cash Sys.,
Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 1979) aft'don othergrounds,628 F.2d
1038 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812,
823-24 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'4 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
160. CONTU also discussed the economic and cultural effects of extending copyright protection to computer programs. As to the former, CONTU believed there was no reason to fear that
granting such copyright protection would have anticompetitive consequences. CONTU FINAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-25. Even if it did, there were antitrust laws to deal with such
problems. Id As to the latter consideration, CONTU thought there was reason to be hopeful that
granting copyright protection would result in widespread dissemination of programs, which in
turn would result in many cultural advances-improved education, health care, and entertainment, to name a few. Any dehumanizing effects that might be attributable to computers would be
completely unrelated to the issue of the proper mode of protection for programs. Id at 25-26.
The Hersey Dissent and Nimmer Concurrence, supra notes 4-5, will be discussed at length infra
notes 278-82, 337-48 & 401-12 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 132.
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copyright law has traditionally meant disclosure of the protected work.

Third, CONTU
was also misleading in its description of programs as
62
"writings."'

CONTU used the word "program" ambiguously, seldom telling the reader when it was referring to source code, when to

machine code, and when to both. Sometimes its statements about "programs" were true only for source code.163 CONTU repeatedly empha-

sized the "readability" of programs, when it knew or should have
known that programs cease to be "readable" in any meaningful sense
when converted to machine-readable form.

64

CONTU also empha-

sized the display functions of some computer programs-pictures,
words, music-as if they were characteristic of all programs. 65 In fact
only a small fraction of programs produce any meaningful display.
Moreover, what a copyright in a machine-readable program protects is
something quite different than the visual display on a screen.
Fourth, the CONTU Report reflects a blindness to the "utilita-

rian" objection to the copyrightability of programs. There is a long
tradition in copyright law of denying copyright protection to "utilitarian" works, that is, works that have a usefulness other than the con-

veying of information or the displaying of an appearance.166 Congress
had codified and even stiffened this rule in 1976.167 CONTU's empha-

sis on the display functions of some programs as if they were representative of all programs contributed to the misunderstanding of the utility
162. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
163. For example, CONTU stated that the set of instructions constituting a program "may be
read, understood, and followed by a human being." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
This is true for source code, but not for machine code. See supranote 74; see also infra notes 26971 and accompanying text.
164. Id The term "read" in the computer science lexicon has a precise technical meaning very
different from the general public's view of the meaning of the word. See supranote 44. CONTU
used "read" ambiguously, not differentiating between its use in the computer science sense and in
its more ordinary sense. When one realizes that "load" or "retrieve" are synonyms for "read" in
the computer-science sense, one can understand the implications of the machine aspect of the
term. One may "load" a mousetrap or "retrieve" a book from the library, but these are very
different things from reading a mousetrap or reading a book. See Hersey Dissent,supranote 4, at
30 ("[I]f a skilled programmer can 'read' a program in its mature, machine-readable form, it is
only in the sense that a skilled home-appliance technician can 'read' the equally mechanical
printed circuits of a television receiver."); Stem, The Caseofthe PurloinedObject Code: Can It Be
Solved? (Part1), BYrE, Sept. 1982, at 420, 430 (critical of Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981), for misunderstanding the term "read":
"Worst of all, the court seems to have badly confused itself with its metaphors. The court speaks
of a computer's 'reading' or 'understanding' object code, and 'act[ing] upon its instructions,' analogously to a person's reading or understanding a source program or other literary work. But the
court mistakes its figure of speech for reality. Computers and other machines do not readbooks or
understandthem in the same sense as a person does.").
165. See infra notes 269, 341 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 296-317 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
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issue. But many programs do not display or convey anything to
humans; they are "utilitarian" in the copyright sense. Operating systems and microcode fall in this category, as do many application programs. Because CONTU failed to consider the copyright implications
of these wholly utilitarian kinds of programs, the courts have been
forced to grapple with the statutory contradiction.168 CONTU's misunderstanding of the utility issue also indicates a lack of understanding of
the classical difference between patent and copyright protection for

programs. 169

IV.

DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES WITH FITTING MACHINE-READABLE
PROGRAMS INTO THE COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK

A.

The Failureof Machine-ReadableProgramsto Disclose the Ideas
They Contain.

A substantial part of the value of a commercially valuable piece of
software once converted to machine-readable form will be due to one
or more new ideas embodied in that program. 170 To maximize profit
potential, the programmer will want to publish the program in
machine-readable form only, keeping secret the source code. If the
source code is made public, the ideas in the innovative program can be
used by competitors to develop a similar or even improved program
171
which can be sold at a lower price.
A computer program in machine-readable form is simply a bewildering string of thousands or millions of high and low voltage electrical
impulses. Machine-readable programs reveal neither the ideas they
72
embody, nor the manner in which the ideas are expressed.1 If copy-

right is permitted to extend to machine-readable programs and there is
no requirement that the source code be published, one of the traditional norms of copyright law would be subverted. It has been the rule
that bringing new ideas into the public domain was the quid pro quo
the public received in exchange for the limited monopoly right the au168. See infra notes 354-96 and accompanying text.
169. See infra note 333 and accompanying text.
170. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Grogan, supra note 75, at 2:
[A]n understanding of the logic and engineering of a program may assist a potential

competitor in designing a similar system. The creation of some programs may involve
many man-months or man-years of development time, and allowing a competitor to
understand fully the structure and the logic of such a program may give the competitor
what amounts to a 'free ride,' i.e., may allow the competitor to develop a similar product
without devoting comparable time and resources to the developmental effort.
172. See supranote 74. The strongest evidence is that program vendors will often not sell the
source code for the program, but only the machine-readable version. See supra note 75.
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thor received to protect his or her expression of the ideas.' 73
As the law seems now to stand, the public may get for its grant of
copyright monopoly to machine-readable computer programs a watch
that accurately tells time according to the set of instructions that the
programmer gave the watch. The public will not, however, learn what
specific instructions the watch contains or any innovative ideas the program employs to make the watch work properly. This raises two questions: Is this enough to satisfy the public interest? And is this enough
to satisfy the constitutional purpose underlying the law? The answer to
both questions is no.
1. Disclosure as a Goal of Copyright Law. Disclosure as a goal
of the copyright laws has constitutional underpinnings. Article I of the
United States Constitution empowers Congress to grant authors the exclusive right to their writings for a limited time "in order to promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."' 174 As the Register of
Copyright reported to Congress: "As reflected in the Constitution, the
ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of
learning and culture for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive
rights to authors for a limited time is a means to that end."' 75 Disclosure as a goal of copyright law was reaffirmed in 1975 by the Supreme
173. See, e.g., R. SALTMAN, supra ncte 123, at 2 (disclosure as quid pro quo for copyright
protection).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965), the
Supreme Court considered the extent to which the constitutional clause concerning the promotion
of science and the useful arts has been viewed as a limitationon the power of Congress to grant
patents (and presumably also copyrights):
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly
without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
'promote the Progress of... Useful Arts.' This is the standardexpressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.
Id at 5-6 (emphasis in the original).

175. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (1961). This report described the
nature of copyright as follows:
In essence, copyright is the right of an author to control the reproduction of his intellectual creation. As long as he keeps his work in his sole possession, the owner's absolute
control is physical fact. When he discloses the work to others, however, he makes it
possible for them to reproduce it. Copyright is a legal device to give him the right to
control its reproduction after it has been disclosed.
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by
the author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical, graphic, or artistic form in which
the author expresses intellectual concepts. It enables him to prevent others from reproducing his individual expression without his consent. But anyone is free to create his
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Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 17 6 where the Court
declared that the immediate copyright aim of compensating authors for
their creative efforts "must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability" of the creative works. 177 Both patent 78 and
copyright have been insistent on disclosure as an aim of the grant of
monopoly.
The copyright protection an author receives is of a limited sort.
The copyright protects against theft of the particularities of the author's
expression, but not from appropriation of any ideas expressed. 17 9 The
ideas in a work--even if they are highly original, extraordinarily ingenious, and exceedingly valuable, and even if they took the author many
years of effort to develop-have traditionally been viewed as beyond
the scope of legal protection. 180 The copyright does not protect the
work that went into the creation, but only the words or notes or pictures the work reveals. The ideas are dedicated by the author to the
public domain upon publication of the work.
The current copyright statute incorporates this principle. "In no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."' 8' Although the principle was not codified in the copyright statute until
own expression of the same concepts, or to make practical use of them, as long as he does
not copy the author's form of expression.
Id at 3.

176. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). See also Hoehling v. University City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974
(2d Cir. 1980) ("The copyright provides a financial incentive to those who would add to the corpus
of existing knowledge by creating original works."); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 31819 (7th Cir. 1897) ("The object of [the copyright statute] was to promote the dissemination of
learning."); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) ("Copyright protection is extended
to authors, mainly with a view to inducing them to give their ideas to the public, so that. . . they
may be used for the intellectual advancement of mankind."); infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
177. 422 U.S. at 156. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1965) for its discussion of Thomas Jefferson's philosophy on the nature and purpose of the patent monopoly (which
stems from the same constitutional provision as the copyright monopoly): "The patent monopoly
was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive right to an
invention was the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideasand was not to be freely given. Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly."
178. See infra notes 240-54 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B][2] (1982).
180. See, e.g., Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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1976, it has been part of the copyright law tradition for a very long
time.
The venerable case of Baker v. Selden 8 2 illustrates this principle.
Selden was the author of a copyrighted book on a novel way to do
bookkeeping. The book contained an explanatory text and some sample ledger sheets. Baker's book on the same bookkeeping system included very similar sample ledger sheets, albeit with somewhat
different column headings and rearranged columns. Selden's heirs
claimed infringement of the copyright. As the Supreme Court viewed
the matter, there was no infringement of that which Selden's copyright
protected. The evidence showed only that Baker had written on the
same system of bookkeeping. Such similarities in expression as there
were between Baker's and Selden's work were due to the similarity of
their subject matter. The Court stated:
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the
author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as
to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.
The very object ofpublishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But

this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could
not be used
without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.' 83
Selden's copyright entitled him to protection from usurpation of his
"explanation" of the bookkeeping system; the "art" itself, unless patented, belonged to the public. 184 The property right in the explanation-to the extent appropriation of it was necessary to practice the
art-had to give way to the free right of the public to use the art. 85
Two courts in recent computer program copyright cases have been
so troubled by the lack of disclosure of the machine-readable programs
that they have denied relief on copyright claims, although they did so
without reference to the Constitution. 86 Courts in other computer program cases have either not addressed this issue 8 7 or not been con182. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).

183. Id at 103 (emphasis added).
184. Id at 104.
185. The Court in Baker v. Selden also stated: "[The teachings of science and the rules and
methods of useful art have their final end in application and use; and this application and use are
what the public derive from the publication of a book which teaches them." Id at 104.
186. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1071 (N.D. I11.1979), a9'd
on other grounds,628 F. 2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 823-25 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'a, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
187. See, e.g., GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Tandy Corp. v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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cerned by it.188 Several of these cases have involved operating system
programs. Although conceding the invisibility of operating system programs, the courts have generally refused to distinguish among types of
89
programs for copyright purposes.'

A study published in 1977, the year before the CONTU Final Report was completed, concluded that copyright protection should not be
188. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d
Cir. 1983) (holding that the copyright statute no longer requires communication with a human
audience); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 2 CoPYRiHT L. REp.
(CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (drawing the same conclusion). There is little discussion
of the issue in these cases.
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982), a videogame
case, also rejected a defendant's argument that to be copyrightable a work "must be intelligible to
human beings and must be intended as a medium of communication to human beings." The
Williams court found the answer to this contention "in the words of the statute itself," id at 877, in
particular in the definition of the word "copy" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). For a contrary interpretation of the statute, see infra note 194 and accompanying text. Williams was relied on heavily by
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in its reversal of the district court's decision in favor of
the defendant in Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1240. It is well to remember that Williams
was a videogame case involving audiovisual and program copyrights that relied heavily on prior
videogame cases which involved only copyrights on the audiovisual display of these games, not on
the programs responsible for producing the display. The audiovisual nature of the videogames
has allowed courts hearing challenges to the audiovisual copyrights to integrate this new form of
work into traditional copyright docrine. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l. Inc., 547 F.
Supp. 999, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afl'd,704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Plaintiff claims copyright
Specifically, the
protection only in the series of images and sounds appearing on the screen ....
protection extends to the fanciful design of the characters used to play the games, the distinctive
manner in which the characters move, and the sounds associated with that movement."). See also
Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 610-13 (7th Cir.
1982) ("ocular comparison" of the two games made); Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852,
855-56 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479-80 (D. Neb.
1981); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981). But see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,748, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no infringement of audiovisual copyright, but infringement of program copyright). The court in Stern Electronicsrecognized
that a particular videogame audiovisual display may be produced by two completely different and
independently developed programs. See 669 F.2d at 855.
189. The district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 780
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (emphasis in original), aftd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), rejected the argument
that operating system programs should be treated differently than application programs:
Essentially, allcomputer programs as embodied in ROMs and diskettes are designed to
operate a machine in such a way as to ultimately produce some useful communication to
the user-that is their purpose. It is difficult to understand how they can be classified
into two categories for copyright purposes, with protection afforded to one category and
not the other, based on whether they directly generate that communication or whether
they merely direct certain machine functions which eventually result in that expression
There is nothing in any of the statutory terms which suggest a different result for
different types of computer programs based upon the function they serve within the
machine.
While one could quarrel with the court's conclusion about the communicability of operating system programs and blame CONTU for Congress's failure to make distinctions among programs
based on their different functions, it is clear the court was right that the statute does not distinguish among programs as regards their display capabilities.
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extended to machine-readable versions of programs as such, in large

part because "copyright registration of object code as a computer program discloses almost nothing in return for the protection of the

law."' 90 The researchers argued that a grant of copyright protection to
machine-readable programs was not only inconsistent with copyright
tradition, but also against the public interest. After pointing out that
knowledge has become an increasingly important resource in the
United States, the authors of the study stated:
[T]here is a strong public interest in maximizing disclosure on two
counts: first, for the maximization of information transfer about
original works, with all the implications for additional creativity that
this implies; and second, to make meaningful the exchange of full
protection of copyright for disclosure through registration. If registration is to imply a minimal disclosure, then the proprietor is capable of obtaining two opposite types of protection, surely not the
intent of Congress. A permission for minimal disclosure would give
full copyright protection; but, would permit the proprietor to maintain his work essentially secret, particularly if he makes it available
through lease agreements only with restrictive disclosure clauses.191

The problem is a new one. Until the advent of computer programs, copyrighted works that were sold to the public communicated
the ideas they contained. Unpublished works that might have claimed

copyright protection had little or no commercial value. Now it is possible both to publish a work and keep it secret, and keeping it secret is

92
part of the way the commercial value of the work is maintained.
Computer programs in machine-readable form are the first type of
copyrightable work to have a major commercial value without disclo-

sure. The well-known copyright scholar Ralph S. Brown has expressed
190. R. SALTMAN, supra note 123, at 62. This study recommended allowing copyright protec-

tion for source code and treating machine-readable versions as "copies" of source code, but not
treating machine-readable forms as independently copyrightable. The Saltman study was not discussed in the CONTU Final Report. Iskrant, an early student of the copyrightability of machinereadable programs, was also concerned about the compatibility of programs with the copyright
goal of disclosure. He thought the disclosure concerns could be resolved because the public could
always go to the Copyright Office to look at the full text of the source code. Iskrant, supra note 30,
at 126. As indicated infra notes 211-22 and accompanying text, this is no longer possible. Iskrant
also thought that a computer could be made to print out the source code, Iskrant, supra note 30, at
106, but this is possible only if the source code is separately stored in memory, see supra note 67.
191. R. SALTMAN, supra note 123, at 52.
192. See Note, Protection of Computer Software-A Hard Problem, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 180,

181 (1977). This Note expressed concern about the lack of disclosure of machine-readable programs. "Since the purpose of publishing copyrighted works is disclosure, it is not clear whether
programs in [machine-readable form] could be 'published' since they were not intelligible to the
general public." Id at 195. The Note went on to say that disclosure problems have been solved by
technology because programs could now be translated into printed form. Id The Note was, however, in error on this point, as well as in believing that programmers would make their programs
available to the public in a readable form.
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his concern about this development by saying that "[t]he notion of se193
cret copyrights is abominable."'

Of course, neither the Constitution nor the federal copyright statutes, present or past, have explicitly stated that disclosure is either a

prerequisite to, or a goal of, federal copyright protection.

94

But until

the computer program problem arose, such an explicit statement had

been unnecessary. Authors affixed copyright notices to their works
when the works were published, 95 and publication meant that the
work was disclosed to the public. 196 While copyright law has respected
193. N. Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at 29, col. 3.
194. The text of § 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified, as amended, at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)), can be read to require disclosure of the
copyrighted work. This provision states that copyright subsists "in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine." Id 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) defines "copies" to mean "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device." Both sections seem to require that the work to be protected-in the case
of computer programs, the set of statements or instructions-be communicated either directly or
with the aid of a machine. Although both sections refer to the reproductionof the work, the words
"otherwise communicated" indicate that Congress may have intended only reproductions of a
communicative sort to be within the terms of the statute. The set of instructions that constitute a
program cannot meaningfully be said to be communicated when the face of a silicon chip is
viewed. Nor can it meaningfully be said that the instructions are communicated by aid of a
machine, either directly or indirectly. Some programs in machine-readable form may cause some
words or pictures to be displayed on a screen, but those words or pictures are not the instructions
which constitute the program. Furthermore, as supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text indicated, many programs do not have any display functions whatever but operate only within the
computer.
There are some kinds of copyrighted works that are used in conjunction with a machine or
device that do communicate the substance-the ideas and the expression-of the work that is
protected. A tape recording, when played on a tape recorder, will communicate to the listener the
whole of the copyrighted work, that is, the music performed and recorded at a particular time and
place by a particular person or group. The same is true of a videotape or a film. It is not, however, true of computer programs in machine-readable form, and that is why machine-readable
programs may not be copyrightable under the statutory provisions. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aft'don othergrounds, 628
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980); Stern, ROMs in Search ofa Remedy: Can They FindIt, 1 COMPUTER
L. REP. 4, 6-7 (1982). Although the court in Data Cash Systems applied the 1909 Act to the
copying of a computer chip for a chess game, it stated that it would have ruled no differently
under the 1976 Act. The court thought ROM chips could not be "copies" of copyrighted works
within the meaning of section 101 because the work in them could not be perceived with the aid of
a machine or device. The 1976 Act "applie[d] to computer programs in their flow chart, source
and assembly phases but not in their object phase." JS&,4, 480 F. Supp. at 1066-67 n.4.
195. Copyright Act of 1909, § 10, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (repealed 1976); cf.
17 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (analogous provision).
196. To obtain a federal copyright certificate, it was necessary to deposit a copy of the published work with the Copyright Office. Copyright Act of 1909, § 11, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat.
1075, 1078 (repealed 1976).
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the right of an author not to publish his work,1 97 it has not previously
had to confront the dilemma of whether to protectpublishedworks unaccompanied by disclosure. The law has always assumed that, as the
Supreme Court said in Baker v. Selden, "[t]he very object of publishing
a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the
useful knowledge which it contains."' 98
If the purpose of the copyright law were only to reward the creative efforts of an author, then rewarding the program author irrespective of the extent of his disclosure would be sensible. 9 9 While
rewarding the author is certainly an important purpose, it is not the
only, nor even the major, purpose. The Register of Copyrights recently
emphasized the importance of disclosure as a goal of copyright law,
saying "authorship, although often profoundly, even painfully, solitary,
is fruitful and socialy useful only when its works are disclosed. ' ' 20°
The constitutional purpose of promoting the progress of science and
the arts will be furthered only if copyright rewards solely those who
make the progress known. Furthermore, seventy-five years is too long a
period of protection to give program owners who do not disclose their
works. 20 ' The public is not getting enough in exchange to warrant such
197. Federal copyright now subsists in original works of authorship from the time they are
first fixed in any tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
198. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
199. One recent Note has concluded that "copyright law has evolved beyond its traditional

purpose of encouraging disclosure of original ideas." Note, CopyrightProtectionof Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1723, 1740 (1983). The Note acknowledged that disclosure
had been an important goal of copyright from as early as 1834, id, and cited Twentieth Century
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), as affirming the continuation of this important historical goal,
Note, supra,at 1739. The author based his conclusion that disclosure was no longer important on
the "structure" of the Copyright Act of 1976. He pointed to nothing in the extensive legislative
history of that Act or its subsequent amendment to support the conclusion of congressional intent
to make such a significant departure from copyright tradition.
Another source which seems to accept the conclusion that disclosure is not required under the
copyright law is National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d
478 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983). In a counterclaim to a copyright and trademark infringement complaint, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Copyright Office's "secure test" regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (1984), under which the plaintiff's Multistate
Bar Examination had been registered with the Copyright Office. The defendant argued that the
regulations conflicted with the disclosure goals of the copyright law. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of this counterclaim, stating that "the statutory scheme of the
Copyright Act demonstrates that the deposit provisions are not for the purpose of disclosure." Bar
Examiners,692 F.2d at 486. But educational and professional qualification tests would seem to
present a special case. The public has a strong interest in the security of these tests. See infra note
223. Very different considerations are involved in computer program nondisclosure.
200. Ladd, Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, New York University Law Center (Apr. 13,
1983), reported25 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 627 (Apr. 28, 1983) 530, 533.
201. Corporate owners of published copyrighted works receive seventy-five years of protection
under 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982). The Hersey Dissent questioned the desirability of granting such
a lengthy duration of protection for computer programs. See Hersey Dissent, supranote 4, at 34.
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a lengthy monopoly.
2. The Code-Book Cases. Some proponents of the
copyrightability of machine-readable programs have relied on a set of
cases involving code books to demonstrate that human intelligibilitythat is, disclosure of content to a human audience-is not necessary for
a work to qualify for copyright protection.202 A close reading reveals
that these cases do not, in fact, stand for the proposition that intelligibility is unnecessary for copyright. They stand only for the proposition
that published code books are copyrightable. Except perhaps in recent
computer program cases, the broader intelligibility issue does not seem
20 3
to have been decided by the courts.
2 °4 inThe 1921 case of Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc.

volved a challenge to the copyrightability of a published book entitled
Simplex Pocket Blank Code. The book contained a title page and a list
of 6325 words, each of which was five letters in length, numbered consecutively from 38,495 to 44,819. The words had apparently been
coined for the first time by the author of the code book. The book was
written to be sold to those who might wish to make use of it to construct a private code for sending cable messages. Parties could agree
between themselves on the meaning they wished to ascribe to one or
more of the coined words in Reiss's book. Reiss's book simply provided readers with a set of otherwise meaningless words for these private communications.
The nature of the National Quotation Bureau's alleged infringement of the Reiss book is not apparent from the case, but it was most
205
likely the same as that alleged in American Code Co. v. Bensinger
206
and Haroeldv. Peterson, the other code-book cases, namely the subsequent publication of a competing code book making use of some sub2 07
stantial part or all of the first author's list of potential code words.
202. The cases are Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937); American Code Co. v.
Bensinger, 282 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1922); Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1921). Sources relying on one or more of these cases have included Iskrant, supra note
30, at 117, and Note, supranote 199, at 1731. CONTU also found the code book cases useful to
support its case for copyright protection for machine-readable code. See CONTU FINAL REPORT,

supra note 1, at 21, infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
204. 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
205. 282 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).
206. 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
207. In American Code, a preliminary injunction had issued against the defendant's publication of a code book on the showing that the defendant had "appropriated everything the plaintiff
copyrighted, and ha[d] reproduced the same by photo-lithographic processes, and [was] proposing
to sell it at a much cheaper rate than the plaintiff." 282 F. at 836. In HarnFeld,a final judgment
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Notwithstanding the eloquent musings of Judge Learned Hand
about whether words must have meaning to be copyrightable, 20 8 it is
clear that the author of the code book in Reiss had in fact disclosed
what he intended to express. That is, he provided the reader with a set
of words that could be used to send coded messages. The words themselves were not given a hidden coded meaning by the author. The

value of the book lay in what it revealed. Because Reiss disclosed his
ideas and his expression for a coding system, Reiss v. National Quotalion Bureau is not a precedent upon which to build the argument that

authors need not disclose their meanings to get copyright protection for
9

20
their works.

against the author of a code book who had been found to have drawn a substantial proportion of
its content from the plaintiffs code book was affirmed. 91 F.2d at 1001.
In Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. at 717, if the National Quotation Bureau
had only sent someone a message using 100 words from Reiss's code book, it is be unlikely that
National Quotation would have been found liable for infringement of the Reiss code book.
Under Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), it would seem that such a use of Reiss's words would
be necessary to practice the art the code book taught, and therefore, noninfringing. It would also
seem that what National Quotation would have been expressing by such a use of Reiss's words
was sufficiently different from what Reiss was expressing with the words as to be noninfringing.
One might also argue that Reiss's publication of the coined words put them into the public domain, and that since National Quotation was not publishing them in the same order and to the
same end as Reiss, its use would be privileged.
208. The question which intrigued Judge Hand was whether the coined words already had to
have a meaning to be copyrightable. He recognized that "[tihese words have a prospective meaning, but as yet they have not received it, like an empty pitcher." Reiss, 276 F. at 718. He pointed
out that some writers had written avowedly senseless prose "designed by its sound alone to produce an emotion." Id Furthermore, he said: "Works of plastic art need not be pictorial. They
may be merely patterns, or designs, and yet they are within the statute. A pattern or an ornamental design depicts nothing; it merely pleases the eye. If such models or paintings are 'writings,' I
can see no reason why words should not be such because they communicate nothing. They may
have their uses for all that, aesthetic or practical." Id at 718-19. All of Judge Hand's examples
are of works with some communicated content which made the works copyrightable.
209. For the code cases to be apposite to the problem that machine-readable programs present, it would be necessary for them to involve infringement claims based on coded messages of the
sort illustrated by the following hypothetical. Assume A sends B a coded message which C intercepts and through diligent effort decodes. Assume A claims a copyright both in the coded
message and in its uncoded version. Would C's publication of the decoded message infringe the
copyright A claims in the coded message? The decoded message would contain none of the same
words that the coded message revealed on its face. Yet there would be a one-to-one correspondence between the coded words and the expression for which they are meant to stand. Would C's
publication of the decoded message infringe A's copyright in the uncoded version? Or would C's
independent creation of this message mean C was free from liability? If C discovered the exact
expression A was intending to convey to B, would C's publication be an infringing work? Does
A's copyright extend to what he meant, to what he said, or both?
Computer programs in machine-readable form raise coded message problems. When one
protects "11001100 10111010 01010111" by copyright, one may be protecting the word "red," the
number "625,000," or the notes "C, F, A." The copyright owner of these digital expressions as
part of a computer program is likely to want protection of both levels of meaning of his work,
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Copyright Office Policy on Disclosure of Computer Programs.

In 1964, the Copyright Office decided to allow registration of computer
programs, and to issue certificates of copyright for these works on con-

dition that those who wished to register such works deposit a readable

"copy"-in other words, the source code--of the program with the Office.210 After the enactment of the 1976 Act, the requirement that a
copy of the full text of the source code be deposited with the Copyright

Office was dropped. 21' At present, the norm under the regulations is
that the first and last twenty-five pages of the source code must be deposited with the Copyright Office. 21 2 The deposit is intended to give

the Copyright Office a basis for identifying the computer program as a
copyrightable work written by the applying author. The deposited
source code on file with the Copyright Office under both present and
2 13
past regulations is available for public inspection.

A deposit of only the first and last twenty-five pages of the source
code does not make a meaningful public disclosure of the copyrighted
object code. It is very easy for someone who wishes to disclose nothing

about his source code to the Copyright Office to do just that. All that
person must do is write fifty pages of "comments," twenty-five of which
will be tacked on to the front and twenty-five to the end of the source
code. 214 One company has an announced policy of deleting from the

source code it deposits with the Copyright Office anything in it the
company regards as "proprietary information.

' 21 5

Even if there is no

without having to tell anyone those meanings. The code-book cases do not help us to address this
issue.
210. See Iskrant, supra note 30, at 100-02. The Copyright Office defined a readable copy as a
"reproduction of the program in a form perceptible or capable of being made perceptible to the
human eye." Id at 101. There had been a controversy within the Copyright Office concerning
whether program authors had to deposit copies which conveyed the content of the program in a
way which was intelligible to humans. In the end, it was decided that a copy of the source code
would be required for registration. Id at 101-02.
211. The present deposit regulations, see infra notes 212, 217 & 220, and accompanying text,
were issued on September 19, 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg. 41,979 (1978). Computer programs have
been exempted entirely from the requirement that copies of copyrighted works be deposited with
the Copyright Office for transmittal to the Library of Congress on the ground that they are a type
of work not needed for the Library's collection. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(1)(c) (1982); 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.19(c) (1984); Notice of Inquiry [Regarding] Deposit of Computer Programs and Other
Works Containing Trade Secrets, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Notice ofInquirt); see also 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982).
212. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(vii) (1984). "[Tlhe Copyright Office has taken the position that the
source code format of a computer program constitutes the best representation of the authorship in
the program .... " Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, at 22,952. The text of the present regulation makes it clear that a "visually perceptible" copy must be produced. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(vii)
(1984).
213. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 203.4, 203.5 (1984).
214. The author has heard programmers declare their intent to make such evasive deposits.
215. See N. Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at 29, col. 2.
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intentional evasion, the creative portions of a program are unlikely to
be disclosed in the first twenty-five or last twenty-five pages of the
source code. 216 Because the Copyright Office is likely to be the only
place-apart from the program author's safe-in which any portion of
the source code is available, this means that the ideas in the source code
effectively are withheld from the public.
An alternative is to deposit only a machine-readable version of the
copyrighted program, 217 but if the owner elects this option, the Copyright Office will not certify that "the object code format identifies an
original work of authorship. ' 218 This, of course, makes sense given
that the Copyright Office cannot "read" the work, even to identify it.
The Copyright Office allows this form of registration "for whatever it
may be worth based on an applicant's assertion that the object code
identifies an original work of authorship. '219 The claimant of the
copyright will have to prove the work is an original work produced by
the claimant.
There is also the possibility of obtaining special relief from the
220
deposit requirement. This is available only in an exceptional case.
If granted, alternative arrangements for deposit will be made. Many
trade secret claimants have sought such special relief under the regulations. The Copyright Office is currently considering issuance of regulations that would allow computer programs to be deposited on a
confidential basis. 22' On May 23, 1983, the Office issued a Notice of
Inquiry which states: "Owners of copyright in works containing trade
secrets, especially owners of copyright in computer programs, have expressed concern about public availability of materials deposited in the
Copyright Office, and have asked that the Office consider the possibil' '222
ity of special deposit provisions.
216. The full text of a source code may amount to several thousand pages. The first 25 pages
and the last 25 pages of source code are very likely to be "comments" which are not actually part

of the program instructions. See supranote 76.
217. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, at 22,952.

218. Id
219. Id
220. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d) (1984). The Copyright Office is somewhat more likely to grant
relief "[w]here it is possible to excise the confidential material and deposit a substantial representation of the authorship in the works." Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, at 22,952.
221. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, at 22,952.

222. Id at 22,951. Adoption of this regulation would mean that computer programmers
would be altogether exempt from making any public disclosure of their works. The Office discussed some of the policy considerations favoring restricting public access to works containing
matter claimed to contain trade secrets and requested public comment on several specific questions bearing on the issue. Id at 22,952-54. As of June, 1984, the Copyright Office had received
43 comments concerning this Notice of Inquiry, and had not taken any further formal action on
the proposed regulation.
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The tradition under copyright law has been to make the published
works on deposit available to the public.223 While one of the purposes

of requiring a deposit is to enable the Copyright Office to identify the
work as to which the copyright certificate issues, historically this has
not been the only reason for deposit.224 The symmetry of copyright
and patent in terms of disclosure should be retained. If the notion of

secret copyrights is indeed "abominable,

225

Congress should require

adequate disclosure if the Copyright Office on its own initiative does
not resume its proper role as the facilitator of disclosure.
4. Protecting Trade Secrets by Copyright. If disclosure is aban-

doned as a goal of copyright law, the federal law of copyright may soon
become the primary means for the enforcement of trade secret rights, at

least insofar as the secrets may be embodied in some sort of "writ-

ing.",226 The trend in this direction has already begun. Several plain-

tiffs in recent computer program cases have sought and obtained relief
both for copyright infringement and for trade secret misappropriation.2 27 The proposed regulations to allow confidential deposits of

copyrighted materials will remove the last constraint which has thus far
prevented the Copyright Office from being flooded with documents

containing the nation's trade secrets. 228

How receptive the courts will be to copyright claims aimed at enforcing what are essentially trade secret rights remains to be seen. In a

few instances, trade secret claims may be found to be preempted by the
223. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 705-706 (1982). The only prior exception to the rule of public availability has been for unmarketed educational tests such as those administered by the Educational Testing Service. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(vi) (1984). A legal challenge to the regulation permitting
this exemption was defeated in National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982). This exemption was granted upon a showing that making
the tests "availab[le] for public inspection could 'severely prejudice the future utility, quality, and
integrity of the materials.'" Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, at 22,952.
224. The Library of Congress collection consists in large part of the works deposited by authors with the Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1982). The Copyright Office is now authorized by statute to exempt certain categories of work from the deposit requirement as to copies for
the Library. 17 U.S.C. § 407(c) (1982).
225. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
226. The work containing the trade secret is required to be copyrightable subject matter under
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). It may not need to be "written" in the sense of being a printed text or a
drawing.
227. See, e.g., S&H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (denying
summary judgment on copyright and trade secret claims); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q.
718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); see also Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 CopYRIGHT L. Rap. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (preliminary injunction granted on copyright claims; trade secret claim not reached).
228. See supranotes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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copyright law,229 but in most cases there may be some basis for an allegation of a breached confidential relationship or other improper conduct on the part of the defendant, the additional presence of which
would be sufficient to keep both claims alive. 230 In a close case, a
plaintiff, fearing federal law preemption, might choose to bring only
the copyright claim. But because one need not attach a copyright notice to trade secret material-since it is unpublished2 31-there would be
nothing to prevent a plaintiff from delaying until shortly before drafting his complaint the decision as to which law he preferred to rely
232

on.

The advantages of copyright over trade secret actions are readily
apparent: sure access to federal courts; 233 ready availability of injunctive relief;234 recovery of attorneys' fees; 235 and damages measured by

the plaintiffs lost profits as well as the defendant's profits.236 If damages are difficult to prove, there are statutory damages available. 237
Thus, the likelihood of an ever-increasing number of essentially trade
secret claims being litigated as copyright cases is strong.
Copyright has other very significant advantages over trade secret
law as a form of protection for secret materials. If, despite the owner's
best efforts to maintain the secret, it somehow leaks out, one can still
get copyright protection for the "expression" of the trade secret, although not for the ideas. Once upon a time, one had to take a risk that,
if inadequately safeguarded, both the ideas and the expression of a
work containing a trade secret might fall into the public domain.
229. Only causes of action under state law that are equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright are preempted by the federal copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
230. Trade secret law generally requires a showing of a breached confidential relationship or
other improper conduct. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). This may prevent the cause
of action from being equated with copyright claims. But see Luccarelli, The Supremacy oflederal
Copyright Law Over State TradeSecret Law For Copyrightable ComputerProgramsMarked With
a Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 19, 42-50 (1981); Note, Protecting Trade Secrets Through
Copyright, 1981 DUKE L. J. 981, 990-97.
231. A notice of copyright needs to be affixed only to published works. See 17 US.C. §§ 401402 (1982).
232. There might be a slight delay caused by obtaining a copyright registration certificate,
which is a prerequisite to a copyright infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. § 41 l(a) (1982). However, one
has three years in which to file an action for copyright infringement, so this may not pose a serious
impediment. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1982).
233. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in federal copyright cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(1982).
234. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982). Infringing materials may also be impounded and destroyed
under the copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1982). Willful infringers for commercial advantage
may also be prosecuted for criminal copyright offenses. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1982).
235. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(b) (1982).
237. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982).
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Things, such as computer programs, that might have been considered
trade secrets when under development, were forced to relinquish their
status as trade secrets when sold in the marketplace. 238 With the aid of
copyright and confidential deposit rules, trade secret owners would be
able to maintain full protection over the secret and its expression for a
seventy-five year period without any disclosure. It is not surprising,
then, that software companies are pressing the Copyright Office for
confidential deposit rules.
The legislative history of the 1976 Act does not reveal a clear congressional intent that the copyright laws be converted to the use of
trade secret owners.239 It would be unwise for copyright law to displace
the state law of trade secrecy, the sure result if the decision is made to
abandon disclosure. Such a development would be an unwarranted
bonanza for trade-secret owners at too high a cost to the public. It
would transform copyright into a general misappropriation law.
5. Protecting Patentable Ideas by Copyright. Copyright is not
the only form of federal intellectual property law which has had disclosure of knowledge and ideas as one of its major aims. Patent law does
not merely encourage disclosure; it requires disclosure. In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must file a patent application 240 that includes
"a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains. . . to make
and use the same." 24 1 The inventor is required to "set forth the best
242
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention,"
and to furnish a drawing "where necessary for the understanding of the
subject matter to be patented. '243 The Patent Office may also require
the inventor to provide models, specimens, or ingredients of the invention before the patent will issue.244
Failure to disclose the invention with sufficient specificity to enable skilled persons to make it from that description will lead to a Pat238. See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983) (rejecting trade secret misappropriation claim because plaintiff failed to restrict access to the computer chips in its videogame). The court stated: "Where such a computer program is made
readily available to the public,. . . its contents may not be deemed a trade secret unless access to
it is actually treated as a secret." Id at 1476.
239. See generally Luccarelli, supra note 230.
240. 35 U.S.C. § I1 (1982).
241. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
242. Id
243. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113 (1982).
244. 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
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ent Office decision not to issue a patent. 245 If the failure to disclose

goes undetected by the Patent Office and a patent issues, the patent can

be challenged as invalid for failure to make adequate disclosure.2 46

Hiding the details concerning one's invention is considered a fraud on
the Patent Office-as well as on the public-and can lead to antitrust

liability.2 47 The patent application is confidential during the Patent Office's consideration, 248 but if a patent issues, the patent application, including the full description and drawings of the invention, will be
available for inspection by the general public at the Patent Office. 249 In
this way, disclosure to the public necessarily accompanies the issuance
2 50
of the patent.

Patent law not only requires disclosure; it requires prompt disclosure. An inventor will be disqualified from obtaining a patent for his
invention if he has not made an application for a patent on it within
one year of the commencement of its use.25 ' As is the case where there

has been an inadequately disclosed invention, a patent is subject to
challenge in an infringement action if the inventor has failed to make a

prompt application for the patent.252 Prompt disclosure has been required because of a fear that the inventor will try to prolong the period
of his monopoly on the invention by holding back his patent applica-

tion until someone else invented the same thing, or discovered how the
245. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1982). The Patent Office is required to make an examination of the
patent application and determine if the applicant is entitled to a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1982).
An examination would necessarily reveal that an applicant had failed to disclose the invention as
required by sections 111 and 112. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (1982).
246. 35 U.S.C. § 282(4) (1982). See generally C. HAMBURG, PATENT FRAUD & INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT (1974).
247. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(sustaining monopolization charge under § 2 of the Sherman Act based on misrepresentations
about an invention to the Patent Office).
248. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
249. See 35 U.S.C. § 153 (1982); 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (1984). Copies of these papers may be
obtained made upon payment of a fee. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (1984).
250. There is one provision that allows certain inventions to be kept secret. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 181 (1982) (if the invention is one in which the Government has a property interest and, in the
opinion of the head of the interested government agency, disclosure would be detrimental to the
national security, it can be withheld from public disclosure).
251. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). The one-year clock does not begin to run until the first public
use of the invention, but courts have construed the "public use" phrase broadly. See, e.g., Egbert
v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1881).
252. See, for example, Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946):
[I]t is a condition upon an inventor's right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly. It is true that for the limited period of two years [under the
patent statute then in effect] he was allowed to do so, possibly in order to give him time
to prepare an application ....
But if he goes beyond that period of probation, he
forfeits his right regardless of how little the public may have learned about the invention.
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invention worked, and then asserting his priority over the other on the
basis of being the first inventor. 253 One court has said that "from the
the
fiat of Congress. . . it is part of the consideration for a patent that
54
2'
public shall as soon as possible begin to enjoy the disclosure.

Of course, the inventor may opt to keep his invention secret, and

rely on trade secrecy law to protect

it.255

If he is lucky, no one will

invent the same thing or be able to "reverse engineer" his product, and

the security measures he adopts to keep the thing secret will not be
breached; if so, his trade secret protection will be perpetual. But since

these conditions will not always be met, trade secret law can be a risky
sort of protection and one inappropriate to protect those inventions
2 56
whose secrets can be discerned by examination of the product.

To acquire the more secure protection of a patent, the inventor
must be willing to disclose the secret that makes the invention work.
Of course, inventors would, if given the choice, prefer to be able both to
obtain a patent andto keep their inventions secret, but this the law will
not allow. Disclosure of the secret is the quid pro quo the public gets in

exchange for giving the inventor a seventeen-year patent monopoly on
the invention. 257 "[Tihe very purpose of the patent system is to en-

courage disclosures. 2 58

253. Id at 518.
254. Id at 520.
255. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (trade secret law not preempted by federal patent law).
256. See id at 489-90.
257. See, e.g., A. F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1977); P. RoSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02 at 1-4 (1982). See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974):
The stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time,
research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture
into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives
for our citizens. In return for the right of exclusion-this "reward for inventions," Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)-4he patent laws impose upon the
inventor a requirement of disclosure. To insure adequate and full disclosure so that
upon the expiration of the 17-year period "the knowledge of the invention enures to the
people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use,"
United States v. DubilierCondenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933), the patent laws require that the patent application shall include a full and clear description of the invention and "of the manner and process of making and using it" so that any person skilled
in the art may make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. When a patent is granted
and the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high
price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will
stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.
258. A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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For copyright to cease to concern itself with disclosure would
cause an unhealthy shift in the prevailing balance among the types of

intellectual property law. There may be cases in which a computer
programmer may have a choice whether to seek patent protection for

the process his program embodies or a copyright for the particularities
of its embodiment. The choice would be seriously skewed in favor of

copyright if copyright, but not patent, allowed the programmer to acquire a lengthy monopoly without any form of meaningful disclosure
of the work. Copyright is already more advantageous by virtue of its

lower standard of originality or creativity than patent,259 the greater
ease and lesser expense and delay involved in getting a copyright registration certificate than in getting a patent, 2 60 and its longer duration. 26'

Until now, federal copyright and patent law have both required
disclosure. As the software industry perceives the copyright shift away

from requiring disclosure, programs for which patents might once have
been sought will be copyrighted, and the information which they embody will be kept from the public.
6. CONTU on Disclosure. It is difficult to ascertain exactly
what CONTU thought about disclosure of the ideas in computer programs, either as an aim of the copyright law or as a likely result of
extending copyright protection to machine-readable programs. The

Commission made no direct statement concerning either, although it
made statements that could be interpreted as expressing the view that

extending copyright protection in this way would result in greater dissemination of ideas and knowledge. There are, for example, a number
of broad statements in the CONTU Final Report concerning the vast

communicative possibilities computers and their programs open up for
human beings,262 which although true are not directly related to the
disclosure issue.
259. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
260. Copyright registration fees are generally $10 or less. See 17 U.S.C. § 708 (1982). The
initial patent application fee is now $150. There are also processing and issuance fees so that a
patent applicant may easily have to pay several hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars by the time
the patent issues. There are also post-issuance fees. See I L. HoRowiTZ, PATENT OFFICE RULES
AND PRACTICE, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 63-64 (1984). Copyright registration may be accomplished
in a matter of weeks or months; the patent examination process may take several years.
261. The patent monopoly is limited to 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). The copyright monopoly for an individual author is life plus 50 years, and for a corporate owner, 75 years from the
publication or 100 years from the creation of the work, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302
(1982).
262. See, for example, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9: "[Tlhese machines are
opening up new avenues for recording, storing, and transmitting human thought. New means of
communication transcend words fixed on paper or images on film and permit authors to communicate creatively, adaptively, and dynamically with their audience." See also id at 25-26 (cultural
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Clearly CONTU believed that copyright protection for machinereadable programs would mean that much more software would be dis-

seminated. Congress had directed the Commission to consider public
access to copyrighted works as a factor in its deliberations about the
computer-related copyright issues. 263 The public access mandate was
construed by CONTU as requiring consideration of whether copyright

would maximize the public availability of software products, but not as
requiring consideration of whether copyright would maximize public
access to the ideas, information, or knowledge contained in
264
programs.
CONTU found no problem with describing machine-readable

programs as "writings" because of the "broad and dynamic meaning"
of the constitutional term "writing. '265 If the meaningless coined code
words in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc.266 were copyrightable, why should machine code, which had meaning-albeit hiddennot be copyrightable? CONTU refers to programs as writings267 and

elsewhere uses analogies to novels and drawings to illustrate how very
similar computer programs are to other kinds of copyrightable

works. 268 At one point, CONTU seemed to presume that all programs
produced displays of words, pictures, or sounds and that the displays
effects of granting copyright protection to programs which stress the potential enrichment of life,
communication, and education). The possibilities, CONTU stated, were virtually limitless, "dependent only on the ingenuity employed in developing the programs that enable humans to communicate their ideas to one another through the intermediation of the machine and on the
willingness of creators of such works to disseminate them at reasonable prices." Id at 26.
CONTU argued that these positive contributions should be considered in determining whether
copyright protection should be afforded to programs. The quality of the programs, however,
should have nothing to do with the appropriateness of copyright as a form of protection.
263. See Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1874 (1974); CONTU FINAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 1. CONTU also recognized that the "ownership and control of information and
the means of disseminating it are emerging as national and international policy issues. Concerns
about the impact on individual freedom posed by the control of the flow of information are at the
forefront of public debate." Id at 3.
264. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11. CONTU commissioned an
economic study of the likely effect on the public of extending copyright protection to programs;
the study addressed the public access issue in terms of the availability of software products, not
availability of the information in them. See 4 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD 112-226 (1980).

265. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
266. 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), discussed supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9, 11, 20.
268. CONTU stated that a program is created by putting symbols into a medium: "In this
respect, it is the same as a novel, poem, play, musical score, blueprint, advertisement, or telephone
directory." Id at 15. See also ld at 13 (comparing adaptations of programs to marginal notes in a
book). At another point CONTU stated that videotapes, phonograph records, and computer programs were "capable of communicating with humans to a far greater extent than the coined code
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were the object of copyright protection.2 69 At numerous other points,
CONTU stresses the human readability of programs. 270 The Commission appears to have mistaken the point at which a program ceases to

be convertible into human-readable form. The Commission's report
suggests that not until the program is operating in the processing unit
of the computer is the capability of human readability lost,271 when in
fact it is lost as soon as the source code is converted to machine-readable form. CONTU may have been somewhat confused about the read-

ability of programs due to its misunderstanding of the technical
meaning of "read" as used in connection with computers and
272
programs.
The report's discussion on the trade secret law as a form of legal

protection for machine-readable programs puts much emphasis on se273
crecy as one of that law's disadvantages from a societal perspective.
words discussed by Judge Hand in Reirs v. National QuotationBureau." Id at 21 (emphasis in
original).
269. Id at 21; see infra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
270. See, for example, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10: "The instructions that
make up a program may be read, understood and followed by a human being." "When other
language is available, programmers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the ideas embodied in them in preparing their own works. This practice, of course, is impossible under a
patent system, where the process itself is protected, and difficult under trade secrecy, where the
text of a program is designed not to be revealed." Id at 20 (emphasis in original). See also infra
note 271.
271. This misunderstanding is a critical one for the copyrightability issue. CONTU assumed
that it was possible to produce a printed human-readable version of a program up until the point
the program was in the central processing unit of the computer. See CONTU FINAL REPORT,
supranote 1, at 22. Machine-readable programs are not human-readable expressions. Seenote 74
supra.Although it is possible to cause a computer to print out the binary code that corresponds to
the high and low voltages of the machine-readable program (called a "core dump"), this is still
unreadable in any meaningful sense. CONTU recognized that there was a point at which the
machine-readable program ceased to be protected by copyright and became an uncopyrightable
process. That was also the point at which the ability to produce a printed human-readable version
of a program ceased. Put somewhat differently, in CONTU's view, the point at which the ability
to produce a printed, human-readable version of a program ceased was the point at which copyright protection ceased. "When a program is copied into the memory of a computer, it still exists
in a form from which a human-readable version may be produced. . . . Only when the program
is inserted-instruction by instruction-into the processing element of the computer and electrical
impuluses are sent through the circuitry of the processor to initiate work is the ability to copy
lost. . . . If it should prove possible to tap off these impulses then, perhaps, the process would be
all that was appropriated and no infringement of the copyright would occur." CONTU FINAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. It is, in fact, possible to tap off or "read" the electrical impulses in the
central processing unit. See infra note 348. So the distinction CONTU makes is one which makes
no sense.

272. See supra note 164.
273. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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Secrecy, CONTU noted, impeded the free flow of information. 274
Thus, time was wasted developing ideas which others had already de-

veloped but were keeping secret.2 75 It also meant higher prices because
of the duplicated effort. 276 CONTU predicted a decline in the use of

trade secret law if copyright protection were made available for

machine-readable forms of programs. 277 The implication a reader
might well draw from these remarks is that CONTU thought copyright

for computer programs in machine-readable form would mean less secrecy and a freer flow of information.
7.

Hersey's Challenge. Commissioner Hersey questioned the

majority's assumption that "copyright would ensure greater public access to innovative programs than would continued reliance on trade
secrecy law."' 278 Hersey's review of the evidence CONTU had collected indicated to him "that the industry would have no intention of

giving up trade-secrecy protection in favor of copyright; to the contrary, every indication is that it would fight hard to assert its undeniable continuing right to the former.

' 279

He noted it was obvious from

the copyright registration figures that the industry had opted for trade
secrecy.

280

Hersey also pointed out that the Commission had been informed
that the possibility of being forced to disclose programs under copyright law because of the threat of preemption of trade secrecy law
would "'driv[e] computer program owners into even deeper secrecy'by encryption, physical barriers to access, contractual restraints, non-

disclosure agreements, and further innovative technical tricks for locking out pirates, thieves and competitors. 'Secrecy will be seen as the

only effective protection for their creations.'

"281

274. "Since secrets are by definition known to only a few people, there is necessarily a reduced
flow of information in the marketplace, which hinders the ability of potential buyers to make
comparisons and hence leads to higher prices." Id at 17.
275. "Experts in the computer industry state that a further problem with respect to trade secrecy is that there is much human effort wasted when people do for themselves that which others
have already done but are keeping secret." Id at 17-18.
276. Id at 17, appendix H at 126.
277. It did qualify this, however, by suggesting that any such decline would likely be attributable to the rapid increase in the number of widely distributed programs for which trade secret
protection could not be successfully asserted. Id at 18.
278. Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 34.
279. Id
280. Id The small number of programs registered since 1964, see supra note 114, suggested to
Hersey that what registration had occurred was "in the nature of bet-hedging." Hersey Dissent,
supra note 4, at 34. Id
281. Hersey Dissent,supra note 4, at 34 (quoting from a response by Robert 0. Nimtz of Bell
Laboratories to a draft CONTU report). There is evidence that despite the extension of copyright

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:663

Relaxation of the requirements for deposit of the source code of a
program in order to receive a copyright certificate-changes CONTU
was contemplating-would mean that "copyright itself would be used
as one more device to prevent, rather than enable, access to innovative
s Hersey's comprograms--one more device of industrial security. 2 82
ments indicate that CONTU had been made aware of the possibility
that continued secrecy, rather than more disclosure, was the likely result of the extension of copyright protection to computer programs.
CONTU simply chose to ignore it.
8. Disclosure and the Information-Rich Society. It is well to
28 3
keep in mind that we are undergoing an Information Revolution.
The authors of a recent book on computers currently under development in Japan and the United States have said:
The world is entering a new period. The wealth of nations, which
depended upon land, labor, and capital during its agriculturaland industrialphases-dependedupon naturalresources,the accumulation of
money, and even upon weaponry-will come in the future to depend
upon information, knowledge, and intelligence.
This is not to say that the traditional forms of wealth will be
unimportant. Humanis must eat, and they use up energy, and they
like manufactured goods. But in the control of all these processes
will reside a new form of power which will consist of facts, skills,
codified experience, large amounts of easily obtained data, all accessible in fast powerful ways to anybody who wants it-scholar, manager, policymaker,
professional, or ordinary citizen. And it will be
284
for sale.
It may be worth adding that this knowledge-much of which will be
embodied in computer programs in machine-readable form-may in
the future be available only by sale. 28 5 These same authors also state:
"As everybody knows, knowledge is power. Machines that can amplify
286
human knowledge will amplify every dimension of power."
In the year 1984, cognizant of the dangers of information control
brought so forcefully to our consciousness by George Orwell in his faprotection to programs, these contrivances to assure deeper secrecy are being used, and becoming
more attractive to those who do not yet use them. See supra note 107.
282. Hersey Dissent, supranote 4, at 34. Hersey also argued that the "entitlement of copyright
protection to adaptationsof programs might, under these circumstances, even further inhibit access, insofar as it provided owners with a covert means of protecting the underlying ideas of their
program." Id (emphasis in original).
283. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
284. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 32, at 14 (emphasis in original).
285. See OTA PROJECT PROPOSAL, supra note 24, at 13, regarding its concerns about the effect
on society as "information and knowledge are treated less and less as a free good and more and
more as a commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace."
286. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 32, at 8.
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mous book, it would seem a great folly to decide to abandon disclosure
as a purpose of the copyright laws. Future generations would be the

poorer for it, not simply by reason of the cost they will have to incur to
acquire whatever knowledge might be for sale, but also by reason of

the diminished public availability of knowledge which will necessarily
follow.
B.

The "Utilitarian" Characterof Machine-ReadableProgramsas a
Copyright Problem.
There is one very simple but important difference between a book

which contains a set of instructions about how to do a particular task
and a computer program in machine-readable form which contains a

similar, if considerably more elaborate, set of instructions on the same
subject: The former informs a human being about how the task might
be done; the latter does the task.2 87 Computer programs now operate

traffic light systems, update inventories, post sales, regulate pacemakers, tune radios, pump gas, and control car engines, among other
tasks. 288
It has long been copyright policy to deny copyright protection to
utilitarian works.289 The designs of houses, typefaces, airplane wings,
and teapots, once embodied in the item itself, have been considered

outside the copyright realm. Repeated efforts have been made to
amend the copyright statute to extend copyright or copyright-like pro-

tection to such works, but all have failed. 290 Similarly, machines or
machine parts have been excluded from copyright. 291 The 1976 Act

makes explicit that if a work has "an intrinsic utilitarian function that
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey in287. See, e.g., Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 28: "Printed instructions explain how to do
something; programs are able to do it." Programs, Hersey said, do not "describe or give instructionsfor the functions of the computer. They control [them]." Id (emphasis in original). Of
course, the source code, like a book, will tell the human how to do the task, but only the machinereadable version can do it.
288. See, e.g., Boraiko, supra note 32, at 421; Lueck, Automating Gas Stations, N. Y. Times,
June 9, 1983, at 28, col. 1.
289. See infra notes 296-312 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, DRAFT, SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, chap. VII

(1975) (reports that between 1914 and 1957 nearly 50 bills were introduced into Congress to extend copyright-type protection to designs of utilitarian objects, none of which passed both houses
of Congress) [hereinafter cited as SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. (A design protection bill to
extend copyright protection to original designs for useful articles (for a ten-year period) was recently introduced in Congress). See H.R. 2985, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Even it would not
grant protection insofar as the designs were dictated by utilitarian considerations.
291. See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:663

formation," 292 it is not copyrightable. This statement recognizes that
conveying information and portraying an appearance are a kind of utility, but not a kind of utility which will be objectionable in a copyright
context. In copyright law "utilitarian" means having a utility other
than conveying information or portraying an appearance of some kind.
When Congress decided in 1980 to extend copyright protection to
computer programs, it neglected to consider the problems raised by the
utilitarian nature of computer programs, 293 because CONTU had misunderstood the issue. CONTU emphasized in its report the visual or
auditory displays some programs produce as if these were representative of all programs, and it did not inform Congress of how integral to
machine functioning and how utilitarian programs truly are. CONTU
also stated baldly, although incorrectly, that copyright protection had
never been denied on utilitarian grounds.294 CONTU's and the Congress's neglect has meant that the courts have been left to resolve a
conflict between the provisions concerning utility and the provisions
recognizing copyright protection for computer programs. Not surprisingly, courts have come to different conclusions about which provision
295
is to be given precedence.
1. An Historical Perspective on the Utility Rule.

Until the

Supreme Court decision in Mazer v. Stein296 in 1954, it was not clear
292. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article").
293. As indicated supra notes 9 & 119-22 and accompanying text, Congress paid little attention to computer program issues either in 1976 or in 1980.
294. CONTU failed to alert Congress to the utility problems posed by the copyrightability of
computer programs. The following indicates the CONTU majority's misunderstanding with respect to the utility issue:
[C]opyri~ht practice past and present..,
recognizes copyright protection for a work of
authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be put. The copyright status of the
written rules for a game or a system for the operation of a machine is unaffected by the
fact that those rules direct the actions of those who play the game or carry out the process. Nor has copyright been denied to works simply because of their utilitarianaspects.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasis added). As the remainder of the present
section will make clear, the emphasized statements in this passage are untrue. The statement with
respect to the copyrightability of a system for the operation of a machine is highly questionable, as
indicated in the discussion of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see supranotes 182-85 and i!fra
notes 383-87 and accompanying text.
295. Compare Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I11.1979),
affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying copyrightability of programs because of their mechanical functions) with Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'a, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting utility objection to
copyrightability of programs). Compare also the district court decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rep"d, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)
(denying preliminary injunction in part because of the utilitarian character of computer programs
at issue) with the court of appeals's decision, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 35487 and accompanying text.
296. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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whether copyright was available to provide federal statutory protection

for the design of any part of a utilitarian work. 297 Mazer v. Stein began
the process of clarifying the very limited circumstances under which

some features of a utilitarian object-not the utilitarian object itselfcould be copyrighted.

Mazer and Stein were both lamp manufacturers. Stein complained that Mazer's lamps infringed a copyright Stein held in a statuette that both manufacturers used as bases for certain of their respective
lamps.2 98 Stein conceded that he had copyrighted the statuette intending to use it as a lamp base. Among the arguments Mazer raised to

defeat the copyright claim was that Stein's lamp was excluded from
copyright protection because it was a utilitarian object, not a work of
art as the statute required. The Supreme Court rejected Mazer's argument, holding that the fact that the statuette had been incorporated into
a lamp design did not in and of itself deprive the statuette of copyright
protection. 299 The Court noted that the Copyright Office had, over the
years, permitted registration of various works of art that had some utili-

tarian aspects. 3°° The Court voiced approval of the Copyright Office
regulation which provided that the Office would issue registration cer-

tificates for "works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as theirform but
not their mechanicalor utilitarianaspects are concerned,such as artistic
jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings, and sculpture."' 30 ' Because the copyright statute did not require that the "work of art" be a

"work of fine art,"'302 the Court thought the statuette was copyrightable.

It was the art in the statuette that the copyright protected. 30 3 The sub297. See, e.g., Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 698 (9th Cir. 1983) (indicating
that prior to Mazer, utilitarian objects were assumed to be entitled to no copyright protection);
SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 290, at 4, which reported that it was widely assumed that only design patent protection was appropriate. For various reasons, described id. at 413, the design patent statute was regarded as an ineffective means of legal protection for designs.
298. Stein had also sold some of the copyrighted statuettes as statuettes. However, only an
insignificant portion of the income from Stein's sales was due to sales of the statuettes alone.
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203.
299. Id at 214-15.
300. Id at 212 & n. 25.
301. Id at 212-13 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949)) (emphasis added).
302. The Supreme Court in Mazer regarded as particularly significant the Congress' decision
to delete the "fine arts" clause of the 1870 Copyright Act (which included as copyrightable subject
matter any "statue, statuary, and. . . models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the
fine arts"), Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 82, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870), when enacting a new
copyright statute in 1909 which referred only to "works of art," Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320,
§ 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 213-14.
303. "The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the
copyright and the invention of original and ornamental design for design patents." Mazer, 347
U.S. at 218.
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sequent embodiment of the statuette in a lamp did not deprive the statuette of its status as art.
After Mazer, the Copyright Office issued additional regulations to
clarify its position about the copyrightability of works with utilitarian
features. This regulation established the test that, until the 1976 Act
became effective, was used in all cases challenging copyrights on utility
grounds. It stated:
If the sole intrinsicfunction of an article is its utility, the fact that the
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work
of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving or pictorial representation,
which can be identfiedseparatelyand are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for
3°4
registration.
This regulation requires two inquiries: (1) whether the sole intrinsic
function of a work is utilitarian, and (2) whether the feature for which
copyright protection is sought is capable of existing independent of the
functional aspects of the work. One treatise author has stated that
"[p]hysical separability would presumably mean that after removal of
those features which are necessary for the utilitarian function of the
article, the artistic features would remain intact. ' ' 305
The lamp in Mazer had a number of functional aspects-including
the wiring, the lamp apparatus, and the shade. The lamp required a
base, but the lamp functioned as a lamp no better or worse for having a
statuette-rather than some equally tall and broad form, such as a milk
carton-as its base. The lamp was not solely "utilitarian." It had at
least one nonfunctional aspect, namely the statuette as its base. That
the statuette was capable of existing independently from the lamp was
evidenced by the fact that it had been copyrighted separately from the
lamp. Some statuettes were sold as statuettes, not as lamp bases. Mazer also makes clear, however, that the copyrightability of the statuette
did not mean copyright protection could be obtained for any other aspect of the lamp.
Among the many things that have been found not to be copyrightable because of their utilitarian character are an attractive "high tech"
design for an outdoor lighting fixture, 306 wire-spoked wheel covers for
304. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
305. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 179, § 2.08[B][31 at 2-96.
306. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (suit against the Register of Copyrights for refusing to accept the application for copyright registration for the lighting fixture be-

cause of the inseparability of utilitarian and other aspects of the work).
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automobiles, 30 7 carpet display folders,30 8 typeface designs, 30 9 artisti-

cally designed watch faces, 310 and a sculpted design of curved lines,
ridges, and troughs for shoe soles.3 1' While architectural or engineer-

ing plans may be copyrightable, it is generally accepted that a structure
built from those plans, unless a monument or some other completely

nonfunctional work-however "fixed" and "original" it might becannot be a "copy" of those plans within the meaning of the copyright

laws.31

2

In revising the copyright law in 1976, Congress strengthened the

rule against granting copyright protection to utilitarian features of a
work. The copyright regulations in effect prior to the revision had provided that a work would not be copyrightable if "the sole intrinsic
307. Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (1lth Cir. 1983) (invalidating registered copyright for wire wheel covers; Register of Copyright joined IT&T in contesting the validity of the registration certificate previously issued in reliance on the district court
decision in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), which was reversed two years
later by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, see supranote 306; because the covers
protected lugnuts, brakes, wheels and axles from damage and corrosion, they were utilitarian and
not copyrightable).
308. Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 698 (9th Cir. 1983) (display folder containing carpet samples accompanied by description of carpet's technical specifications, said by
both parties to be superior in structure and appearance to previous types of carpet display folders,
held utilitarian and hence uncopyrightable). "The folders' usefulness in marketing is their only
reason for existence." Id at 700.
309. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) (affirming dismissal of mandamus
action against Register of Copyright to accept registration of typeface design). See also Leonard
Storch Enters. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissing unfair
competition and misappropriation claims arising out of use of uncopyrightable typeface design on
grounds that Congress' decision not to allow copyright protection for typeface designs meant typeface design was in the public domain).
310. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d
Cir. 1958).
311. SCOA Indus. v. Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
312. See, for example, Katz, Copyright Protectionfor ArchitecturalPlans, Drawings, and Designs, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 224, 236 (1954) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted): "An
architectural plan is a technical writing. It is capable of being copied only by similar technical
writings, that is, by other plans, etc. A structure is the result of plans, not a copy of them." See
also Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., 476 F.2d 386, 391 (8th Cir. 1973); HOUSE
REPORT, supranote 120, at 55 ("An architect's plans and drawings would, of course, be protected
by copyright, but the extent to which that protection would extend to the structure depicted would
depend on the circumstances. Purely nonfunctional or monumental structures would be subject to
full copyright protection under the bill, and the same would be true of artistic sculpture or decorative ornamentation or embellishment added to a structure. On the other hand, where the only
elements of shape in an architectural design are conceptually inseparable from the utilitarian aspects of the structure, copyright protection for the design would not be available."); Russell v.
Trimfit, 428 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'a,
568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978) (copyright in drawing
of stocking not infringed by manufacture of competing stocking); Muller v. Triborough Bridge
Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (copyright in drawing showing a novel bridge approach
design did not give copyright protection to that bridge design; Triborough Bridge not an infringement of the copyrighted drawing even if deliberate use of the idea).
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function" of the work was its utility.31 3 The new Act provided that the
work would not be copyrightable if it had "an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information." 3 14 The change from "sole" to "an" was signifi-

cant and intentional.31 5 The statutory definition also clarified the test
for distinguishing what was utilitiaran from what was not. Any function beyond the portrayal of an appearance or conveyance of informa-

tion is "utilitarian," and places the work beyond the protection of
copyright. Contrary to CONTU's conclusions, the originality of a
work is not the sole legitimate copyright criterion. 31 6 Congress intended that works be denied copyright protection on account of their
utility,31 7 as had been true for decades.
2.

Why Copyright Protection Does Not Extend to Utilitarian

Works. The reasons why copyright law should not extend to utilitarian works may not be immediately apparent, but a rich variety of

those reasons exists. Understanding the complex rationale behind this
rule will aid in understanding why computer programs raise similar
utilitarian problems.
First, there may be constitutional problems with extending copy313. See supranote 304 and accompanying text.
314. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article"). The utilitarian issue is sometimes
posed as one of differentiating between "applied art," which is copyrightable, and "industrial
design," which is not. Clarifying what was meant by "industrial design," the House Report on the
1976 Act stated: "[A]lithough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying
and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other
industrial product contains some element that physically or conceptually, can be identified as
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under
the bill." HousE REPORT, supra note 120, at 55. The test of separability does not depend on the
intent of the designer "[E]ven if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only elements if any, which can be identified separately from
the useful article as such are copyrightable. And even if the three-dimensional design contains
some such element (for example a carving on the back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver
flatware), copyright protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover the overall
configuration of the utilitarian article as such." Id
315. See, for example, Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 698, 700 (9th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis in original): "The significant change from the prior law is that the courts need no
longer determine whether an article's function is solely utilitarian. Now, if an article has any
intrinsic utilitarian function, it can be denied copyright protection except to the extent that its
artistic features can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of
art."
316. CONTU stated at one point in its report that the "only legitimate question regarding
copyrightability is: Is the object an original work of authorship?" CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 25. See also supra note 294.
317. See supra note 314.
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right protection to "utilitarian" works. 31 8 Congress is empowered
under the Constitution to give "authors" a limited term of protection
for their "writings" in order to promote the progress of science and the
arts. 319 While it is true that the term "writings" has been construed
broadly enough to include such320things as photographs, which are not
"writings" in a technical sense, an extension of protection to photographs is not constitutionally problematic. If a drawing of an object
can be a "writing," and if an etching of the same object can be a "writing," a photograph of the same object should be considered a "writing.",32 ' All three portray an appearance of an object. It is possible
that all three may also convey information. Therein lies their value,
and whatever utility they possess. Somewhat more constitutionally
problematic is whether a sound recording can be considered a "writing." Written notations of music are clearly "writings." Sound recordings are only a different way of "recording" the music. 322 Although
sound recordings do not produce visible display, they do produce an
audible "display." In this lies their utility and their value. The rationale for treating both forms of music as "writings" thus seems the same,
and is consistent with the constitutional purpose.
It is quite another thing to say that a house-or a TV set or an
airplane wing or a machine-readable program-is a "writing" in the
constitutional sense. A house may be constructed in accordance with
the directions set forth in a set of architectural plans, yet to say the
house is copyrightable because the architectural plans are copyrightable is problematic. For if a house is a "writing," what man-made
things would not be? Although a house, like the drawing, might be
said to portray an appearance, it does more than that. The value of the
house lies more in what it does than in how it looks, just as the value of
a machine-readable program lies more in what it does than in what it
or the source code might convey to a human audience. The clearest
way to make a distinction between things that can be "writings" in a
constitutional sense and things that cannot be is to inquire whether
they do more than portray appearances-visible or audible-or convey
information. If they do, they are, pro tanto, not "writings."
318. See, e.g., Nimmer Concurrence,supra note 5, at 26.
319. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
320. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (rejecting argument that a photograph could not be protected by copyright because not a "writing").
321. The same should be true of a digital encoding of a visual image of the same object.
322. That sound recordings have become the major form of distributing music may also figure
in the analysis. When the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution, written texts were the primary means of distributing musical works.
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Another reason to treat architectural plans differently for copyright purposes from the structure made from them is that the structure
"expresses" a different set of things than the plans do. The plans convey information of a sort that the structure alone does not. Much of the
detailed information (as well as many of the ideas) expressed in the
plans will not be apparent from an examination of the structure. The
external face of the structure tells little of what went into constructing
it, which is the substance of the plans.323 One might be able to infer
some things about the plans from the external face, but one could not
reconstruct the plans, except by tearing the structure apart, and even
then some features of the plans might not be detectable. One might as
well draft a different set of plans-which would, of course, be noninfringing-to construct a building of the same appearance. 324
Furthermore, while the design of a building may have considerable aesthetic appeal, there may be good reasons not to permit the architect from whose plans it was constructed to have a copyright monopoly
on structures of that form. An architect may have chosen a particular
design for the lintel over the front door of a structure, partly because of
the attractiveness of the shape and partly because that particular lintel
will prevent some other part of the house from falling on those who
enter the structure through the door. To give the designer of that lintel
a copyright on it would mean that other architects could not use it
without the former's permission. If that design is not only the most
visually appealing but also the safest way to construct that door frame,
it would be socially undesirable to permit the existence of a copyright
in it to impede use of a safe design. Allowing a copyright on the frivolous embellishments of the structure-a particular colorful design in
the floor tiles, for example-is less problematic, for there are many variations possible for floor tiles. The next hacienda will be none the less
safe for the first one's having a copyrighted design in the floor tile
pattern.
Another concern may be the duration of copyright. Seventy-five
years of exclusive right may be too long a term to satisfy the public
interest as to utilitarian works. It would be one thing to grant seventyfive years of exclusive protection to a floor tile pattern and quite another to grant the same period of exclusive rights to lintel designs. The
323. It is, of course, not the information in the plans, as such, that the copyright protects. One

cannot, for example, acquire copyright protection for using bricks to make an outhouse by drawing up architectural plans which direct the use of bricks.
324. The same issue arises with respect to computer programs. An identical audiovisual display can be produced by two different and noninfringing computer programs. See Stem Elecs,,
Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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public has a strong interest in having either unrestricted access to useful
325
works, or at least a relatively short term of restricted access to them.
This public interest, as much as the more extensive monopoly right, is
3 26
what accounts for the considerably shorter term for patent rights.

There is yet another important concern. If one eliminates the rule

against copyright protection for utilitarian works, one eliminates the
clearest basis for distinguishing between copyright and patent law. The

law has generally not sought to discourage people from copying functional designs of objects unless the functional aspect was inventive
enough for a patent to issue on it. There is at present only one area in

which patent and copyright overlap: ornamental designs for articles of
manufacture.3 27 One who invents a "new, original and ornamental de-

sign for an article of manufacture" may protect it by design patent 328 or
by copyright, assuming the separability test can met. 329 Design patents,
like copyrights, are not available to protect designs which are dictated
solely by considerations of function. 330 To protect functional designs
one needs a patent of another sort.33' While Congress undoubtedly has

the power to permit some overlap of subject matters, the copyright and
patent realms have generally been kept separate by the requirement

that a thing have utility to be patentable 332 and not have utility to be
copyrightable.

333

325. Recognition of this policy may be part of the reason the chip design protection bill, see
infra note 350, is intended to be limited in its term of protection to ten years.
326. See generally White, Why a Seventeen-Year Patent?,38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 839 (1956).
327. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A.
1974).
328. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982). The design patent statute does not require the design to be useful. 1 S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.04[l] at 1-117 (1983). Design patents are shorter in
duration than either copyright or regular patents; they may be granted for three years and six
months, for seven years, or for fourteen years, as the applicant elects. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982).
329. See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 328, § 1.04[5]; supra notes 304-05 & 314-15 and
accompanying text (regarding the separability test).
330. 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 328, § 1.04[2] at 1-117.
331. See id § 1.04[2] at 1-125.
332. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Microcode has been held to be patentable as a part of hardware
in In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nona

Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981). If microcode has sufficient utility to be patented, it is
questionable whether it can have the nonutility to be copyrightable.
333. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text. How exclusive copyright and patent laws
are or should be has not been much litigated. There was some discussion of the issue in Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), discussedsupra notes 296-303 and accompanying text. The defendant
Mazer argued, among other things, that if any federal monopoly was to be given to the lamp
design at issue in that case, it had to be a design patent, not a copyright. Mazer argued that
Congress had intended to grant protection only to those designs that met the standard of creativity
demanded by the patent statute and that permitting an overlap of copyright and patent would be
unwise. The Supreme Court rejected Mazer's argument:
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To illustrate why one might want to keep the copyright and patent
realms separate, consider this example. Assume a manufacturer
designed a sleek new airplane wing. Assume further that the design
was only a slight improvement from a functional standpoint over the
prior art and was not inventive enough to be eligible for a patent. If the
manufacturer could get an exclusive right to make airplanes utilizing
that wing design for seventy-five years by obtaining a copyright on it,
the patent objective of leaving in the public domain those improvements which do not meet the standard of invention would be subverted. The unavailabilty of copyright protection for utilitarian designs
thus has furthered the purposes of patent law by leaving in the public
domain those utilitarian designs that are not patentable. 334
3. A Corollary Rule Against Copyrightfor Machines or Machine
Parts. Given that copyright law has traditionally been loath to grant
protection to utilitarian objects, it should come as no surprise that
claims of copyright protection for mechanical devices also have been
As we have held the statuettes here involved copyrightable, we need not decide the question of their patentability. Though other courts have passed upon the issue as to whether
allowance by the election of the author or patentee of one bars a grant of the other, we
do not. We do hold that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted,
does not bar copyright as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says
that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. See also In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974). As broad
and as strong as this statement is, one should not assume that the Supreme Court meant to rule
out exclusivity in all cases. One must remember that the Court in Mazer was dealing with the one
area, that involving designs, in which patent and copyright law seem to have been intended to
overlap.
The court in Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944), discussed the exclusivity of patent and copyright as to subject matter
other than designs. Taylor's copyright in a circular chart used in conjunction with a temperature
recording machine was declared invalid in large part because the chart had been part of a device
covered by a patent which had expired at the time of the suit. The court noted that
Congress has provided two separate and distinct fields of protection, the copyright and
the patent. In the former ... it has placed 'all the writings of an author,' and in the
latter. . . inventions and discoveries of 'any new and useful art, machine, manufacture
• . . or any new and useful improvements thereof. . . .' While it may be difficult to
determine in which field protection must be sought, it is plain, so we think, that it must
be in one or the other, it cannot be found in both. In other words, there is no overlapping territory, even though the line of separation may in some instances be difficult of
exact ascertainment.
Id at 99. The court found the separation to be grounded in the distinction made in Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879), between "explanation" and an "art." The former was the domain
of copyright, the latter of patent.
334. Of lesser importance, but still a factor in the retention of the copyright rule against protection of utilitarian objects, is the danger of flooding the Copyright Office with a great tide of
applications seeking protection for TV sets, dishwashers, airplane wings, and the like. Even if one
was only required to submit a photograph or drawing of the object, rather than a copy of the
object itself as identifying material, the workload of the Copyright Office would be very substantially increased. The office is already experiencing acute storage problems. See 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 638 (July 21, 1983) 253, 253.
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rejected. 335 Similarly, claims of copyright protection for works which

function as machine parts have not been upheld. 336 Machines and their
parts are utilitarian, and the same policy considerations that support

the utilitarian rule support its "machine" corollary.
CONTU Commissioner Hersey was of the opinion that computer
programs in machine-readable form should not be deemed copyright-

able subject matter because they are machine parts. He had no problem with extending copyright to the flow charts or the source code.

"But the program itself, in its mature and usable form, is a machinecontrol element, a mechanical device, which on constitutional grounds

and for reasons of social policy ought not be copyrighted. '337 When a
program becomes machine-readable the "writing" metaphor breaks
down, said Commissioner Hersey.338 "In the case of computer programs, the instructionsthemselves eventually became an essentialpart of
the machinery thatproduces the results. They may become (in chip or

hardware form) a permanent part of the actual machinery; or they may
become interchangeable parts, or tools, insertable into and removable

from the machine.

'339

The CONTU majority was unpersuaded by Commissioner Hersey's argument. "Programs should no more be considered machine

parts than videotapes should be considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of sound reproduction equipment.

' 340

In all three

cases, the majority noted, "the medium in which copyrighted material
is stored is moved past a sensing device at a set speed, causing electric
335. See, e.g., Durham Indus., v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980) (copied features related only to mechanical, utilitarian aspects of the toys). "Mechanical devices which cannot qualify as pictorial, graphic or sculptural works are not writings and may not obtain copyright
protection." 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 179, § 2.18[F] at 2-208. The definition of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" in § 101 of the copyright statute makes clear that the
mechanical aspects of a work cannot be protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
336. See, e.g., Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 101 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied,321 U.S. 785 (1944), discussedsupranote 333. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held Taylor Instrument's copyright on temperature-recording charts to be invalid despite
Taylor's having a copyright registration certificate for them. The chart was "a mechanical element
of the instrument of which it is an integral part. The chart is as indispensable to the operation of a
recording thermometer as are any of the other elements. They are interdependent. . . . IThe
chart neither teaches nor explains the use of the art. It is an essential element of the machine; it is
the art itself." Id at 100. It was, therefore, not copyrightable subject matter. See also Brown
Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 801 (1947) (charts
intended for use in machine not copyrightable subject matter).
337. Hersey Dissent,supra note 4, at 27.
338. Id at 28.
339. Id (emphasis in original).
340. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 21. See also Nimmer Concurrence,supranote 5,
at 27 (discussing the notion of machine-readable programs and sound recordings as machine
parts).
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current to flow, and ultimately resulting in the movement'34 of machine
parts to print words, display pictures or create sounds." ' Commissioner Hersey countered this argument by pointing to a profound difference between programs, on the one hand, and phonograph records
and videotapes, on the other: The latter two "produce for the human
ear and/or eye the sounds and images that were fed into them and so
are simply media for transmitting the means of expression of the writings of their authors. ' 342 Phonograph records are "the writing of the
author in its audible form"; videotapes are "the writing of the author in
its visible and audible forms. ' 343 The very purpose of stereo equipment and video equipment is to make these writings audible or visible. 344 This is not the case with computers and computer programs.
The purpose of a computer is not to make visible the various sets of
program instructions it contains, but to operate as a machine in the
manner the program instructions direct;345 the program or set of programs controlling the computer determines what kind of machine it
346

will be.

CONTU overstated its case by asserting that all three types of
works-machine-readable programs, videotapes, and phonograph
records-cause machines to "print words, display pictures or create
sounds," because many programs do not yield such output, and even
those that do so yield output that is different in kind from the copyrighted work, which is the machine-readable instructions. 347 Extending
341. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
342. Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 29.
343. Id
344. Id Hersey also observed: "The overwhelming majority of program applications are
mechanical and industrial: the monitoring of an assembly line in a factory; the microprocessors in
an automobile; the aiming device of a weapons system; the coordination of approach patterns at
an airport." Id at 36.
345. In Hersey's view, a more appropriate analogy to use in analyzing machine code is
"mechanical devices [such] as the code-magnetized cards which open and close locks or give access to automated bank tellers." Id at 29. Sound and visual recording devices are not the only
examples of things which work by sensing magnetized information. Indeed, even a cam contains
machine instructions, and it is more closely analogous to a computer program in operation.
A cam, like a mature computer program, is the objectification of a series of instructions:
A cam controlling a drill
"Up, down, up, down ... ," or "In, out, in, out.. ."....
may embody such instructions as:
"Advance rapidly while the hole is shallow, pause and retract for a short distance to
clear chips, advance more slowly as the hole goes deeper, stop at a precise point to
control the depth of the hole, retract clear of the hole, dwell without motion while
the work piece is ejected and another loaded; repeat procedure."
Id Computer programs can and do embody precisely similar instructions.
346. See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
347. See supranotes 63-67 and accompanying text which discuss display and other forms of
computer output and the difference between program instructions and the display they create. It
is ironic that the CONTU majority, which elsewhere in its report, see notes 407-12 infra and
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copyright protection to sound recordings may have amended to some
degree the copyright rule against protection of a machine part, but it
was only to a very limited degree. 348 It is because these works when
used in conjunction with machines make copyrighted works audible
that copyright does and should extend to them. Except for the ill-ad-

vised decision to extend copyright protection to machine-readable programs, the statute and the cases make clear that the rule against

copyright protection for machine parts stands.
4.

The Utility of Computer Chips. At the heart of the current

debate about whether to extend copyright protection to the design patterns for integrated circuits 349-that is, to the "masks" used to imprint

circuitry or data on silicon chips-is the problem of copyright protection for utilitarian objects. Congress held hearings in 1979 and in 1983
accompanying text, criticizes Professor Nimmer's proposal to limit copyright protection for
machine-readable programs to those whose output is the written word, graphic displays, or sound,
falls victim to the same error when responding to Commissioner Hersey's machine-part argument.

As the CONTU majority notes in responding to Nimmer, the ultimate result obtained from a
computer program may just as likely be the smooth flow of traffic during rush hour as some sort of
visual display. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note I, at 21.

348. In another portion of its report, the CONTU majority provides the perfect rebuttal to its
analogy to phonograph records and videotapes. CONTU stated:
[W]hen the program is inserted-instruction by instruction-into the processing element
of the computer and electrical impulses are sent through the circuitry of the processor to
initiate work. . . the ability to copy [is] lost. This is true at least under the present state
of technology. If it should prove possible to tap off these impulses then, perhaps, the
process would be all that was appropriated,and no infringement of the copyright would
occur.

The movement of electrons through the wires and components of a computer is
precisely that process over which copyright has no control.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1,at 22 (emphasis added). What CONTU does not say is that
it is not until the program is in the processing unit of the computer that the instructions which
make it up are "sensed" or "read" by the machine. No one would argue that phonograph records
or videotapes would cease to be protected by copyright when they were being "moved past a
sensing device at a set speed, causing electric current to flow, and ultimately resulting in the movement of machine parts." See supra note 341 and accompanying text. No one would argue that
these works were only "process" which the copyright could not reach. Yet CONTU was willing to
say that when the instructions are "read" by a computer, they are "process," and if one could
manage to tap them off, no infringement of the copyright would occur.
Apart from this, there are several problems with the presence or absence of the machinereadable program in the central processing unit as a basis for a distinction between the copyrightable expression and the uncopyrightable process. First, it Lr possible to tap off or "read" the
electrical impulses constituting a program from the processing unit of a computer. Second, it does
not make any sense as a distinction. If one taps the string of electrical impulses in the processing
unit, one takes the exact same thing as one takes if one replicates a ROM or a tape containing the
program. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1,at 22, for its discussion of the misappropriation of various forms of programs.
349. See supra note 32 for a discussion of integrated circuits.
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on whether to amend the copyright statute to protect chip designs. 350

In the 1979 hearings an official from the Copyright Office argued that
"[i]n the judgment and practice of the Copyright Office, the configuration of the chip is not [copyrightablel-if you were to depict these patterns on an earlier piece of paper, we believe that piece of paper and
the drawing is copyrighted, but there are limitations on the rights extended thereby." 351 Questioned about this, the official responded,
"[I]t's a question of whether the drawing and the chip are the same

thing." 352 To the Copyright Office they were not. Because of the utilitarian character of chips and the masks used to make them, the Copy-

right Office argued against extension of copyright protection to chip

353
designs in 1979, and again in 1983.
The difference between a drawing of a chip and the chip itself or a

mask of the chip's design is that the latter two are "utilitarian" in the
copyright sense. The chip design drawings portray the appearance of a
chip. If they can be said to convey information, it is only information
about the layout of the network on the chip. The chip itself or a chip
350. See generaly CopyrightProtectionforImprinted Design Patternson Semiconductor Chifps,
1979: Hearingon H.A 1007 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Libertiesand theAdm instration
ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as
1979 Hearings]; 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 632 (June 2, 1983) 96, 96.
(reporting on the 1983 Senate hearings on S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), to amend the
copyright statute to provide copyright protection for chip mask designs). The House of Representatives has taken a different approach to chip design protection. It recently passed H.R. 5525, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), which will create a new form of legal protection for chips. See N.Y. Times,
June 11, 1984, at A16, col. 1; 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 684 (June 14,
1984) 163, 163. Concerning H.R. 5525, Representative Kastenmeier has stated:
It, therefore, is extremely unwise for Congress to provide copyright protection for semiconductor chips by amendment to the present statute. . . . The appropriate solution to
the problem of protection for semiconductor chips is the creation of a sui generis proprietary right, separate and distinct from the author's copyright. Stated somewhat differently,
a mask work is not a book. The proposed legislation does not engage in the legal fiction
of treating books and mask works similarly. In the long run, we will reap great benefits
by not proceeding from false analogies.
Quoted in id at 172, 175.
On October 9, 1984, Congress gave final approval to a bill, Federal District Court Organization Act of 1984, H.R. 6163, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. III, 130 CONG. REC. HI 1,598, HI 1,602-05,
HI 1,616-17 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984) (Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984) (to be codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914), which, although nominally providing "copyright" protection for chip designs, in fact creates a new form of legal protection which is a hybrid of copyright and patent
principles. The legislation is expected to be signed by the President. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1984, at Al, col. 4.
351. 1979 Hearings,supra note 350, at 19.
352. Id at 21.
353. See 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 632 (June 2, 1983) 96, 96 on the
Copyright Office counsel's statements to Congress in hearings on S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). Harvard Professor Arthur Miller is reported to have remarked that the bill would in effect
create "a patent in copyright clothing," and that it was a logical extension of the rule providing
copyright protection for computer software. Id

Vol. 1984:663]

CONTU REVISITED

mask may portray much of the same appearance and conveys much of
the same information, but both do more than that. Chips may store bits
of data until called for by the computer. Chips may also serve as the
central processing unit of the computer, that is, its hardware. The
value of the chip lies in its utilitarian character, not in its communicative character. The value of a chip mask is in its utility as a stencil to
create an imprinted chip. It is because the chip, and masks used to
create it, do more than convey information and portray its appearance
that the Copyright Office objects to their copyrightability.
The Copyright Office has taken a firm position against granting
copyright protection to computer chip designs. Oddly, however, it has
ignored the utilitarian character of computer programs in machinereadable form. To object to the copyrightability of the chip design on
utilitarian grounds when no objection is raised to the copyrightability
of machine-readable programs is radically inconsistent.
5.

The Utiliy of ComputerPrograms. All computer programs in

machine-readable form are capable of controlling the functioning of
the machine or machines of which they are a part. While some programs are capable of causing information to be conveyed or images to
be displayed in the copyright sense, they all have a utility beyond information conveyance and image display. Having an intrinsic utility of
another sort, they should be deemed "utilitarian" within the meaning
of the copyright laws, and hence uncopyrightable. In machine-readable form, the utility of computer programs cannot be separated from
their non-utilitarian aspects, and for this reason as well they ought to
be deemed uncopyrightable.
The first computer-program copyright case to raise this utility issue was Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&4 Group, Inc.35 4 JS&A had

exactly copied the encoded version of the computer program which
controlled the operations of the "Compuchess" game that Data Cash
manufactured. The district court viewed the difference between source
and machine code versions of a computer program as essentially the
same as the difference between architectural plans and the structure the
plans were used to construct. 355 Since copyright law does not regard
buildings as "copies" of architectural plans, the court did not treat the
machine-readable program as a "copy" of the source code. 356 The en-

coded chip was, in the district court's words, a "mechanical embodi354. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill.
1979), af'd on other grounds,628 F,2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
355. Id at 1068.
356. Id
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''357 Although the
ment of the source program,. . not a 'copy' of it.
court was no more specific, it is apparent that it was disturbed by both

the utilitarian and the mechanical character of the machine-readable

"Compuchess" program.
The district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.3 58 was more precise in its analysis of the utility problem

presented by machine code. At issue there was the copyrightability of
operating system programs, some of which were encoded on "ReadOnly Memory" (ROM) chips and some on disks. 359 The court treated

the ROM chips on which some of the operating system programs were
encoded as three-dimensional works, which in its view were subject to

the same copyright limitations as other structures: "ROMs encoded
with an object program may be compared to a physical structure with
an essentially useful purpose or function, like that of a bridge, or to an
architectural work like a house. '360 Neither a bridge nor a house is
copyrightable subject matter, and the same is true of a machine pro36 1
gram on a chip.
Operating system programs seemed to the district court to present
3 62

more serious copyright problems than did application programs.

357. Id "In its object phase, the ROM, the computer program is a mechanical tool or a
...Id at 1069.
machine part.
358. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rep'd,714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
359. See supranote 32 regarding ROM chips and notes 52-56 and accompanying text regarding operating system programs. Several other recent copyright cases have involved operating system programs. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal.
1983), aft'd,725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance,
Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217
U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (both operating system and application programs); Tandy Corp, v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (from the description of the
program, it appears to have been an operating system program for Tandy's TRS-80 computer);
Only in the two Apple cases-Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. at 814-15, and FormulaInternational,562 F. Supp. at 780, 784-85-has the utility objection to copyrightability arisen with respect
to operating system programs.
360. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. at 823 (citations omitted). The reason why the court
focused on the three-dimensional nature of the chips was probably that the copyright term "useful
article" is referred to in the definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and only there.
One could argue that literary works-another possible category in which to place programsmight not present utility problems. See infranotes 377-85 and accompanying text for a development of this argument, which was apparently adopted by the court of appeals in Franklin
Computer.
361. Interestingly, the Office of Technology Assessment of the Congress would seem to agree
with the Franklin Computerdistrict court that Congress had not acted as to encoded ROMs. See
OTA PROJECT PROPOSAL, supra note 24, at 4: "With respect to the Apple [Franklin] case, for
example, the law failed to address the important questions of whether copyright law applies to
operating code that is readable, for the most part, only by machine, or to information that is
embedded in hardware."
362. The court took pains to differentiate between application and operating system programs.
See Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. at 814. It did not state that application programs in
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While all programs might present some utility problems, operating sys-

tem programs do so more clearly because of their critical role in the
machinery of the computer. The operating system was "internal to the

computer," "designed only to facilitate the operating of the application
program," "configured to satisfy the requirements of the physical environment of the computer, especially the structure of the [central

processing unit]," and "a part of the machine.
364

district court in JS&4,

365
programs it reviewed.

'363

This court, like the

emphasized the mechanical aspects of the

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision in Franklin Computer,366 dismissing the utility objec-

tion as already having been satisfactorily dealt with in one of its prior
cases. 367 A review of that case, however, reveals that it too avoided a

meaningful discussion of the utility issue. Williams Electronics,Inc. v.
Artic International, 1nc.3 68 was a videogame case in which the

defendent challenged both an audiovisual copyright and a computer
program copyright in the game "Defender" on the ground of utility.
369
The other videogame cases that had considered similar challenges
had been cases in which only the audiovisual aspects of the videogames, not the programs that produced the games' sounds and images,

had been copyrighted. 370 The court of appeals in Williams Electronics
disposed of the utility defense against both the audiovisual and the pro-

gram copyright by expressing its agreement with the reasoning contained in a lengthy quotation from a prior case in which the utility
machine-readable form would be copyrightable, but much of the discussion emphasized the fact
that operating system programs were involved in the case at bar.
363. Id at 814.
364. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. IIl. 1979), afd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
365. "Ifa ROM is found to be a mechanical device, it loses the protection reserved for writings
and expression under copyright." Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. at 823-24.
366. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
367. "Defendant [in Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982)] had
argued that there can be no copyright protection for the ROMs because they are utilitarian objects
or machine parts. We held that the statutory requirement of 'fixation,' the manner in which the
issue arises, is satisfied through the embodiment of the expression in the ROM devices." 714 F.2d
at 1249.
368. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
369. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), a'd,704
F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
370. Most of the videogame cases have involved audiovisual copyrights only. See, e.g., Stem
Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F.
Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981). It appears that only one other reported case, Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. I11. 1983), involved both audiovisual and program copyrights,
and it was decided after Williams Electronics.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:663

objection to an audiovisualcopyright had been rejected.3 71 The court in
Williams Electronicsrefused to treat the utility argument as to the program as raising either a different or a more serious problem than the
372
audiovisual aspect had.
Yet the computer program embodied in the chips of a videogame
would seem to raise more serious utility problems than would the audiovisual displays. An audiovisual copyright protects the size, shape,
color, and other features of the characters or other images displayed on
the video screen, the repetitive pattern of actions which are displayed
on the screen involving those characters, and the set of sounds that
correspond to various game actions. 373 A copyright in the program
protects the set of instructions which cause one part of the screen to
display red and another part green, and which cause a wide variety of
other machine functions to be performed in the circuitry. Although
this set of instructions produces the audiovisual work, the two things
are quite distinct. 374 For copyright purposes, it matters not at all how a
shape is drawn-whether by hand, by photograph or by digital encoding. One can copyright a drawing, but not how the drawing was
produced.
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Franklin Computer probed deeply enough into the utility problem. The utilitarian
character of the programs involved in that case is readily apparent
from their description. The "Autostart" program, for example, was
said to "initiate registers and other circuitry in the Apple II when the
power is turned on. It also performs a variety of hardware-oriented
functions during operating, so that the machine can accept keystrokes
and generate character graphics for video display. ' 375 All of the func371. 685 F.2d at 875 (quoting Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1008-09
(N.D. Ill.
1982)). The court in Midway, however, had been careful to limit its holding on utility to
cases involving audiovisual copyrights. 547 F. Supp. at 1008.
372. The court simply referred to its rejection of the argument as to the audiovisual aspects
and said that the language and legislative history of the Copyright Act did not support the defendant's position. 685 F.2d at 877.
373. See, for example, the description of the extent of the audiovisual copyright protection in
videogames in Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615-17
(7th Cir. 1982).
374. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text regarding the difference between the program instructions and the display. The distinction between the two was recognized by at least one

court which observed that the same audiovisual display could be produced by completely different
videogame computer programs. See Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir.
1982). In one case, the audiovisual copyright in a videogame has been held not to be infringed,
even though the program copyright was found to be infringed. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741, 749-53 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
375. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. at 815. The programs are described individually Id at
815-16.
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tions which the operating system performs could have been hardwired
instead; from the point of view of the user, the operating system, the

microcode, and the hardware are a unit, together constituting a virtual
machine.

376

One might challenge the assertion that an operating system program is an intrinsically utilitarian work and therefore uncopyrightable,
by arguing that the "utility" objection is limited to "pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works," 377 for it is in the context of this definition that
the concern about utilitarian aspects is explicitly voiced in the copy-

right statute. This challenge apparently underlay the approach of the
Third Circuit in Franklin Computer. Rejecting the district court's char-

acterization of the encoded chip as a sculptural

work, 3 7 8

the Third Cir-

cuit characterized the program at issue as a "literary work," noting that
the category "is not confined to literature in the nature of Hemingway's
379
For Whom the Bell Tolls."
There are several responses to this contention. First, while source

code is clearly a literary work within the meaning of the statute,
machine code is not. To say that a machine-readable program is a lit-

erary work because it is a "copy" of a literary work, namely the source
code, is like saying that a building is a drawing because the architectural plans which were used to make it are drawings. 3 80 It is only if we

do not understand what programs are that we can consider a machine
code a literary work. A second response is that of John Hersey: "To

call a machine-control element a copy of a literary work flies in the face
of common sense. Ask any citizen in the street whether a printed cir-

cuit in a microprocessor in the emission control of his or her car is a
copy of a literary work, and see what answer you get."' 38' A third re-

sponse, drawing from the statutory language itself, is that "useful article" is defined separately from "pictorial, graphic and sculptural
376. See supra notes 38, 60 & 61 and accompanying text.
377. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "pictorial, sculptural, and graphic works").
378. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
379. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249.
380. Similarly, to say that machine code is a literary work because one can compose a program directly in machine code is like saying that a building is a drawing because one can build a
building without written plans. One author has argued that the blueprint/building analogy for
source code/machine code is fallacious on the ground that machine code, unlike buildings, can be
easily replicated and maintains a symbolic character. See Davidson, Protecting Computer
Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETPiCS 337, 345 (1983). This argument ignores the
fact that it is because of the utilitarian character of buildings-and not because of their other
characteristics-that Congress has chosen not to protect them. See supra note 312 regarding the
legislative history of the 1976 Act on this point.
381. Hersey Dissent, supranote 4, at 33.
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works," and is not by its terms limited in scope to the latter category. 382
The definition of "useful article" is, in fact, broad enough to cover
machine-readable programs, such as operating systems. A fourth response is that Baker v. Selden3 83 and its progeny 384 demonstrate that to
the extent a "literary work" has a utilitarian character, it too may either
be unprotected or have more limited copyright protection. 385 The
Third Circuit in Franklin Computer responded to this last argument by
noting it could not accept the expansive reading that some cases 38 6 had
given to the language in Baker. While conceding that the literal language of Baker "could support" such an argument, the court regarded
Mazer v. Stein as rejecting it, relying on the Supreme Court's statement
that it found " 'nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument
that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration.' "387 But Mazer did not speak
to the issue that the machine-readable operating-system programs
raise. Mazer involved a non-utilitarian object subsequently incorporated into a utilitarian object, and the issue there was the viability of
the copyright as to the separately existing non-utilitarian work. For
Mazer to be comparable to Franklin Computer, it would have to be the
whole lamp itself, or some of its utilitarian features, for which copyright was claimed and for which copyright was sustained by the
Supreme Court. The machine-readable form of an operating system
program is inherently "utilitarian." The Court in Mazer was only willing to allow the copyright for the statuette because it could be nonutilitarian. Therefore, Mazer is inapposite, and the Third Circuit's
argument has no firm basis.
Other arguments that machine-readable programs do not have the
utility necessary to disqualify them from copyright protection are also
382. Compare the definitions of "useful article" and "pictorial, sculptural and graphic works"
in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
383. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).

384. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 816 (1958) (narrow scope of protection for insurance form because of the utility of the
form in commerce); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944), discussedsupranotes 333, 336.

385. A recipe may be another type of "literary work" whose utility may produce copyright
problems. Copyright regulations in effect prior to the 1976 Act denied copyright protection to a
"mere listing of ingredients or contents." 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1959). The copyright scholar
Nimmer has noted that there is some case authority for copyright protection for recipes, but he
regards the cases as doubtful because "the content of recipes are clearly dictated by functional
considerations." 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supranote 179, § 2.18[1], at 2-214.5. Recipes may be
patentable subject matter. See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 328, § 1.02[6].
386. See, e.g., Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944).
387. Franklin Computer,714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)).
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rebuttable. One might say that it is the computer and not the program
that, for example, makes a traffic-light system operate, and that a program is simply stored on a chip or floppy disk in the same manner as
music is stored on a phonograph record or words are stored in a book.
This argument ignores two key facts: First, it is the program which
controls the execution of the machine functions and, second, computers
do more with programs than merely store them. To say that programs
have no utility because they can be stored in chips is no more sensible
than saying a hammer has no utility when it is resting on a shelf. When
called upon, the hammer will pound the nail into the board. When
called upon, a computer program will make the traffic lights work.
No one would argue that there is a utilitarian objection to the
copyrightability of source code. Like other written works, it may disclose a pattern of steps which a reader may follow to carry out a proceis
dure for the accomplishment of a particular task. 388 Source code 389
"explanatory" in the sense the term was used in Baker v. Selden.
Nor can there be any utilitarian objection to the copyrightability of the
visual and auditory displays produced on a screen or on print-outs as a
result of the operation of a computer program. These displays are appearances portrayed or information conveyed. That is their function;
that is their value. They are therefore nonutilitarian in a copyright
sense.3 90 Although the program copyright for a videogame would seem
to be distinct from the audiovisual copyright for the game, although the
copyrighted videogame program instructions are never displayed or revealed on a screen, although the machine-readable videogame program
instructions do have an intrinsic utilitarian function apart from the display of images, and although videogame program instructions do operate as machine parts, still, it is less offensive to copyright tradition to
say that videogame programs fall within the ambit of copyright than to
say that operating systems do. The primary function of videogame
programs is, after all, to convey information or display images and
sounds. 39 1 Other programs which serve as book substitutes, even those
388. The Franklin Computer case is disturbing because the plaintiff seemed to be seeking copyright protection for the "logic and structure" of its program, which a traditional reading of Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), suggests would be beyond the reach of copyright. See also HousE
REPoRT, supranote 120, at 116, quoted infra note 421, regarding congressional concern about such

matters.
389. 101 U.S. 99(1879). See the discussion of this case supranotes 182-85 and accompanying

text.
390. See supra notes 289-334 and accompanying text.

391. It would be possible to amend the law to limit copyright protection to those programs
whose only utility is to convey information to a human audience or to portray an appearance.
This would make the rule consistent with the rule for other utilitarian objects.
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with some analytic capabilities, 392 may similarly be designed primarily
to convey information or display appearances; under the present statute, they too should be considered copyrightable subject matter. The
machines in such cases have as their only function the communication
of words, images and sounds to a human audience.
But there are serious questions about whether Congress intended
to protect operating systems, microcode, and programs that perform
functions such as running digital watches. CONTU's blindness to the
utilitarian objection to copyright, 393 CONTU's apparent assumption
about the display capabilities of all computer programs, 394 and
CONTU's failure to perceive the differences among the vast range of
programs 395 have all contributed to the problem. Because of the flaws
in CONTU's analysis, it is appropriate for courts analyzing cases involving these kinds of programs to apply to computer programs the
rule against copyright protection for utilitarian or mechanical works, or
to find that Congress has not acted as to programs presenting these
396
kinds of problems.
Programs dictate what kind of a machine a computer will be. 397
To the extent the program causes the machine to be something other
than a book or an audiovisual work and to the extent it makes the
computer a dishwashing machine or a gas pump, the traditional rules
against copyright protection for utilitarian works and for machine parts
ought to be enforced. This is particularly appropriate because the same
kind of machine, if not a computer, would be disqualified from copyright protection under these rules. It is absurd to deny copyright protection to the shape of a television set on account of its partially
utilitarian character while allowing full copyright protection to the operative mechanism controlling the tuning of the television picture if
that mechanism is run by a computer program. Copyright law would
392. See supranote 68 (concerning "expert system" programs).
393.
394.
395.
396.

See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 340-41 and accompanying text.
See supranote 159 and accompanying text.
The courts that have been asked to rule on this point have not closely examined the issue.

Rather they have relied on syllogistic reasoning of the following sort: In 1980, Congress made
computer programs copyrightable. Operating systems are computer programs. Therefore, operating system programs are copyrightable. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 77980 (C.D. Cal. 1983), a'd,725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). These courts have also pointed to other
copyright infringement cases involving operating system programs, such as Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (infringement found), and
GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (infringement found). Neither of
these latter cases addressed the utilitarian issue.
397. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

Vol. 1984:663]

CONTU REVISITED

not have protected the tuning device before it was computerized. Congress could not have intended such an inconsistent result. Having been
so firm about limiting copyright protection to nonutilitarian works,
Congress could not have understood its decision to extend copyright
protection to computer programs to be a decision to extend such protection regardless of the program's utility.
Arguably, Congress was seriously misled by CONTU. To the extent that the utilitarian character of programs is now better understood,
Congress should reevaluate either copyright protection for computer
programs or its policy with respect to utility and promulgate a consistent rule. The policy considerations 398 present powerful reasons why
the shape of TV sets and the operative mechanisms which run them
ought to be treated the same way. Society will make better decisions
about how to protect what should be protected in programs when it
takes full and careful stock of what computer programs truly are and
makes decisions based on their overall nature, and not on only one of
399
their aspects.
C.

The Essence of Copyright.

The foundation of copyright protection since its inception has not
been simply the desire to give one who has created a valuable work a
limited monopoly to reproduce and distribute the work in the hopes
that this reward will stimulate creation. If that were its sole purpose,
no one could question the wisdom of extending copyright protection to
computer programs. That purpose, of course, is an important part of
the concept of copyright, but rewarding creative work in order to stimulate more of it is as much the goal of patent law as it is of copyright.
What has distinguished copyright from other forms of intellectual
property, what has been at its base but not at the base of the others, is
that the content of a copyrighted work has always had some nonfunctional aesthetic, informational, or entertaining qualities which are communicated to a human audience. The only "function" of copyrightable
works has been "to portray the appearance of an article or to convey
information. '' 4°° What has been protected has only been the expression
of what has been portrayed or conveyed: the words made visible, the
sounds made audible, and the like. The level of the aesthetic, informational, or entertaining qualities may not always have been very great,
398. See supra notes 318-34 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 350, regarding Representative Kastenmeier's similar statement justifying
the creation of a new form of legal protection for chip masks.
400. See the definition of "useful article" in § 101 of the copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
See supra notes 292 & 313-17 and accompanying text.
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but they have always-until computer programs-been present. This
fundamental point is what the CONTU majority was either unwilling
or unable to appreciate. The CONTU majority brushed aside the expressions of concern about protecting the "essence" of copyright made
by Commissioner Hersey in his dissent 40 ' and Commissioner Nimmer
in his concurrence 4o2 as if they were insignificant and involved a very
different set of issues.
Commissioner Nimmer, a well-known copyright scholar, concurred in the Commission's recommendation to extend copyright protection to computer programs. Yet he feared that implementing the
majority's recommendations would be a major-and perhaps unwisedeparture from copyright tradition. What troubled him most about the
Commission's approach was
its failure to articulate any rationale which would not equally justify
copyright protection for the tangible expression of any and all original ideas (whether or not computer technology, business, or otherwise). If literary works are to be so broadly construed, the Copyright
Act becomes a general misappropriation law, applicable as well in
what has traditionally been regarded as the patent arena, and indeed,
also in other areas to which neither copyright nor patent law has previously extended. 4°3
This, said Nimmer, would pose a serious constitutional question; the
Commission's approach might stretch the meaning of the constitutional
terms "authors" and "writings" beyond the breaking point. 40 Equally
troubling to him were the murky policy questions raised by this shift in
the direction of the law.4 5 What seemed to sway him to acceptance of
at least an experiment with such full-scale copyright protection of computer programs was the professed need of the industry for some mean6
ingful protection. 40
401. Since much has already been made of Commissioner Hersey's views, the text will focus

on Commissioner Nimmer's thoughts on this subject. However, it is worth noting that Hersey
maintained that copyright should subsist in only those original works of authorship, however
fixed, "which communicate the work's means of expression." Hersey Dissent, supra note 4, at 29.
Congressional action admitting machine-readable versions of programs to the copyright realm
would mark the first time copyright protection "had ever covered a means of communication, not
with the human mind and senses, but with machines." Id at 28. However susceptible to expansion the constitutional term "writings" had proved in the past, one thing had remained constant:
communication as the aim of copyrightable works. Id at 36. To Hersey, an important principle of
copyright was undermined by the abandonment of this limitation on the meaning of "writings."
402. Nimmer Concurrence, supra note 5.
403. Id at 26 (emphasis in original).
404. Id
405. Id
406. After stating his constitutional and policy objections to copyright protection for programs, Nimmer wrote, "[s]till, at this time, knowing what we now know about the nature of the
computer industry, its needs, and its potential for great contribution to the public welfare, I am
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Yet Nimmer foresaw that, in time, the Commission's recommen-

dations, if implemented, might become unsatisfactory because they too
radically departed from copyright tradition. He noted that, in the fu-

ture, Congress might want to decide to limit copyright protection for
computer programs to those programs which produced works which
themselves were copyrightable in the traditional sense. 40 7 Thus, a pro-

gram designed for data storage and display would be copyrightable because a printout of the data or portions of it would be copyrightable as

a compilation, and a program for a videogame would be copyrightable
because of the audiovisual aspect of the output.4° 8 However, "programs which control the heating and air conditioning in a building, or

which determine the flow of fuel in an engine, or which control traffic
signals would not be eligible for copyright because their operations do

not result in copyrightable works. '409 Nimmer's proposal recognizes a
qualitative difference between the traditional categories of copyright-

able and noncopyrightable works which in his view should not lightly
be cast aside, as the CONTU majority seemed to do.4 10 Because of its

utilitarian character and because it neither portrays an appearance nor
conveys information, the computer program that runs an air-conditioning system should not be copyrightable.

The CONTU majority's rejoinder to this expression of concern
about preserving traditional limitations on copyrightable subject matter
misconstrued the point. The CONTU majority seemed to think that
prepared, on balance, to support the Commission's conclusions and recommendations." Id at 2627.
407. He proposed "a possible line of demarcation which would distinguish between protectible and nonprotectible software in a manner more consistent with limiting such protection to
the conventional copyright arena." Id at 27.
408. Id.
409. Id
410. The majority responded at some length to the Nimmer proposal. His basis for distinction
was, in their view,
not consistent with the design of the Act of 1976, which was clearly to protect all works
of authorship from the moment of their fixation in any tangible medium of expression.
Further, it does not square with copyright practice past and present, which recognizes
copyright protection for a work of authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be
put. ... Nor has copyright been denied to works simply because of their utilitarian
aspects. It follows, therefore, that there should likewise be no distinction made between
programs which are used in the production of further copyrighted works and those
which are not.
CONTU FINAL. REPORT, supra note 1,at 21. As pointed out, supra notes 294 & 316-17 and accompanying text, the majority was in error regarding the copyrightability of utilitarian objects.
The majority construed Nimmer's proposal as if it were an attempt to separate the idea from the
expression in a computer program, and responded that it would be better for the courts rather
than the statute to make this distinction. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. This is a
misconstruction of Nimmer's purpose, which was chiefly to harmonize copyright protection for
programs with copyright tradition.
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what Hersey and Nimmer were saying was that cultural or aesthetic
judgments on the merits of a work should be the basis of the decision
on copyrightability. The CONTU majority retorted at length that
there was no basis in the history of copyright legislation or court interpretations of it "for the imposition of a standard of literary or artistic

merit for determining copyrightability." 4t ' The sole "legitimate question" regarding copyrightability, said the CONTU majority, was
411. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. The perils of such censorship, the majority
noted, had been discussed by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239 (1903), in which the Supreme Court recognized the copyrightability of a circus poster.
CONTU quoted at length from the Holmes decision:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for
instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure
of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command
the interest of any public they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say they
have not aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of the public is not to be treated
with contempt.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 (quoting Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52).
But the issue in Bleistein was of a very different sort than the CONTU majority's use of it
suggests. The poster pirate in Bleistein had argued that the statutory limitation to "pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts" excluded the circus advertisement poster from
copyright protection because the poster was not a piece of "fine art." Justice Holmes responded

by saying,
the act, however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters are not good enough to
be considered within its scope. The antithesis to "illustrations or works connected with
the fine arts" is not works of little merit or of humble degree, or illustrations addressed to
the less educated classes. . . . A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a
subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement.
188 U.S. at 251. It was not because the poster was "original," or because it was commercially
valuable, that it was copyrightable. It was copyrightable because it was a picture. Whether it
expressed its content well or not was not the issue; it did have some modicum of aesthetic content
that made it a picture and therefore copyrightable. CONTU overlooked this aspect of Blelsten.
The CONTU majority cited a number of examples of works of little or no aesthetic merit
which are nonetheless copyrightable: "advertising copy, picture post cards, videotaped wrestling
matches, violent and sexually explicit films, and the most banal popular music." CONTU FINAL
REPORT, supranote 1,at 26. But these are examples of works that have at least a minimal amount
of aesthetic, informational, or entertainment content. Even a telephone directory, which has no
aesthetic or entertainment qualities, at least conveys information. It is the presence of one of these
qualities that makes a work an "expression" that copyright will protect. When judges in copyright
cases have searched for the minimal originality and creativity necessary to find a work copyrightable they look only for some faint sign of such content. The content itself may not necessarily be
protected. In a work with informational content, for example, the information itself is in the
public domain. But to the extent that an author makes the information available to the public in a
form different from that in which it might previously have been available, the law will grant the
author some protection for his original prose, or, if there is none of that, for his selection, ordering,
and arrangement of information. See, e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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41 2
whether the work was original.
As the discussion in the preceding sections of this article has
demonstrated, however, originality is not the sole criterion of
copyrightability. The "utility" of a work and its expressive contentthat is, the portrayal of an aesthetic appearance or the conveyance of
information or entertainment-are also legitimate copyright questions.
It is possible for the display of a functioning computer program to have
the same kind of aesthetic, informational, or entertainment content as
other kinds of copyrighted works. It is also possible for the flow chart
or source code of a program to have, if not an aesthetic or entertaining
character, at least an informational character, the expression of which
copyright might protect. However, a program in machine-readable
form-apart from whatever it might cause to be displayed--does not
have an aesthetic, informational, or entertaining content which is conveyed to human users. Machine code has a functional, not a communicative, purpose. For this reason, machine-readable forms of programs
are different in kind from all other types of copyrighted works. Their
utility and invisibility put them beyond the reach of copyright protection. They may deserve protection, but copyright should not be distorted solely to accommodate this form of work.
Commissioners Nimmer and Hersey were right to warn that extending protection to all computer programs would subvert the meaning of copyright. Copyright law should not be transformed into a
general-purpose misappropriation law. It is not too late to restore the
traditional copyright rules for the traditional categories of copyrightable works and to invent new forms and new rules for the protection of
computer programs.
412. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote I, at 25. The context in which this statement occurs

is worth quoting:
To attempt to deny copyrightability to a writing because it is capable of use in conjunc-

tion with a computer would contravene this sound policy [against basing copyright on a

judgement of aesthetic merits]. Where could a meaningful line of demarcation be
drawn? Between flow chart and source code? Between source code and object code? At
the moment of input into a computer or microprocessor? The Commission believes that
none of these is appropriate. The line which must be drawn is between the expression
and the idea, between the writing and the process which is described. This proposal
acknowledges the propriety of keeping cultural value judgements out of copyright. The
only legitimate question regarding copyrightability is: Is the object an original work of
authorship?
Id Yet the architectural plan cases, see supra note 312 and accompanying text, show that the line
is clearly and routinely drawn in copyright law between writings, such as plans, and the useful
objects created from the writings.
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How THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY PERCEIVES PRESENT THEORIES
OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR PROGRAMS

Lawyers, judges, and legislators often find it difficult to step back
and take a long, hard look at the law to determine whether it "works"
as it was intended to work. Many persons closely involved with the
software industry believe that the existing means of legal protection for

computer programs in machine-readable form do not work satisfactorily. 41 3 From the industry's perspective, the chief deficiencies of the
existing legal forms are the uncertainty about the extent of protection

each of the major forms may provide, 414 and the fact that each of the
major forms refuses to recognize as protectible certain aspects of the
value of computer programs which the industry would have protected
if it could.415 That lawyers and judges tend to understand the technology only dimly or not at all contributes to the sense of dissatisfaction
416
with existing legal forms.
A.

PerceivedLimitations of Copyright Law.

Much of the software industry finds copyright to be an unsatisfactory means of protection for computer programs. 417 One reason for
this has been uncertainty about the scope of protection which copyright
413. See, for example, Mantle, Developments in Copyright and Trade Secret Protectionfor
ComputerSoftware, COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 95, at § I-l: "Although the software
industry has become a major commercial and technological contributor to the success of U.S.
businesses, and one at which the creators of U.S. software have an undisputed worldwide lead, the
legal systems in the U.S. and worldwide are ill-prepared to provide the degree of certain protection available to other industrial property through patents, copyrights and trade secrets."; see also
Goldberg, Legal Protectionof EDP Software, 18 DATAMATION 66 (1972); Stem, The Case of the
Purloined Object Code: Can It Be Solved? Part 2, BY'rE, Oct. 1982, at 210, 222 ("Software is
clearly different enough and important enough to justify its own system of legislative protection);
supra notes 22-25.
414. 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 630 (May 19, 1983) 57, 59 (report on
computer software protection program). See also supra note 25.
415. See, e.g., Goldberg, supranote 413, at 68-70; Stem, supra note 164, at 430-38. See also
infra notes 419, 446 & 449 and accompanying text.
416. See, e.g., Bosworth, supra note 95, at 26 ("A problem ... is lack of understanding of
what computers are and can do. Today, most legislators, judges, and government officials have
little personal knowledge of computer systems and software and, therefore, have at best an inadequate understanding, and at worst a wrong understanding. . . . In particular, computer software
is unique-it can't be successfully correlated with historical crafts or sciences and, thus, can't be
easily explained by analogy."); see also Lecht, DP Lawyers: Hessians of U.S. Tech Revolution,
COMPUTER WORLD, May 16, 1983, at 81 ("Now it could be that the ineffable pleasure of working
with nincompoops [lawyers] whose technological grasp of their cases has ranged from inaccurate
to nil has been mine alone." The article continues in that vein.).
417. See, e.g., M. GEMiGNANI, LAW AND THE COMPUTER 115 (1981) ("Even if the law [recommended by CONTUI is passed, it does not change the fact that copyright remains inherently
unsuitable as a means of protecting programs.") (Gemignani is both a computer scientist and a
lawyer); Mantle, supranote 413, at § 1-3; Stem, supranote 164, at 434.
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law might provide beyond some compensation in the event of an exact
replication of a program encoded on a chip. 4 18 Perhaps an even
stronger reason for dissatisfaction is that copyright law does not aim to

protect that which sophisticated programmers and those who market
the programs think are the most commercially valuable aspects of the

programs: either the algorithm of the program, the elaborate logical
structure of the program, or some "trick" that makes the program oper-

ate faster or more efficiently than others.4 19 What the programmer

wants to be compensated for is the value of these ideas, not just for the
particular words or symbols used to express them. Yet Baker v. Selden420 and other copyright cases would suggest that these are matters to
which the copyright cannot extend. 42 1 Part of the reason there is cur-

rently so much secrecy about marketed programs may be that the industry knows these valuable ideas are not protectible by copyright. It is

possible that the industry would be willing to disclose more if these
ideas could be protected in some way.
The industry is also uncomfortable with the implications of inten-

tional or unintentional "publications" of programs. The industry, for
the most part, wants to keep programs secret while at the same time

selling them to the world at large. Failure to put copyright notices of
some sort in, on, or near the machine code of computer programs may

lead to a court finding of dedication to the public domain. 422 But putting copyright notices in the programs may be dangerous, as it may be

some evidence of "publication" of the work, which then may mean that
the ideas contained in the program can no longer be protected as trade
418. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 164, at 420-34.
419. See, e.g., AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REvISION 97 (1973); Goldberg, supranote 413, at 67. See also Stem, supra note 413, at 214 ("Almost all
proposals on software law have opposed protection of algorithms and concepts. Both patent and
copyright law oppose their protection on the theory that they are ideas, which should not be
protected as such ....").
420. 101 U.S. 99, 101-04 (1979). This case is discussed supranotes 182-85 and accompanying
text.
421. The House Report on the 1976 Act made it explicit that granting copyright protection to
programs would not change this rule:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend
protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than
merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other
things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable
element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in
the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
HousE REPORT, supra note 120, at 56-57.
422. See, e.g., Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1980)
(failure to affix copyright notice led to finding of dedication of computerized chess game program
to the public domain).
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secrets. 423 At the moment it appears that the chief value of having

copyright protection for a machine-readable version of a computer program is as a threat the copyright owner can use against those who
might be writing a similar program. 424
B.

PerceivedLimitations of Patent Protection.

Except as to computer hardware, patent protection is a gamble
which those in the industry are not eager to take, especially because the
patented program will be published if the Patent Office can be convinced to issue the patent. 425 Inasmuch as the validity of the patent can
be attacked by a subsequent programmer if the patentee sues to enforce
the patent,4 26 the valuable idea in the program may, through patent
publication, be dedicated to the public without any benefit necessarily
being conferred on the patentee. The expense and delay involved in

prosecuting a patent application present other disadvantages. 427 But
the major problem with patents is the uncertainty of protection. 428
One of the reasons CONTU recommended extending copyright
protection to computer programs was that it was unclear at the time
whether any patent protection at all was available for computer programs.4 29 Since the CONTU Report, there have been many cases in-

volving patent protection for computer programs, but the irresolution
evident to CONTU in 1978 seems to be even worse now than before.
423. But see, e.g., Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc.,
687 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1982) (affixing copyright notice not publication as a matter of
law).
424. The author has overheard computer scientists state that they would seek copyright protection for their programs for this reason. The threat is an empty one from a legal standpoint
because the copyright was not intended by Congress to protect the ideas or processes embodied in
programs. See supranote 421.
425. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 413, at 67.
426. Cf.id (noting that 70% of such patents challenged in the courts have been struck down as
invalid).
427. See id at 66. See also CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
428.

See, e.g., L. GASAWAY & M. MURPHY, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS

37 (1982) ("For more than a decade confusion has reigned over whether patents should be granted
for computer software. Courts first answered yes, then no, then maybe, and now the answer appears to be sometimes."); Mantle, supranote 413, at § 1-2.
429. See supranote 151 and accompanying text for a description of the three Supreme Court
cases decided before the CONTU Final Report was issued. Two of these-Benson and Flookare discussed infra notes 430-36 and accompanying text. A fourth case, Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175 (1981), discussed infra notes 437-40 and accompanying text, was decided after the
CONTU Final Report was issued, as were all of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decisions cited and discussed infra notes 441-49, 447-49 and accompanying text. The Freeman decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, cited and discussed infra notes 441-43 and
accompanying text, was decided several months before the CONTU Final Report was released.
The Report makes no mention of the Freeman case. Because there is often several months delay
in the publication of opinions, the Commission may have been unaware of it.
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The pre-CONTU state of understanding about the availability of
patent protection for programs did not give reason for much optimism.
In Gottschalk v. Benson,430 the Supreme Court reviewed a claim for a
process patent on a computer program for conversion of numbers from
one form of binary code to another. While it had been possible to perform this function previously, the existing procedure was very complicated and time-consuming whereas the method described in the patent
application was simple and considerably faster. Despite the fact that
this was an important and commercially valuable innovation, the
Supreme Court denied patentability. Benson seemed, to the Court, to
be claiming a patent on a mathematical formula, and that the law did
not permit him to do:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect
that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD [Binary
Coded Decimal] numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in
this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer,
which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
and in practical effect
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula
43 1
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.
This decision has been criticized by commentators, 432 but remains a
viable and important precedent which calls into question the availability of patent protection for programs themselves. Benson is the only
Supreme Court case directly to rule on the patentability of computer
programs per se as processes.
Several years after Benson, the Supreme Court again had occasion
to rule on the patentability of computer programs. In Parker v.
Flook,433 the computer program at issue was not the whole of the process claimed to be patentable, but only the novel element of that process. For many years, those who operated catalytic converters had
been measuring operating conditions such as temperature, pressure,
and flow rates in order to calculate "alarm limits" which indicated
whether conditions within the converter were abnormal or dangerous
and required corrective actions. 434 Using a basic algorithm already in
existence, Flook had written a computer program which allowed the
alarm limits to be continuously updated. 4 35 The Supreme Court
thought Flook to be seeking, as Benson had, a patent on a mathemati430. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
431. Id at 71-72.
432. See, e.g., Note, Protection of ComputerPrograms.-Resurrection ofthe Standara 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 333 (1974).
433. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
434. Id at 585.
435. Id at 585-86.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:663

cal formula, and hence rejected his claim as unpatentable. 436 Although
the Supreme Court did not say that processes involving computer programs were not patentable, its holding was discouraging for those who
thought such protection desirable.
Only three years later, in Diamondv. Diehr,437 the Supreme Court
was again faced with a process patent claim involving a computer program. Diehr had sought a patent on a process for curing rubber, the
novel element of which was a computer program that permitted continuous monitoring and updating of information about conditions within
the rubber mold and that signaled when the mold should be opened.
The process produced perfectly cured rubber. Prior to Diehr's process,
rubber was often improperly cured.438 This invention thus solved a
long-standing industry problem. Because the process, "when considered as a whole, [was] performing a function [of the sort] which the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an
article to a different state or thing),"4 39 the Supreme Court held that
Diehr had recited a patentable claim. This case was hailed as a significant victory for the patentability of programs. 40 And yet it did not
hold that a program in itself could be patentable as a process.
The Supreme Court has not been the only court to struggle with
fashioning a standard for reviewing the patentability of computer programs. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has reviewed many
such claims in recent years and has made numerous efforts to refine the
standard. In re Freeman441 involved a typesetting process which utilized a computer program. 442 The court said it would use a two-step
test to determine whether the process claimed in a patent application
and involving a computer program could be considered to be subject
matter covered by the patent statute. The first step was to determine
whether the claim directly or indirectly recited an "algorithm" in the
sense used in Benson. The second step was to assess whether granting a
patent on the claim in its entirety would wholly preempt use of that
algorithm. Only if the claim attempted to preempt entirely the right to
use the algorithm would there be a statutory subject matter problem
436. Id at 594-95.

437. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
438. Id at 192.

439. Id
440. See, e.g., Nimtz, Diamond v. Diehr: A Turning Point, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
LJ.267 (1981).
441. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

442. Id at 1238. In other words, the computer program made the computer into a typesetting
machine.
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with patentability. 443 This seemed to give patent applicants two ways
of avoiding the Benson/Flook abyss-one by carefully drafting the pat-

ent application so that it did not appear to recite an algorithm, and the
other by claiming the right to exclusive use of the algorithm only as to

specific applications or specific machines.
The Freemantest was modified somewhat by In re Walter.4 " Wal-

ter involved a program for seismic testing and surveying, which the
court held to be nonpatentable subject matter. The court elaborated on
the second step of the Freeman test:
If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a
specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit
claim steps (in process claims), .

.

. the claim passes muster under

§ 101. If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented
and solved by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and
Flook, and is not applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no amount of post-solution activity will render the claim
statutory; nor is it saved by a preamble merely reciting the field of
use of the mathematical algorithm. 44 5

Walter seems to be trying to make a distinction between mathematical
algorithms and nonmathematical algorithms, a distinction any computer scientist would find absurd.44 6 Despite this, the court has continued to use or refine this test in making patentability decisions. 44 7 Its
attempts at refinement have made no discernible progress toward

clarity.
If one tried to discern a pattern in the morass of these cases, one

would be led to conclude that no matter how inventive a program may
be, unless it is part of an apparatus or process of a sort traditionally
regarded as patentable, and unless it brings about a new way of physi443. Id at 1245.
444. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
445. Id at 767.
446. See, e.g., Gemignani, Legal Protectionof Software: A Survey, in ADVANCES IN COM-

PUTERS 19-20 (M. Yovits ed. 1983) (discussing the artificiality of a distinction between "mathematical" and "nonmathematical" algorithms); see also Davidson, supra note 380, at 353-54
(criticizing C.C.P.A.'s "undue fixation" on algorithms).
447. See, e.g., In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (reversing rejection of patent claims
relating to a compiler program; discusses Freeman and Walter and concepts of "nonmathematical
algorithms"); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that certain claims in patent
application involving computer program used in computerized axial tomograghy (CAT scan)
machine which related to reduction of X-ray exposure and improvement of images were patentable subject matter, while other claims involving mathematical algorithms were not patentable subject matter, discussing Freeman and Walter and reinterpreting Walter in light of Diehr); In re
Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that a method of seismic exploration involving
a computer program was patentable subject matter; distinguishing Walter by focusing on the "process of converting one physical thing into another physical thing").
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cally transforming something from one state to another, it is unlikely
that the program will be found patentable. In re Meyer 448 is an example of a program denied patentability because it represented only a
mental process and was not applied to physical elements or process
steps. 44 9 In other words, it lacked the transformation characteristic.
Meyer had developed an "expert system" program to aid neurologists
in making diagnoses of patients based on case history and test data fed
into the program. This program paralleled the thought processes of the
physician but was designed to be more consistent, more thorough, more
reliable, and faster than a physician might be. A great many computer
programs which are exceedingly complicated and expensive to develop
and refine and which are very valuable to users are precisely of the sort
illustrated in Meyer. These programs parallel human thought
processes-but without the ignorance, errors, omissions, and distortions to which the human mind is so often subject. Yet patent law will
not protect them.
C. PerceivedLimitations of Trade Secret Law.
Because secrecy is so important to software authors and vendors,
one might think trade secret law would offer the best form of protection
for computer programs. It is indeed the favored form of protection at
0
the moment.45
The most serious limitation on the effectiveness of trade secret law
as a form of protection for computer programs is that once the program
has been sold without a restrictive agreement requiring maintenance of
secrecy, anyone who-without engaging in industrial espionage-can
obtain and replicate it can do so without incurring liability for stealing
a trade secret.45 With programs on tapes, disks, and chips, replication
is not only possible but easy, and one need not understand the programs to copy them.452 One way to attempt to protect computer programs as trade secrets is to enter into restrictive licensing agreements
instead of selling them outright. 453 The restrictions in such a licensing
448. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
449. Id at 796.
450. See, e.g., Mantle, supra note 413, at § 1-3 ("Despite Diehr,at present (and for the foreseeable future) protection of software under trade secret principles in most instances will be more
significant (and more predictable) than copyright or patent protection."); see also L. GASAWAY &
M. MURPHY, supranote 428, at 69; Goldberg, supra note 413, at 68; Stem, supra note 164, at 438.
451. See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983) (rejecting trade secret claim for videogame program because plaintiff made no effort to restrict access
to the encoded program).
452. Id at 1476.
453. See, e.g., Gilbume, A PracticalApproach to the CoordinatedUse of Copyright and Trade
Secret Protectionfor Licensing or Selling Software, COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 95, at
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agreement would be aimed at establishing procedures for keeping the
secrets secret and out of the hands of persons other than the licensee.

The law will usually protect those who make reasonable efforts to keep
their secrets secure. 454 But what a reasonable effort to maintain secrecy
is depends on the circumstances. 4 55 Given that "hacking" to gain im-

proper access to computer systems is a common sport among young

computer enthusiasts, 4 56 the standards for maintaining trade secrecy as
to computer programs may be higher than for other types of works.
There are several other problems with restrictive agreements as a

way to maintain trade secret protection. One is that some potential
purchasers may be unwilling to enter into these restrictive agree-

ments. 457 Another is that it is not always possible for the licensee to do
the kind of monitoring of access and of user conduct that may be necessary to preserve the secrecy. 458 Such monitoring is expensive and the

user may not be willing to bear those costs. Another problem is that if
the secret is uncovered and transferred to one who takes without
knowledge of the trade secret rights of the licensor, there may be no
4 59
effective remedy for the wronged party against the good faith user.
Still another is that restrictive agreements do not guard against the ma-

departure from the firm trying to
jor threat to trade secrecy--employee
4 60
maintain the secret.
Trade secret law is also problematic as a form of protection because of its common law roots. 46 1 The content of trade secret law var-

ies somewhat from state to state. 462 The lack of uniformity in trade

secret law may be particularly troublesome to those who market their

computer programs nationally. The possibility of some preemption of
§ IV; Gilbume & Johnston, Trade Secret Protectionfor Software Generally andIn the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER LAW J. 211, 224-27 (1982).
454. 1 R. MILGRIM, MILORIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.04 (1982).
455. Id at §§ 2.04, 2.07.
456. See, e.g., TrialandErrorby IntrudersLedto Entry Into Computers,N.Y. Times, Aug. 23,
1983, at Al, col. 5; ComputerTampering Reportedby Hospital,N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1983, at A33,
col. 4.
457. See, e.g., Gilbume, supra note 453, at § IV-7.
458. See, e.g., Gilbume & Johnston, supranote 453, at 221-27 (recommending elaborate security procedures for maintaining program secrecy); see generally 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS,
supra note 454, at §§ 2.04, 2.05 (concerning loss of secrecy).
459. See I MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supranote 454, at § 5.04[2]; Stem, supranote 164, at
438.
460. See, e.g., GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); BPI Systems, Inc. v.
Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981). See also Gilbume & Johnston, supra note 453, at 22224, 238-54.
461. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18, discussedsupra note 152.
462. See, e.g., Stern, supranote 164, at 438. Lack of uniformity in trade secret law was one of
the reasons CONTU rejected trade secret law in favor of copyright for computer programs. See
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
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state trade secret law by copyright law as to computer programs is another real danger. 463 So trade secrecy law too has serious limitations as
a form of legal protection.
VI.

THE ALTERNATIVES:

CONVERT COPYRIGHT TO GENERAL

MISAPPROPRIATION LAW, MODIFY COPYRIGHT TO MAKE
EXCEPTIONS FOR MACHINE CODE, OR DEVELOP
A NEW FORM OF PROTECTION FOR
THIS SPECIAL KIND OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Several alternatives are available to resolve the dilemma presented
by machine-readable computer programs that, as the previous discussion has shown, do not fit well into the existing intellectual property
structure. One is to accept the conversion of copyright to a general
misappropriation law. This approach would involve abandoning both
disclosure as a goal of copyright law and the rule that the "utility" of a
work bars protection under copyright law. It would also mean that
copyright would take over many of the functions of trade secret and
patent law. One would, of course, have to be prepared to live with the
consequences of this decision, not only with respect to computer programs, but for other types of copyrightable subject matter as well. Television sets and airplane wings would be copyrightable too if the utility
objection were abandoned. The constitutionality of such a development is questionable, but Congress may decide it is willing to test the
issue.
A less drastic but more complicated option would be to do some
"patch-up" work on the copyright law to make exceptions to the traditional copyright rules which would be applicable only to programs in
machine-readable form. To heal the wound to copyright principles,
one might require that the source code be filed with the Copyright Office for works published in machine-readable form. One might also
revise the copyright statute to restrict the category of utilitarian works
that are copyrightable to machine-readable forms of computer programs. Although requiring disclosure of source code might remove one
constitutional problem, the constitutional problem with protecting utilitarian works would remain even with this more limited surgery upon
copyright law.
A preferable alternative is to devise a separate category of protection for computer programs in machine-readable form, one more appropriate for the specific type of intellectual property that programs are
and more responsive to the specific needs of the industry that produces
463. See generally Luccarelli, supra note 230.
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This latter alternative would have the advantage of allowing the
principles of copyright law to be left intact, and would avoid the constitutional problems presented by the other two alternatives. A new form
of protection could draw on copyright concepts to the extent they were
helpful, and discard those that were not. Some concepts could also be
taken from patent law.465 Some concepts found in neither law but apit.464

propriate to the subject matter could be allowed to develop.
While this might seem to be a radical solution, one must recognize

that both patent and copyright law have been legal responses to historical change and to new phases in technological developments. 466 Because many believe that current developments in the computer and

other communications technology fields are of at least the same level of
historical importance as the Industrial Revolution, 4 67 the creation of a

new form of protection appropriate to this new phase of technology is
worth considering seriously. That the existing forms of law do not satisfy the industry's needs reinforces the value of such a consideration.

Unfortunately, it may be necessary to have another commission
empaneled to propose the new form of legal protection for machine464. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 413, at 70 ("Computer software surely is different from
other forms of intellectual and industrial property, and a new legal mechanism must be devised to
protect it. The most desirable form of protection is one of relatively short duration which limits
the need for extensive disclosure, which defines the scope of coverage with precision, and which
can be enforced effectively."); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp.
775 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (acknowledging that copyright law may not be the most appropriate form of
protection for computer programs, but indicating that it is up to Congress to develop a new law);
Galbi, Proposalfor New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 260 (1970), Stem, supra note 413, at 222 ("Software is clearly different enough and important enough to justify its own system of legislative protection.").
465. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 413, at 69 ("Many of the new suggestions and proposals
being made for software protection, except for those which urge merely a strengthening of the
status quo,. . . seem to be based on the realization that a level of protection less than patents and
greater than statutory copyright is needed."). The Goldberg article also contains a discussion of an
IBM software protection proposal that borrowed some concepts from patent and some from copyright law and added some new features. Id at 70.
466. As noted supra note 27 and accompanying text, the first copyright law was adopted to
deal with the "piracy" that the invention of the printing press made possible. See also supranote
28 and accompanying text.
Indeed, Congress has just recently recognized a new form of legal protection for computer
chip designs precisely because neither patent nor copyright alone was satisfactory for this type of
subject matter. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 4. The new protection is a hybrid of
patent and copyright law, see supranote 350, and represents "a new form of intellectual property,"
the first such new form created by federal statute since the Trademark Act of 1881, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 10, 1984, at A41, col. 1. (quoting Richard H. Stem, an attorney representing the semiconductor industry); see also 130 CONG. REC. HI 1,610-11 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier on the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984).
467. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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readable forms of programs.468 Congress will be understandably reluctant to set up another commission to study this matter. After all, it has
already done this once. However, the last commission that studied the
issue simply did not have the expertise necessary to make the best decision on the matter.469 There should be computer scientists, professional programmers, software industry and hardware industry
representatives, and large and small users of computer systems on the
commission studying and recommending the kind of legal protection
computer programs in machine-readable form ought to have.4 70
Among the reasons to have computer scientists on such a commission is that they will understand not only present but also past and
probable future developments in this rapidly changing field, and they
are likely to be the most concerned about the need to ensure adequate
disclosure of program ideas in order to advance the science. They will
also tend to take a longer range view of the issues. The software industry, the primary target of piracy, has, of course, the most immediate
stake in the controversy. Its representatives also have strong views
about what the law ought to protect. Their views on the need to minimize disclosure to give adequate protection to programs should be
heard. Hardware manufacturers have an interest in legal protection for
machine-readable versions of programs for two reasons: First, they
often produce machine-readable programs, namely, microcode and operating systems, for their machines; and second, they have some interest in minimizing restrictions on software so that their machines can
more readily be used for a wide range of purposes. Users of programs,
whether of highly complex or more simple systems, may have their own
concerns about disclosure of program details and about the length and
scope of legal protection for programs, and those concerns have not
thus far been attended to.
This author firmly believes that it would be best for a commission
of computer program experts to draft a new form of intellectual property law for machine-readable programs, and makes the following sug468. The last commission limited its consideration of forms of protection to those already in
existence. This is understandable in view of the apparent congressional directive to determine if

copyright was appropriate as a form of protection for programs.
469. See supranotes 137-39 and accompanying text.
470. See, for example, Stem, supranote 413, at 216: "Lawyers and other amateurs have in the
past pontificated on the nature of software and on such issues as whether its 'essential character'
(and therefore the appropriate system of protection) is more like that of the subject matter of
patents or copyrights. This is an interesting academic and metaphysical inquiry. Perhaps the time
has come for those in the software industry to see whether they can make more sense of the
matter." Obviously, it would also be helpful to have someone with expertise in intellectual property law to give guidance to those whose expertise lies in computer-related fields.
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gestions for such a group's consideration.471 First, there should be a
disclosure requirement imposed on one who receives federal protection
for a machine-readable version of a program. Disclosure as a quid pro
quo for the granting of a federal monopoly right is an essential part of
the federal intellectual property scheme. 472 A strong argument can be
made that the Constitution requires disclosure as a prerequisite to the
granting of federal protection, for it is only by disclosure of creative
ideas that science and the useful arts will be fostered and progress in
473
them assured.
What form such a disclosure requirement ought to take474 and

how soon any disclosure document ought to be made available to the
public 4 75 are

issues likely to generate considerable controversy. The

software industry can be expected to argue strongly for minimal disclosure and for as much delay as possible in making the disclosure docu-

ments available to the public. Scientists and users can be expected to
argue for maximum disclosure and no delay. On this issue, some rea-

sonable compromise should be possible.
Second, there should also be a requirement that prompt applica-

tion be made in order for machine-readable programs to be eligible for
federal protection. Patent law requires an inventor who wants a patent
to file a patent application within one year of commencement of
471. Although the author does not think it necessary to dwell on the need for a uniform national system of protection or on the desirability of a registration process similar to those developed for patent and copyright, she regards these as basic elements of a new form of protection.
The author agrees with CONTU that the need for uniformity in the law makes a federal system of
protection the most desirable option. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
472. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
473. See supranotes 190-200 and accompanying text. One might argue that much of the progress made thus far in the programming field is attributable to the fact that there has been relatively widespread dissemination of program ideas, especially in academic circles. Even CONTU
recognized the undesirability of secrecy for computer programs from the standpoint of furthering
scientific endeavors. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 17-18; see also supranotes 27377 and accompanying text.
474. One might require a programmer to file with a federal office one or more copies of the
full text of the source code, or of a flow chart of the program, or of some other commonly prepared document such as an internal specification document. One might also adopt a kind of
patent-based model which could simply require a description of the algorithm of the program and
its implementation in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to develop a comparable
program. See supranotes 241-44 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supranote 413, at 70
(discussing IBM's software protection proposal, which would have required disclosure of a
description of the concept of a program at the time of registration; the proposal would have required complete disclosure of the program upon expiration of the term of protection). As in patent law, failure to make adequate disclosure should be considered a fraud on the federal
registration office and a basis for invalidation of the right. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
475. Even if the Constitution were interpreted to require that disclosure be made, it would not
necessarily require immediate disclosure. See supra note 474.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:663

nonexperimental use of the invention. 476 One who fails to file

promptly is barred from obtaining patent protection, although trade
secret protection remains available to the extent the subject matter can
be kept secret.477 The same policy considerations that make this rule
appropriate for patent law make it appropriate for whatever intellectual property law is devised to cover machine-readable computer

programs.
Third, in view of the utilitarian character of machine-readable
programs, the length of legal protection available for them should be
considerably less than the seventy-five years from the date of publication that now obtains for corporate copyright owners. 478 Patent protection, the form of federal legal protection ordinarily applied to
utilitarian works, is less than one-quarter this length. The duration of

the patent law monopoly has long been deemed a reward to inventors
sufficient to stimulate invention. 479 Moreover, outside the United

States, many proposals for software protection that are now under serious consideration would grant much shorter periods of legal protection
for computer programs than the present American copyright duration.4 80 Although the author does not favor the proposal that would
extend copyright protection to computer chip designs, she would note
that even this proposal would limit such copyright protection to ten
years. 48' That the commercial life of most programs seems to be quite

476. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
477. Id; see also supranotes 255-56 and accompanying text.
478. See supranotes 325-26 and accompanying text. See also supranote 201 and accompanying text regarding the argument that seventy-five years is too long a period of protection, given the
present lack of disclosure of the programs.
479. The patent term has been seventeen years in duration since 1861. See CHIsuM ON PATENTS, supra note 328, at § 16.04[l]. It is worth probing further the reasons why it may be desirable
to have a shorter term of legal protection than seventy-five years. Granting a monopoly right to
the creator of a utilitarian work (such as a computer program) means that society is allowing the
creator to restrict production of that useful item and to keep prices at higher levels than would
obtain if free competition were allowed as to that subject matter. The law in free enterprise economies generally frowns on such restrictions. Because of the need for some rewards to those who
create in order to stimulate them to be creative, society has been willing to compromise and grant
exclusive rights to creators-but onlyfor limitedperiods. Granting exclusive rights for all time or
for a very long time not only is not needed to stimulate the creative work in the first place, but
may in fact be counterproductive.
480. A proposal seriously being considered in Japan would limit software protection to fifteen
years. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at 33, cols. 5 & 6. Even the World Intellectual Property
Organization Model Provisions for software would limit the period of protection to 20 years. See
Abel, World-Wide Protection of Computer Software: An Analysis of the WIPO Draft Proposal,2
N.Y.L.S. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 278, 307-08, 315 (1981).
481. See supra notes 325, 350-53 and accompanying text; see also H.R. 2985, 98th Cong., 1st
Seass. (1983) (would amend the copyright law to grant ten years of copyright protection to ornamental designs for useful articles); 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 638 (July 21,
1983) 246, 246.
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short4 82 is yet another reason for making the length of protection considerably shorter than that which copyright now provides.
Fourth, serious consideration ought to be given to granting some
legal protection to innovative ideas embodied in programs that cannot
now be protected by patent because they are mathematical formulas or
other sets of "mental steps," 483 assuming that such protection would be
constitutional. 484 The industry's dissatisfaction with existing legal
forms of protection is at least partly due to a perceived "gap" in protection. 48 5 Granting some, perhaps more limited, period-say, three or
five years--of protection for innovative algorithms or other ideas embodied in programs might make the industry more satisfied with the
law, and thus perhaps more willing to disclose its ideas in writings
486
describing the programs.
Fifth, careful thought must be given to how clear lines demarcating the new form of intellectual property law from both patent and
copyright can be drawn. It will be easier to do this vis-a-vis copyright
law than vis-a-vis patent law. With respect to copyright, one could say
that copyright protection should be available for audio, visual, or audiovisual displays produced by computer programs, and for data bases
stored on computers-regardless of whether the data base is a compilation of facts, a novel, or a set of images or sounds-to the extent that
these works would qualify for copyright protection if made available in
more traditional "hard-copy" form. Copyright protection should also
be available for the "output" of a computer, to the extent the output
would otherwise qualify as an original work of authorship and is nonutilitarian in the copyright sense. Copyright protection should also be
available for source code, flow charts, and other written depictions of
program ideas, although subject to the rule of Baker v. Selden that the
487
art the source code describes is not protected by the copyright.
Copyright protection should not, however, be available for machinereadable forms of programs, and it should not be considered an in482. See, eg., Seneker & Pearl, supranote 25, at 94; Note, InternationalCopyrightLawApplied
to Computer Programs,in the United States and France, 14 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 105, 126 (1982)
(marketable life span of most programs is ten to fifteen years).
483. See supra notes 429-49 and accompanying text.
484. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (discussion of cases that question
whether it is constitutionally permissible to grant intellectual property rights in abstract intellectual concepts).
485. See supra notes 419 & 428 and accompanying text.
486. One author has suggested that the West German "petty patent" concept might be
adapted to deal with some of the deficiencies of American patent and copyright law. See Note,
Petty Patentsin the FederalRepublic of Germany: A Solution to the Problem of ComputerSoftware
Protection?, 8 Sw. L. J. 888 (1976). Perhaps this concept could be used to protect algorithms.
487. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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fringement of copyright to convert source to machine-readable code
any more than it is an infringement of a copyright in blueprints to
make a house described by the blueprints. Instead, there should be a
separate form of legal protection for machine-readable forms of programs. Such a law might consider conversion of copyrighted source
code to a machine-executable form to be an infringement of the new
legal right. Upon expiration of federal protection for the machinereadable forms of programs, it should be permissible for anyone to
convert even a copyrighted source code into an executable form. 488 A

copyright in the written text of the source code could continue to protect against unauthorized reproduction of the source code in written
text form even after the expiration of the machine-readable program
right.
With respect to patent law, one might say that to the extent a
programmer thinks he has developed a computer program which can
be successfully claimed to be part of a patentable process, and would
prefer to obtain a patent for the process rather than to seek protection
for the program under the new legal scheme, he should be able to
choose either form of legal protection. 489 The same subject matter,
however, should not be covered by more than one intellectual property
right. One problem with separating patent law and a new legal form of
protection for computer programs derives from the potential interchangeability of program and machine. 490 It is always possible to build
a completely hardwired machine to do whatever task a program for a
universal machine can do. It may also be difficult to demarcate the
patent realm from that of a new legal scheme if the latter provides protection for innovative but nonpatentable ideas. Although these
problems may be difficult, they do not seem inherently unresolvable.
Sixth, the new commission should design a system of protection
capable of adapting to foreseeable technological changes. In 1978,
CONTU stated, "In the event that future technology permits programs
488. This would be similar to the Copyright Office rule of not accepting for copyright registration any documentation that has been submitted to the Patent Office as part of a patent application as to which a patent has issued. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1984).
489. It also ought to be possible for a programmer to opt for trade secrecy law as an alternative to patent law. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. At the very least, one would have to decide whether it would infringe the new property right for someone to build a hardwired machine
to do that which the protected program did. It would be necessary to decide also whether a
program implementing a function (in conjunction with a computer) would infringe a patent on a
machine that performs this function without a program. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the
manner of implementation of the idea may be sufficiently different so as not to infringe a patent
on the machine. See I CHISUM ON PATENTS, supranote 328, at § 18.04; but see Davidson, stpra
note 380, at 354-55.
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to be stated orally for direct input to a computer through auditory sensing devices ... difficult questions will arise. '4 91 CONTU did not say
what those questions were, let alone how they should be resolved. But
now that this technology is within reach, 492 a commission recommending a law for protection of programs should attempt to draft a law
that can incorporate this as well as other foreseeable developments.
Despite agreement with copyright defendants' arguments concerning the conceptual problems of applying copyright principles to
machine-readable forms of computer programs, the author does not
champion the cause of software pirates. Until such time as a new form
of protection can be enacted, courts should continue to protect
machine-readable computer programs from piracy by application of
such common law tort doctrines as misappropriation, unfair competition, or trade secret law. 493 Congress might also pass an interim measure establishing a federal cause of action for computer program
misappropriation until a new intellectual property regime can be drawn
up and adopted.
We should not be "locked" into thinking of copyright, patent,
trade secret, and common law misappropriation as the only possible
forms of legal protection for programs. Our short history of attempting
to fit computer programs into the established categories has proven unsatisfactory. A more satisfactory solution can be devised and can be
made to work.

491. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
492. See, e.g., FEIGENBAUM, supra note 32, at 119, 129. It may also soon be possible to program a machine, such as a robot, not through the use of words, but through a physical demonstration of the task to be performed. For example, a human hand might take a robot's hand through
a series of steps necessary to tighten a bolt and thereby "program" it. See generally G. DODD & L.
RosSOL, COMPUTER VISION & SENSOR BASED ROBOTS (1979). There is also the possibility of
storing programs in some media other than silicon chips, e.g., magnetic bubble memories. See
Boraiko, supranote 32, at 444.
493. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.

